

SOME PROBLEMS OF SANSKRIT POETICS

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IN MEMORIAM

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THE PROBLEM OF POETIC EXPRESSION¹

One of the fundamental problems of Sanskrit Poetics as indeed of all Poetics is the problem of the content and expression of Poetry. From the beginning of the discipline this is recognised and the parts of language namely the *Śabda* and *Artha* word and sense or technically the *Vacaka* and *Vācya* the expressor and the expressed had already been distinguished by grammatical and philosophical speculation as the medium of linguistic expression. The essential element of all literature as of all language therefore is said to consist of the material of word and sense and the earliest definitions of Poetry naturally start in terms of *Śabda* and *Artha*. So long as Poetry is a kind of expression conveyed through the medium of language this is inevitable. Accordingly Bhamaha defines Poetry as *śabdārthan sahitam* *kavyam* which is followed by Rudrata's more general statement *śabdārthan kavyam* while Dandin describes the body of Poetry as *vyavacchinna padavali* and Vamana speaks of *śabda-pada-ratana* as its essence. Thus the *Śabda* and *Artha* united together and not in themselves constitute Poetry and all later writers more or less accept this position of the *Sahitya* or unity of *Śabda* and *Artha* as the starting point. The term *Sahitya* implies that *Śabda* and *Artha* are inseparable and go together. Kuntaka describes this *Sahitya* as *Anyana anatinkatva* or *Paraspara spardhā*.

1 Lectures delivered by invitation at the University of Bombay in 1943. The approach is from the standpoint of modern Aesthetic, and therefore it is different from that of my *Sanskrit Poetics* which gives only a descriptive-historical treatment. First printed in *New Indian Antiquary* x no. 13—Much of the matter of this monograph the topics being overlapping is taken over from the author's *Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetics* which was delivered as lectures at Annamalai University in December 1935 and printed in the *Dacca University Studies* vol. i. This last monograph, therefore is not reprinted in this volume.

but Kālidāsa conveys it more beautifully by his well known comparison of Poetry to Ardhamañsvara in which Parvatī is Vac or Śabda and Paramesvara is Artha. That the poets and not only the theorists were aware of this idea is also clear from Magha's declaration that the discerning poet pays equal regard to Śabda and Artha in the well known line *śabdārthan sat kāmā nā dhayā n vidhāt apekṣate*.

This concept of the Sahitya of Śabda and Artha from which literature itself came to take the designation of Sahitya is not new but it had a grammatical origin. It means the general grammatical and logical relation between word and sense in all linguistic expression and did not at first connote any special poetic relation between the two. We know that like Sanskrit Grammar Sanskrit Poetics started as an empirical and normative discipline and since from the very beginning Poetics accepted the authority of the older science of Grammar to which it was closely related the grammatical speculations on speech in general not only prompted its speculations on poetic speech but also influenced its method and outlook. It is no wonder therefore that both Bhamaha and Vamana two of the earliest formulators of poetic theory devote whole sections of their works to the question of grammatical correctness and the grammatical analysis of word and sense came to possess an important place in rhetorical speculation. As set forth by the grammarians the Śabdārtha or Vācaka Vācya sambandha was taken to comprehend the consideration of the structure and variety of the Vācaka of the syntactic import of a succession of Vācakas in a Vācya and of the logicity of the expressed idea in other words Pada Vākya and Pramāṇa are comprehended in all expression and constituted the original meaning of Sahitya.

But it is also perceived that even though grammatical correctness or logical consistency characterises speech in general this is not enough for poetic speech. What then is Sahitya from the standpoint of Poetics? It is true that

Bhamaha's definition *śabdārthan sahitau kavyam* implies that neither Śabda nor Artha alone is Poetry but both must be united together. In Poetry there is no question of the superiority of the one or the other or of the one being Bahya and the other Abhyantara or as Bhartrhari puts it of the Artha being the Vivarta of Śabda. But mere Sahitya of Śabda and Artha is not Poetry, it is a grammatical fact common to all speech to the utterances of ordinary life of Śāstra of Akhyana as well as of Poetry. It is therefore realised that this Sahitya of Poetry must be of a special kind so that the special charm of poetic speech which distinguishes it from ordinary speech can be properly explained. It cannot be missed that Śabda and Artha in their unity bring about a special beauty in Poetry which is not found elsewhere. Poetry is not merely linguistic expression but beautiful expression. In other words it came to be recognised that the Sahitya of Śabda and Artha in Poetry must have a Viśeṣa or speciality. Hence Vāmana speaks of Viśiṣṭa pada racana and Kuntaka declares more clearly that *visiṣṭam eva sahitam abhipretam* while Samudrabandha in summarising the views of different schools of Poetics is emphatic that *the viśiṣṭa śabdārthan kavyam*. The question of deciding what this Viśeṣa is and how it is realised thus becomes the main problem of Poetics.

Some theorists approach the problem from the stand point of outward expression and declare the Viśeṣa to be the Dharma of Śabda and Artha which could be analysed into categories of Lakṣaṇa Alaṅkāra or Guṇa. Some dive deeper into the content and maintain that it is the poet's peculiar way the work of his poetic imagination the Kavi vyāpāra which is the Viśeṣa whether it takes the form of Ukti Bhaṇati Bhoga or Vyāṅjana. But it is admitted on all hands that the Sahitya which by its Viśeṣa makes ordinary Śabdārtha into poetic Śabdārtha is not the sum total of grammatical and logical relation but indicates a certain poetic relation between the two. It is the magical quality

pertaining to words and ideas springing from the imaginative power of the poet which makes ordinary utterance with its Pada Vākya and Pramāṇa into the charming utterance of Poetry. The Sāhitya therefore is a certain charming commensurateness between content and expression and becomes synonymous with Poetry.

Exactly when and how the term Sāhitya came to be employed for Poetry in this technical sense we do not know but the concept is acknowledged from the very beginning. We find however that it is no longer a grammatical but a poetical concept in Rājasekhara who mentions Sāhitya and Sāhitya vidyā as Poetry and Poetics although Rājasekhara in his allegorical description does not bring out the theoretical implications of the idea. Among the theorists the credit of divesting Sāhitya for the first time of its stirring grammatical associations and defining it clearly as a poetic quality imparted by the imagination of the poet belongs to Kuntaka.

The earlier speculations on the subject are vague and insufficient but several tentative approaches appear to have been made. One of the earliest was through the idea of Sayya to which Bana refers and for which the *Agnipurāṇa* appears to employ the term *Mudra* with a similar connotation. The Sayya is described as the repose of word and sense in their mutual favourableness like the repose of the body in bed. The idea of Sāhitya is also recognised in what is called the *Maitri* or mutual friendship of verbal and ideal elements of Poetry which is apparently a variation of *Kāṇḍaśā*'s more perfect conjugal metaphor. The theory however is not elaborated but only feebly and incoherently voiced here and there and it is also strange that the Sayya is sometimes taken as a mere verbal excellence but at the same time it rightly insists upon what is called inevitability of words and ideas as the foundation of poetic expression. The older views on Pāka mentioned by Vāmana appear to make a similar approach but greater uncertainty and confusion prevail. The term Pāka meaning literally

ripeness or maturity is employed by Vamana with reference to the delightful effect of what he calls Śabda paka or maturity of words resulting from what he considers to be the best mode of diction namely the Vaidarbhi Riti. He describes Śabda paka as that : attaining which the excellence of a word quickens and in which the unreal appears as real. This description would lead one to believe that Vamana's Śabda paka is nothing more than met- verbal proficiency (Śabda vyutpatti) in which sense some later writers would like to take the term. But Vamana further explains that the Śabda paka occurs when the words are so chosen that they cannot bear an exchange of synonym. It is clear that this view makes Paka almost identical in its connotation with Sayya. We find therefore that some later writers formulate Śabda paka as the perfect fitness of word and its sense : but in conformity with the prevailing view about the essentiality of Rasa they speak rather vaguely of Artha paka or maturity of sense of various kinds brought about by the different taste of different sentiments. Rāja śekhara's name compilation of earlier views on the subject is interesting and deserves reference as illustrating how undecided aesthetic ideas were and how inconstant the use of aesthetic terminology. The passage runs thus. The Ācāryas ask : what is Paka? Maṅgala says : it is maturity (Parinama). What again is maturity? ask the Ācāryas. Maṅgala replies : it is the skill in the use of noun and verbs. Hence it is verbal excellence (Saśabdya). The Paka is fixedness in the application of words say the Ācāryas. It is said [by Vamana : 3.15] "The insertion and deletion of words occur so long as there is uncertainty in the mind : when the fixity of words is established the composition is successful. So the followers of Vamana say. The Paka is the aversion of words to alteration by means of synonyms. Therefore it is said [by Vamana loc. cit.] The specialists in the propriety of words have called that Śabda paka in which the words abandon the capability of being exchanged (by

less, the whole discussion furnishes interesting evidence of an early tentative attempt to explain the essential character of poetic expression

This brings us to the first systematic approach to the problem made by the so-called *Alaṅkāra* School of Bhāmaha. Udbhata and Rudraja from which starts the earliest known formulation of a definite theory of poetic expression. Although as a theory of expression the *Ālaṅkārika* view was subsequently discarded for its insufficiency, the concept of *Alaṅkāra* persisted and its utility was acknowledged throughout the history of Sanskrit Poetics. It is, therefore, important to consider and understand clearly the concept of *Alaṅkāra* in its various aspects as the *Viśeṣa* or speciality of the *Śabda* and *Artha*.

known with the term *Alamkāra*. As a collective designation, it doubtless denotes the poetic figures as such but it also connotes a deviating strongness of expression which underlies all individual poetic figures and forms their distinguishing characteristic. It is thus the fundamental principle of figurative expression, but since Bhamaha regards the figurative expression to be the only proper expression of Poetry the *Vakrokti* becomes the distinguishing characteristic of poetic expression and the essential principle of Poetry itself. Bhamaha does not define *Vakrokti* which term like the term *Alamkāra* was perhaps already traditionally established but in speaking of it in connection with the figure *Atisayokti* he perhaps implies in it the *lokatikranta gōṣṭhāḥ* which he expressly mentions as a characteristic of *Atisayokti*. As explained by Abhinavagupta and developed by Kuntaka the qualification perhaps implies a heightened form of expression, a certain imaginative quality which constitutes a poetic figure and as such distinguishes poetic speech from the matter of fact speech of everyday life. All poetic expression involves some kind of expressional deviation which constitutes its charm. Bhamaha's *Vakrokti* signifies this expressional deviation proper to Poetry, but since examining the whole field of poetic expression Bhamaha finds the *Alamkāra* or poetic figure omnipresent in it as a means of realising this deviation his *Vakrokti* becomes the essential principle of an *Alamkāra* and necessarily of Poetry itself.

Although Dandin uses the term *Vakrokti* only once in a significant passage as a collective designation of individual *Alamkāras* or poetic figures and thus far agrees with Bhamaha he does not yet apply it to the essential poetic quality underlying an individual poetic figure or individual *Alamkāra*. On the other hand he applies the term *Alamkāra* itself generically to the attribute apparently of word and sense which produces beauty in Poetry the *Kāvya-sobhakara Dharma* of *Śabda* and *Artha*. Even though he does not define the term *Kāvya-sobha* or poetic beauty he agrees with

Bhāmaha that the entire Vāṇmāyā or poetic speech is comprehended by Vakrokti or figurative expression, with the only exception of the first or primary figure the so called Svabhāvokti or natural description. The reservation made with regard to Svabhāvokti is not found in Bhāmaha. It cannot be said that, like Kuntaka, Bhāmaha entirely rejects it, he mentions it with the guarded remark *in kecit prachakate*. In so far as natural description involves strikingness of expression, it would be admissible but Bhāmaha would not then consider it separately it would be included in the scope of his Vakrokti as figurative expression.¹

Although Dandin would employ the term Alankāra as the essential poetic attribute of Śabda and Artha and the beautifying principle of poetic expression, he would not take the individual Alankāras or poetic figures as the sole or essential means of the beautifying principle. He elaborates a theory of two modes (Bhāga) or kinds of poetic diction which he calls respectively Vācārtha and Gauda and finds that the so called excellences or Gunas (like sweetness or lucidity) form their essence. Dandin therefore employs the generic term Alankāra meaning poetic embellishment to designate both the excellences or Gunas on the one hand and the specific poetic figures on the other commonly known as Alankāras and admitted as such by Bhāmaha. The concept of Guna is not new having been mentioned by Bharata but it is considered in a new context, it is, however,

1 Kuntaka rejects the figure Svabhāvokti on the ground that it consists of mere unadorned description of physical objects. But the poetic intuition of a physical fact even if unadorned being not the same as a matter-of-fact statement or description Dandin and others rightly take it into account. We have shown elsewhere (in the article entitled Bhāmaha's Views on Gunas) that both Bhāmaha and Dandin betray an uneasiness over the character of the figure Bhavika and do not know whether to classify it as a Guna or Alankāra. They vaguely realise that it involves an aesthetic fact which concerns the sustained intuition of the poet and find it difficult to pack it within their limited and formal scheme of Guna and Alankāra.

neither properly defined, nor its relation to the old concept of *Alaṅkāra* exactly determined. Dandin only tells us that the *Guna* is an *Alaṅkāra* belonging to the *Vaidarbha Mārga* exclusively, while the poetic figure is an *Alaṅkāra* which is common to both the *Mārgas*. Thus, it appears that the *Guna* in his opinion, forms the essence or essential condition of what he considers to be the best poetic diction, but the so-called *Alaṅkāra* or poetic figure, on which the *Alaṅkāra* School of *Bhāmaha* laid exclusive stress is not the special characteristic of any specific diction, for it may reside in all kinds of diction. Every *Guna*, according to Dandin, is an *Alaṅkāra*, but he states nowhere that every specific *Alaṅkāra* is a *Guna*.

Vāmana further develops the rather indefinite ideas of Dandin regarding *Alaṅkāra* and *Guna*. He follows Dandin in taking the term *Alaṅkāra* both in its denotation and connotation, but he draws a more rigid line of distinction between *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*. He states at the outset that Poetry is acceptable on account of *Alaṅkāra* and he is careful to explain that the term *Alaṅkāra* should be taken here not in the specific sense of poetic figure, but in the general sense of poetic beauty. He, therefore lays down sententiously that *Alaṅkāra* is beauty (*śaundaryam alaṅkāraḥ*). He also explains that the term *Alaṅkāra* or embellishment is primarily synonymous with the act of embellishing but in the secondary instrumental sense it is applied to that which embellishes or the means of embellishment. In all this he is evidently developing Dandin's teaching, and like Dandin, but more clearly, he does not make the presence of poetic figures like simile and metaphor, an essential condition or requisite, as he does with respect to the presence of *Gunas*. The *Guna* is defined as an essential characteristic of *Riti*, which term *Vāmana* employs for Dandin's *Mārga*. The *Riti* being, in his opinion, the essence of Poetry, the *Gunas* are those characteristics which create the beauty of poetry, *kāvya śobhāyati kartāro dharmah* a function which is assigned by Dandin to both

the Gunas and the so-called Alamkara or poetic figures. The Alamkara in his opinion are such means of embellishment ■ serve to heighten the beauty thus created by the Gunas *ind-atisaya-hetavaḥ*. The Guna therefore being the *sine qua non* of poetic expression ■ described as Nitya implying that the Alamkara is Anitya the Guna ■ the Dharma of Riti which is the soul (Atman) of Poetry while the Alamkara is apparently the Dharma of Śabda and Artha which constitute its body. In other words the Alamkara without the Guna cannot by itself produce the beauty of Poetry which the Guna can do without the Alamkara. Although Vamana declares at the outset that the term Poetry applies to such word and sense as are beautified by Guna and Alamkara (*kavya śabdo ram gunalamkṛtayoḥ śabdārthayor vartate*) yet the Guna which is rigidly differentiated from Alamkara is taken as the essence of poetic expression in his system.

Although like Bhamaha and Dandin Vamana acknowledges the omnipresence and utility of Alamkara as a means of poetic expression he yet elaborates after Dandin a theory of Riti-Guna to explain the Visesa of Śabdārtha-sahitya. He defines Riti as Visesa pada-racana or particular arrangement of words and explains the Visesa or particularity of arrangement as consisting of the Guna realised in varying degrees in various kinds of Riti. Whether the idea of Riti like that of Pravṛtti of Bharata was evolved from geographical association and named Vardarbhu Gaudī and Paucal accordingly but was afterwards standardised with reference to the subject it is clear that in Vamana's system it is synonymous with the literary mode displayed in various distinguishable types of poetic diction realised by the unification of certain well defined excellences such as sweetness and lucidity which are called Gunas. The Alamkaras on the other hand like simile and metaphor are no doubt means of poetic expression but they are merely striking turns of word and sense which have a subsidiary value.

From this brief review of the growth of the fundamental concepts of *Alaṅkāra* and *Guna-Riti*, it is clear that both the *Alaṅkāra* and *Riti* Schools start with *Śabda* and *Artha*, word and sense and find their *Sahitya* to consist of the poetic *Vidya* of *Alaṅkāra* and *Guna Riti* respectively as the essential *Dharma* of *Śabda* and *Artha*. While these early theories rightly call attention ■ a certain extraordinary quality in the relation of word and sense in poetic expression which distinguishes it from ordinary expression their inadequacy from the aesthetic point of view is evident. Their acute analysis of outward form and technique, with which they mainly concern themselves, is admirable, but they forget that the explanation of mere verbal and ideational arrangement ■ not sufficient for explaining the fact of poetic expression. Mere enumeration of categories of rhetorical embellishment or of so-called literary excellences do not adequately explain ■ to why they embellish or why they are excellent. As the *Dhvani* theorists rightly criticise these earlier views do not correlate outward poetic expression to the inner content of poetry, nor do they as *Kuntaka* rightly points out, correlate poetic expression to the individuality of the poet to the *Kavi-svabhava*.

It is true that the *Alaṅkāra* School employs the term *Alaṅkāra* to connote the fundamental characteristic or principle of the beauty of poetic expression but in actual theory and practice it ■ applied to the objective beauty of poetic form realised by certain decorative devices known as poetic figures. The poetic expression, in this view is chiefly figurative or rhetorical expression. Even if *Bhāmaha* speaks of *Vakrokti* as an essential principle of poetic expression he does not define it nor does he elaborate the idea in all its implication, while his successors *Udbhaṭa* and *Rudrata* never mention the term nor discuss the principle. The attempts of these exponents of the *Alaṅkāra* School are limited to a systematic classification of poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories and from this formal treatment their

works have the general appearance of technical manuals comprising a collection of definitions, illustrations and empirical canons elaborated for the benefit of the aspiring poet. Poetry is regarded, more or less, as a mechanical series of verbal devices, in which a desirable sense must prevail, and which must be diversified by means of certain tricks of phrasing which consist of the so-called poetic figures and to which the name *Alaukārā* is restricted. These theorists approach the fact of expression or embellishment as a positive or accomplished fact, just in the same way as a scientist approaches a physical fact, to be methodically collected in their greatest possible variety analysed with acute scholastic acumen, and grouped in fixed classes and types. In other words, they devote their effort chiefly to the working of the rules and means formulae and categories of external production into an exact system and this practical or pedagogic outlook must have received a great impetus from the highly developed analytic enquiry into the forms of language made by the normative grammarians. Like the grammarian and the scientist, who label and classify ever new series of facts the Sanskrit *Alaukāraka* pretending to find universals calculates the particular species of expression from the original four ornaments of Bharata to one hundred and twenty five of Appayya Dīkṣita, but considering the inexhaustibility of individual poetic expressions they may be easily renewed to an infinite number while the universals of a formal analysis are of doubtful theoretic value for explaining the principle of concrete individual expression itself.

The aesthetic insufficiency of rhetorical categories was however very speedily perceived but the theories which were advanced against mere rhetoric did not entirely reject it. On the contrary, a reserve was made regarding its utility and its principles were carefully preserved. When Vamana declared the essence of poetic expression to be the *Rim* by which he meant nothing but a specific arrangement of words characterised by the so-called "qualities" or *Gunas* he did not

advance the speculation much further nor did his predecessor Dandin to whom Poetry was nothing more than a series of words determined by a desired sense. Both agree that the words should have a Vyavacchinna Vistāra or particular arrangement but this Vistāra consists not only of a special disposition (Rita) but also of ornamentation (Alankāra). Dandin gives indeed an extended interpretation of the term 'ornament' applying it to anything which lends 'beauty' (Sobha) to poetry and including in its scope the figurative devices as well as modes or grades of arrangement of word and sense. Vamana substantially agrees with this view when he defines ornament as beauty itself but with regard to the means of realising this beauty he draws a sharp distinction between particularities of arrangement and the mere figures of poetic speech as essential and accidental means respectively.

It must however be made clear that the term beauty Sobha or Soundarya which is taken as the test of poetic expression is not clearly defined. There is no exposition of its character even if its means are described and detailed. But it appears to have no other far fetched meaning than that of the logical external effect realised by a carefully worked out adjustment of word and sense which avoids damaging flaws by adopting primarily the so-called literary qualities and secondarily the rhetorical figures for heightening the effect thus produced. Whatever attempt later theorists like Kuntaka might have made to place the concept on a better aesthetic footing or in whatever sense later writers might have employed it, there can be no doubt that the term Rita in Dandin and Vamana signified nothing more nor less than a specific arrangement of word and sense a mere combination in varying degrees essentially of clearly defined qualities like perspicuity or smoothness and incidentally of equally clearly defined rhetorical figures like simile or metaphor. It has no reference to the organ or expressive activity of the poetic intuition which Kuntaka calls Kāvī-vyapāra nor is it made equivalent in this sense to the Western concept of 'style' as

the expression of poetic individuality. The *Riti* as understood by these early theorists is incapable of technical formulation, and as such the so called literary qualities of 'simplicity', 'vivacity' and so forth become only generic or specific categories for labelling particular aspects of the aesthetic activity, they do not explain the true character of the activity itself. The so-called *Riti* and its constituent literary qualities properly designate the different degrees in the development free or less free of the expressive activity and are thus aspects of successful or less successful expression. When completely successful we have the expression itself. The so called *Doṣas* or flaws designate embarrassed activity ending in failure and are thus aspects of unsuccessful expression. From the aesthetic point of view this success or failure of expression may also be termed beauty or ugliness. But the beautiful as the perfect expression does not possess degrees. If ugliness does complete ugliness as complete negation altogether ceases to be ugly for it loses its contradiction and is no longer an aesthetic fact. The consideration of expression itself therefore is important rather than a scholastic definition and classification of its different degrees of success or failure of freedom or bondage.

The distinction again which the *Riti* theorists draw between *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* lacks a proper aesthetic foundation. They find that both impart beauty to poetry that is both are parts or means of perfect expression. Some like Daṇḍin said that there was little difference between the two as means of producing beauty the one being a generic and the other a specific term; some said that they differed but slightly the *Guna* being the *Dharma* of the collocation of word and sense in a whole and *Alaṅkāra* of *śabda* and *Artha*. The view was also proposed that the *Guna* was *Sobha* *hetu* and *Nitya* while the *Alaṅkāra* was useful for extra beauty *Sobha* *prayatna* *hetu* and *Anitya*. All these theorists realised only this that both *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* imparted beauty but they did not understand the vital question as to what in Poetry did they impart beauty. They failed to perceive that *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* in what-

ever sense they are used are only relative terms and that they imply a *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*. Vamana, no doubt, stumbled upon something more than *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*, upon what he calls *Riti*, but Ānandavardhana rightly points out, the *Riti* theorists thereby only dimly perceived the real nature of the essence of Poetry which cannot be the mere objective beauty realised by *Riti-Guna* and *Alaṅkāra*. The distinction again, between literary qualities and rhetorical ornaments as essential and non essential may be of some use in logical or normative analysis but not in aesthetic realisation, for, given a particular expression the qualities are as much integral parts of it as figures of speech. The expression should be taken not as a mechanic but as an organic whole in relation to the poetic intuition. As each individual expression automatically selects its own appropriate qualities and ornaments it cannot be definitely laid down that a particular expression should possess this and should not possess that. If expression is expression, it is successful, there cannot be any question of intermediate degrees of success in aesthetic estimate. Kuntaka therefore rightly criticises that there can be no classification of *Riti* into good bad or indifferent types. Nor can qualities or ornaments be categorically attached, since such expression is not a fixed and generic but a variable and individual fact. Kuntaka therefore rightly says that the concepts of *Riti*, *Guna* and *Alaṅkāra* can only be justified if they are related to the *Kavi-larman* or *Kavi-svabhava*, to the imagination or individuality of particular poets.

The poetic expression is capable of infinite diversity in accordance with the infinite diversity of poetic individuality. Dandin wisely declares that speech is diversified in its multifarious mode of expression and admits the impossibility of labelling and classifying all modes of poetic expression with fixed and unalterable characteristics, but maintaining that the sub-varieties are incalculable he distinguishes two broad or extreme types, namely, *Vaidarbha* and *Gaudī*. While his successor Vamana proposes three types adding *Pāṇicāli* as inter-

mediate, and recommending the Vaidarbhi as containing all the literary qualities, subsequent writers add Lāṭi, Avantika, Magadhi and so forth. But the attempt to exhaust and stereotype the entire poetical output within the clear-cut bounds of ready-made modes and fixed qualities on the basis of more or less formal analysis like the similar attempt of the Alankāra School to classify and label the entire poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories, is sure to prove unconvincing as the theoretic basis of poetic expression. Neither Dandin's nor Vāmana's differentiation of individual Ritis and Gunas, therefore is found as the criticism of Mammata and others shows exhaustive and consistent. These varieties of Riti, with their constituent Gunas, are really instances of complete and incomplete expression erected into definite universal types, probably (as the names imply) on the basis of empirical observation of localised usages. But, as Kuntaka shows the Riti cannot be a *Deśa dharma* as localised usage nor a *Vastu dharma* as an inherent attribute of word and sense but a *Dharma* of *Kavi svabhāva* or the character of the poet, depending upon the nature of his poetic intuition, upon his *Śakti* (poetic power) *Vyutpatti* (culture) and *Abhyāsa* (practice). In this sense the Riti becomes synonymous with the manner of individual poets and not with prescribed or universalised modes or grades, and all aspects of expression can be comprehended in it. But since the manner of expression varies with various poets it is of infinite kind. It can be classified under broad types but the definition and classification are susceptible to infinite but unprofitable, multiplication.

II

From what we have said it is clear that by drawing attention for the first time to the aspects of poetic activity indicated by the 'qualities' or Gunas the Riti-theorists may be regarded as having gone a step further than the mere

Ālaṅkāras but the speculation in its halting formalism touches only the fringe of the aesthetic problem. By their very attempt at systematisation the Ālaṅkāras recognised the existence of certain facts of poetic expression namely, its so-called embellishment or extraordinariness as aesthetic facts, the Riti theorists went further and believed that these facts are reducible to a definite principle, but both of them failed to realise that this principle is not an external category but a category of the spirit. It should have been clearly understood that every single expressive fact stands by itself as the result of a particular poetic intuition under a particular stimulus. Such facts may be grouped generically by the inductive process but the continuous variation of individual poetic expression results in an irreducible variety of expressive facts. Each poet has his own mode of expression characteristic of his particular intuition in a particular case, and with such differentiation the classification of 'modes', like the classification of ornaments, would be endless without reaching any definite theoretic principle of expression.

The Dhvany theorists who came into prominence in the next stage consequently declared that the true character of Poetry was imperfectly understood by those who took cognisance only of word and sense (*Dhvanyaloka* 1.7), but, curiously enough their own theory finds its origin in the conventional manner in the analysis of language and its meaning. The influence of the grammatical concept of the *Samvaya* of *Śabda* and *Artha* was still acknowledged and the new theory of Dhvani was started on the analogy of the older theory of *Spṛṣṭa*. Ānandavardhana speaks of his own system as being founded on the authority of the grammarians to whom he pays an elegant tribute as the first and foremost theorists *prathamā vādīnām*. From grammarians and logicians, the Dhvani theorists acknowledged the functions of Denotation (*Abhidha*) and Indication (*Lakṣana*) of words the former giving as the literal sense, and the latter on the incompatibility of the literal sense a

further secondary but allied sense. But this was not all. They went further than the grammarians and logicians by contending that this did not exhaust the entire significance of Poetry. They pushed the analysis to the positing of another function of word and sense: another characteristic of poetic expression namely Suggestion (Vyanjana) which gives a deeper sense never directly expressed but depending upon the poet's particular purpose in employing the word in its obviously denoted or indicated sense. This purpose or Prayojana being always unexpressed can be arrived at only by the process of suggestion but it constitutes the essential charm or peculiarity of poetic expression. Here for the first time the poet's purpose is brought into the consideration of the product of the poet's mind and an unexpressed sense (Dhvani) is acknowledged beyond what is directly expressed but we shall see presently the analysis is still empirical and concerns itself with the form rather than with the essence.

The Dhvani School in its analysis of the essentials of Poetry found that the content of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one is that which Sabda and its denoted or indicated Artha give us that which is expressed in so many words whether directly explicit or metaphorically implicit the other is not expressed but suggested springing from what is thus expressed or indicated. The unexpressed or suggested part is not something vague but it is distinctly linked up with the expressed. It is manifested by a peculiar power of suggestion called Vyanjana inherent in word and sense and is set forth as a fact of aesthetic experience and distinguished from the concept of mere Vacya or denoted sense of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of Poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue and the poets had been more or less

partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent symbol or allegory. But suggestive poetry, according to the new theorists, is something more than the merely metaphorical or figurative on which the Alamkara and the Riti Schools placed so much emphasis. The metaphorical or allegoric however veiled, is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such, but the suggested in Poetry is always unexpressed and is, therefore, a source of proper charm or strikingness by its very capacity of concealment, which, however, is not concealment in the sense in which an enigma is. The Dhvani School thus postulates that the unexpressed or inexpressible is the very 'soul' or essence of all good Poetry; it is called into being by a particular function of suggestion inherent in word and sense, while such means of expression as the Gunas and Alamkaras of earlier schools are mere means or attributes which receive their justification for employment as such from this inner content of poetry.

The inner content of Poetry is undoubtedly a fact of aesthetic experience, being the poetic intuition itself, but to distinguish or bifurcate the content and expression as two separate, though intimately connected entities, is formal analysis and not aesthetic experience. The new theorists, no doubt clearly perceive that the consideration of the ornamental fitting out of words or of the literary qualities of structure are not enough to solve the problem of poetic expression. They clearly demonstrate that the so called ornaments or qualities have no absolute value but depend upon the character of the particular utterance. In recognising all this they sailed very closely along the coast but they hardly succeeded in making an effective landing. The theory rendered great service by rightly emphasising that the literal sense alone was not sufficient but that it should lead to the deeper poetic purpose embodied in the suggested sense of Poetry. But the analysis still concerned itself with the intellective rather than the intuitive aspect of poetic ex-

pression, with the understanding of its ideas only as empirical facts. The unexpressed in this case has no reference to the individual poetic intuition, but is universalised as a mode of thought, and being bound up by definite links with fixed and mechanical symbols of the expressed, it becomes as much a fixed and mechanical symbol as any rhetorical or qualitative category. It is no wonder, therefore, that the attempt resolved itself into the same empirical and normative method of elaborately distinguishing and classifying hundreds of varieties of the unexpressed, and even when the unexpressed was generically grouped into an unexpressed matter, an unexpressed ornament or an unexpressed sentiment, corresponding to the old mechanical grouping of descriptive, ornamental or sentimental composition, the speculation only labelled and pigeon holed certain generic or specific aspects of the poetic function without exhausting or explaining the function.

It is not enough to say that the unexpressed is the essence of Poetry or analyse into groups the varieties of unexpressed meaning, for Poetry in reality is expression, which contains in itself what is obviously expressed, as well as what is implicitly suggested. In aesthetic experience, as opposed to the merely logical analysis, it is impossible to separate the unexpressed and the expressed, for both of them together make up the being of poetic expression. The poet's "purpose" which embodies the unexpressed, is undoubtedly important, but it is not meant by these theorists to be co-extensive with poetic intuitivity, which is rich in unified images rather than in disintegrated thought or meaning in its power of intuitive expression rather than in presenting this or that concept or idea. The expression is the actuality of the intuition, the so-called expressed and unexpressed forming its indissoluble constituents undistinguishable in the organic whole. It is true that Sanskrit theory recognises that in order to be poetical, language should be generically semantic, but it forgets that the language of Poetry must be taken as the language of poetic intuition and not of logical intelligence, as in

aesthetic and not an intellective fact. The scholastic bipartition between the unexpressed and the expressed therefore, is useful in grammatico logical analysis, but it hardly helps us in understanding the significance of Poetry. The whole constitutes Poetry and not a part, it avails us little in externally analysing what in its internal unity cannot be analysed. there is no exteriority and interiority in poetic expression which is one and indivisible. The attitude finds a parallel in one of the disastrous errors of modern philosophy, namely, the Cartesian mistake of regarding body and mind as separate substances from which all the insufficiencies and perplexities of the 'mind body problem' flow and render clear thinking of the subject difficult. The poet's purpose' in poetry again is unnecessarily and narrowly segregated from the word and its meaning when the poetic purpose in its true sense is the word and the meaning themselves in their unity. This is the real meaning of the *Sahitya* of *Śabda* and *Artha* in poetic expression. It should be admitted that by the unexpressed is pre eminently intended the poetical and not the logical or ethical meaning but the poetic intuition knows of no dualism between word and its meaning between itself and its expression for the content here is form and form is content. In attempting to combat the science of word and sense the new theory appears to have preserved the same tradition in a fresh garb inasmuch as it starts with the same pre-occupation with word and sense with the same pre-supposition that a word or its sense is a natural mechanical fact or symbol which can in the manner of a scientific fact be grouped in class & types or categories.

The *Dhvani* theorists however did an important service by directing attention to an aspect of Poetry which had so far been imperfectly understood or entirely ignored in Sanskrit poetic theory. Hitherto speculation had been busy with the consideration of poetical ornament or structure, and it was thought enough if by these means certain definite ideas were expressed in a definite manner. But it was realised

impression (*Vasana*), being derived from actual experience of life or from inherited instincts. On reading a poem which describes a similar emotion, this latent emotion is suggested by the depicted factors, which, being generalised or impersonalised, cease to be called ordinary causes but become extraordinary causes in Poetry. The ordinary causes, therefore, being generalised or impersonalised by the suggestive power of word and sense, do not refer to particularities, Rāma or Sītā is no longer Rāma or Sītā as an individual lover or his beloved, but is presented as the lover or his beloved in general. In the same way, the emotion suggested, which is the source of the relish is also generalised, the love of Rāma or Sītā being presented as love in general, and in this generalised form it is possible for the reader to relish the emotion, even though it is not his own inasmuch as the impression is already latent in his mind. The emotion (*Bhava*) is generalised and relished as a sentiment (*Rasa*) also in the sense that it refers not to any particular reader but to readers in general. The particular individual while relishing it as a reader, does not think that it is his own personal emotion, and yet it is relished as such; nor does he think that it can be relished by him alone but by all persons of similar sensibility. It is also not the personal emotion of the poet, for it is divested of all personal interest and presented in an impersonalised form. The natural emotion, whether of the poet or of the hero, becomes a poetic sentiment, and the natural causes become poetic causes. The relish partakes, no doubt, of the nature of cognition, it is nevertheless different from the ordinary forms of the process inasmuch as it involves an imaginative or poetic process of idealisation, which has the power of stirring the latent emotional impressions of the reader's mind into a relishable condition of enjoyment. The resulting relish, therefore cannot be identified with the constituent factors, for at the time of relish the factors are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as *Rasa*, which is thus simple

It is very similar to but not the same as, the state of true enlightenment which comes only to the knower who, no longer on the empirical plane, transcends completely and permanently the sphere of pleasure and pain. As such, this state of aesthetic delotation is not capable of proof because its cognition is inseparable from its existence, or, in other words it is identical with the experience of itself. The only proof of its existence is its relish itself by the man of aesthetic sensibility, the *Rasika* or *Sahrdaya*, the ideal connoisseur of Poetry, to whom alone it is vouchsafed. The reader must reproduce in himself what the poet has produced.

It is clear that the theory demands the existence of the aesthetic intuition, or capacity of enjoyment of what it calls poetic bliss, and the presupposition of latent impressions is only an aspect of this demand. Those who do not possess this intuition can never relish this spiritual state. There is plenty of people in this world who do not appreciate Poetry, and the theorists are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and mere dialecticians, who are incapable of attaining the aesthetic attitude. It is the *Rasika* or *Sahrdaya* alone, who by his own intuition can identify himself with the intuition of poetic creation (*taumayibhavana yoga*) and thereby obtain its true relish (*Rasa*). It must be understood that although the word 'relish' or 'taste' renders the word *Rasa* literally, it does not imply, apart from the reader's reproduction of the poet's production any conscious ethical valuation good or bad taste. It implies an experience similar to what we understand when we speak of relishing or tasting food but this realistic description must not at the same time drag it down to the level of natural pleasure because by its aloofness and serenity it is lifted into a personal impersonal blissful state of mind. The word 'Stimmung' used by Jacobi may give us the nearest approach but the *Rasa* is not a mere highly pitched natural feeling or mood but indicates pure intuition which is distinct from an empirical feeling.

It is clear that however blissful the aesthetic enjoyment as conceived by these theorists may be it must be distinguished from the enjoyment of natural feelings and the theory does not fall into the mistake of aesthetic hedonism which sees no difference between the pleasure of Poetry and that of easy digestion. No doubt the conventional classification of generic and specific feelings is accepted but they are given as constituting the material or stimulus of Poetry. They may form the substratum (Sthāyi bhava) or concomitant (Vyabhiçārī bhava) of the poetic sentiment (Rasa) but they are not identical with it. Just as in the unity of spirit one cannot talk of cause and effect so in the unity of Rasa the separate natural feelings say of love grief or horror which may form its constituents are never experienced but the whole appears as a single and indivisible aesthetic sentiment of bliss from which every trace of the constituent empirical pleasure or pain is obliterated. In other words love grief or horror is no longer experienced as love grief or horror in their disturbing poignancy but as pure aesthetic sentiment of blissful relish evoked by the idealised poetic creation. This fact is borne out by the common experience that after keenly feeling grief in a play on the stage the spectator says I have enjoyed it. He may shed tears but Viśvanatha explains clearly that tears constitute no proof that pain is felt for the tears that are shed by the spectator are not those of pain but those of sentiment which causes a melting of the mind as a result of the nature of the particular aesthetic enjoyment. Hence in a devotee as Jagannatha observes tears arise on the contemplation of the deity when the religious feeling is raised to a serene state of similar enjoyment. The intuitive bliss arising from idealised poetic creations should therefore be distinguished from the experience of natural feelings and from all natural experiences of life as something *Alankā* as something impersonal disinterested or supernatural.

It follows that the question of the so-called qualities

and ornaments Guna and Alamkara, which loomed so large in previous theories must be revised from this standpoint. The previous speculation recognised that both Guna and Alamkara imparted beauty to Poetry but since they went no deeper than Śabda and Artha expressed word and sense they could not answer the vital question as to what in poetry they imparted beauty. The inability arose from their not realising that Guna and Alamkara are relative terms and that they must be related to a Guna and Alamkara. The analogy is maintained that Poetry like a man has two separable constituents body and soul. The Vācya vacaka the form of poetry the expressed word and sense however important, constitutes its body or Śarīra. Of some soul Atman in Poetry Vāmana had a dim idea for he stumbled upon something more than Guna and Alamkara upon what he calls Riti. But the Dhvani theorists point out that the Riti is still regarded as Vācya vacaka carita betu or means of external embellishment of word and sense and the essence of Riti being according to Vāmana a certain normatively standardised collocation of the Gunas it becomes a redundant concept. Some idea of Rasa was still there from the time of Bharata but Bhāmaha and Dandin would regard it an aspect of Alamkara. Vāmana as that of Guna the form of Poetry being alone considered important. But the Dhvani theorists found that behind the Vācya vacaka the Śarīra of Poetry the most important thing is the Ātman behind what is directly or figuratively expressed by word and sense the most essential thing in Poetry is what is unexpressed but distinctly suggested. This in their opinion, is not Anuśa or Śarīra body but the Anuśa Śarīra Atman or soul of Poetry. What is suggested as Āhina may take the form of a matter (Vastu) or that of a poetic figure (Alamkara) but in most cases it is a sentiment (Rasa) which becomes the most important suggested Āhina.

This being clearly formulated that Poetry must have an Āhina a Guna and Alamkara in order to have Guna and

Alamkāra, the problem of differentiation of Guna and Alamkāra came, as a matter of course, to be solved. So long as the Śarira or outward form of Poetry alone is accepted and everything recognised as its beautifying element, there can be no tangible difference between Guna and Alamkāra as fruitful concepts. If, on the other hand, the poetic sentiment involved in the composition is accepted as the Ātman or essence, distinct from the Śarira, there can be this differentiation that the Gunas like the qualities of a man's soul, pertain to the Aṅga named Rasa, and the Alamkāras like ornaments on a man's body, to the Aṅga called Vacya-vācaka. Both the Guna and Alamkāra are, thus interpreted in a new sense, and justified by being brought in effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a composition. The mere verbal or structural form of a work cannot, except by way of analogy, be said to possess the qualities, say, of sweetness or energy, unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is sweet and vigorous. The Gunas, as they make up the verbal form, are aspects or attributes, the real cause is Rasa, even as the soul of a man and not his body, is the true cause of virtues like heroism. Pressing the analogy further, it is held that the Alamkāras or poetic figures adorn words and meanings which constitute the body of Poetry, although through word and sense they may embellish the underlying soul of sentiment indirectly, but not invariably. Where there is no Rasa, they result in mere charmingness of expression. It is clear that these considerations simplify the classification and useless multiplication of Gunas and Alamkāras, and the Rūpa, being a combination of specific Gunas, is no longer necessary as a separate concept. Although secondarily the Gunas concern Śabda and Artha (just as Alamkāras primarily concern them), the Gunas, and not Alamkāras, are taken primarily as the Dharmas or attributes of Rasa. Words and ideas, for instance, which have the power of suggesting the quality of sweetness (Mādhurya) of particular Rasas, are not by themselves sweet, but in relation to the Rasa we call them sweet. The mental

activity involved in the enjoyment of *Rasa* is the sole criterion of a particular *Guna*; and in this sense only three *Gunās* are justified. The *Mādhurya* or sweetness is supposed to consist of a melting (*Druta*) of the mind, appropriate to the erotic and pathetic sentiments; the *Ojas* or energy is a form of brilliant expansion (*Vistāra*) of the mind, suitable to the sentiments of heroism, horror and fury; while the *Prasāda* or perspicuity, proper to all sentiments, is an aspect of pervasion of the mind (*Vyāpti*), necessary for quick apprehension. The *Gunās*, as attributes of *Rasas*, are thus *Citta-vṛttis*; and the three conditions of the mind, namely, melting, expanding and pervading, which accompany the relevant poetic sentiment, are made the basis of only three pertinent *Gunās*.

The *Dhvani*-theorists undoubtedly mark an advance in explaining that the so-called *Gunās* or qualities of composition are not mere tricks of sound and sense but should be considered in vital relation to the underlying poetic sentiment. The consideration of structure as such, therefore, is not necessary, and the distinction between qualities of sound and sense is, from this standpoint, meaningless. The activity of the spirit involved in aesthetic enjoyment can alone justify them. In all this the *Dhvani*-theorists show themselves conversant with the true nature of poetic expression. But since poetic expression knows of no dualism between word and sense, just as there is no real dualism between body and soul, it is meaningless, from the aesthetic point of view, to draw an absolute distinction between the so-called quality and ornament. The poetic intuition automatically chooses its expression, which is only the externalisation of the spiritual activity, and which is, therefore, not a mechanically fixed fact but a part and parcel of that activity. The differentiation of the various means of externalisation ■ qualities or ornaments may have an useful or practical value, and a doctrine of technique may be evolved, but since poetic expression is a variable and individual fact with individual poets, no fixed laws of means and ends can be laid down for universal appli-

cation. If we say that a poet has a new technique, we really mean to imply that the new technique is the poem itself. A vital poetic intuition cannot have a prescribed technique of expression, for the simple reason that it is an intuition of which the expression is the actuality, it is not a volitional effort about which alone we speak of means and ends, nor is it an intellectual concept which can be logically or universally formulated. As the poetic intuition differs in each poet, according to his psychic organism and the nature of the stimuli acting upon it, there is bound to be endless kinds of expression which are individual and concrete, which have their own standards, spheres and means in each case and which cannot repeat themselves. It does not, for instance, help us to understand Kālidāsa's poetry by merely understanding that it fulfils the prescribed requirements of 'qualities' or 'ornaments' or even of arrangements of words with a view to suggest this or that sense, for his poetry is not what it is by its mere conformity to these formal requirements. The technique of the poet is his poetic conception itself, it may express itself in an ornate or simple manner, sweetly or harshly, expressively or suggestively, as is suitable to itself. It may be a failure or a success, but there can be, theoretically speaking, no question of standardised means, of good, bad or indifferent technique. What is appropriate to itself is its own technique. Even the ordinary man never believes in the manufacturing of ready made poetry. No technique can be universalised and the enumeration of technical means can never be exhausted by formal treatment. It may serve the practical purpose of supplying information about means, materials or groups of stimuli, or even the logical purpose of exposition but it possesses no theoretic value for the understanding of the nature of poetic creation.

The Dhvany theorists were not unaware of all this, although following older rhetorical convention they did not bring out all its aesthetic implications. Ānandavardhana himself declares that the ways of poetic expression are infinite (*anantā hi vāg*

vikalpak) but he does not fully realise that since there is no end of poetic individuations it is futile to distinguish or elaborate rhetorical and qualitative categories. He is however, right when he says that only the broad rule can be laid down that whether they are qualities or ornaments they must follow the import of the poetic intuition which in his theory is the aesthetic sentiment of *Rasa* intended by the poet and if it is necessary to accept the older conventional categories of rhetorical figures and literary qualities the only rule that should govern their employment is their appropriateness to the particular *Rasa*. Anandavardhana therefore lays down very clearly that there is no other circumstance which leads to the violation of the *Rasa* than inappropriateness and that the supreme secret of *Rasa* consists in observing the rules of appropriateness. For each poetic intuition there exists its appropriate expression and the theory of Propriety or *Aucitya* alone should explain and justify it.

This in general outline is the theory of *Dhvani* and *Rasa* finally reached by Sanskrit Poetics. The chief value of its contribution lies in its recognition already foreshadowed by *Bhaṭṭa Nayaka* of the poetic sentiment as a fact of internal aesthetic experience and of its process of idealisation from a natural feeling (*Bhava*) to a poetic emotion (*Rasa*). In this the theorists undoubtedly approach the very core of the aesthetic problem and solve the question of *Śabdārtha sahitya* in a novel way. But unfortunately the starting limitations still remain and prevent a proper development of mere rhetoric into aesthetic. Because of these limitations it cannot be maintained that they have said the last word on the subject or said it clearly and consistently, but they have certainly dealt with some of its fundamental aspects very ably. A right exposition is given indeed of the aesthetic enjoyment resulting from the idealised creation of Poetry and incidentally of the general nature of poetic idealisation but the question is still approached from the standpoint of the reader or critic the *Samajika* or *Sahridaya* and the problem of poetic intuition

series of verbal rules and modes to govern infinite cases of particular and variable poetic expression ; for each creative fact is an individual occurrence which must be judged by itself.

The process of idealisation is also not fully and properly explained; it becomes a kind of abstract enjoyment of abstract symbols by ignoring the concreteness of poetic intuition and creation. The idealisation is not mere generalisation ; even when he has an intuitive image of it, the poet never leaves the concrete. His Rāma or Shā, however idealised, is not a mere abstraction, and the poetic sentiment, however serene, is never divested of its warmth, colour and vivid reality. Again, the theory maintains that feelings alone can be raised to the state of aesthetic relish by the idealising capacity of poetry ; but there is no adequate reason why the poetic intuition of a descriptive matter, or even of a mere ornamental idea, cannot become an aesthetic fact or Rasa. Just as the experience of feeling as feeling is not aesthetic intuition, so is also not the perception of matter or idea as such ; they are only cases of the practical or logical forms of mental activity. But as soon as mere matter or idea, like mere feeling, becomes a part of the poetic intuition, it becomes a form of its spiritual activity, an aesthetic fact, capable of being equally well relished. It is not enough to say that a matter or ornament may be suggested ; it is necessary to recognise that matter or idea can in poetic creation stand on the same footing as the feeling, on which alone stress need not laid. In emphasising sentimental poetry and distinguishing it from the descriptive or the ornamental, the Sanskrit theory falls back upon the old error of confusing the form with the essence. Nevertheless, in spite of its imperfections, the theory of Rasa is a highly important contribution to poetic speculation. It indicates that the Sanskrit theorists were certainly aware of the aesthetic problem, even though they did not tackle it consistently in its entirety, contenting themselves, as they did, by treating it only in some of its aspects.

It was Kuntaka who, for the first time, divested the concept of *Sahitya* of its mere grammatical associations of *Pada*, *Vākya* and *Tātparya*, and defined it as a definite poetic quality or relation, brought about by the poetic imagination, the *Kavi pratibhā* or *Kavi vyāpāra*. The *Sahitya* is not, in this sense present either in the *Śāstra* or in the ordinary utterances of the world, but is seen in Poetry only, it is not the mere union of the expressor and the expressed, the *Vācaka* and the *Vācya*, but the union has a special beauty in Poetry; and the determination of this speciality is the problem of Poetics. Kuntaka, therefore, holds that *Śabda* and *Artha* united together or equipoised is Poetry (*dvaṃ sammilitam kāvyam*). It is meaningless to emphasise either *Śabda* or *Artha*, (*na śabdasyaiva rāmanīyata viśiṣṭasya kevalasya kāvyatvam, na py arthasya*) to call one *Abhyantara* and the other *Bahya* (*dīpāḥ or api pratilam iva tailam, tad vid ahlāda kāritam vartate, na punar ekaśmin*), but what is more important is that a special kind of *Sāhitya* is meant (*kūṭ in viśiṣṭam eva sāhityam abhipretam*), by which mere language blooms into Poetry. This *Vaiśiṣṭya*, in his opinion, is displayed in a composition (*Bandha*) characterised by *Vakra* *Kavi-vyāpāra* and causing *Tad-vid-āhlāda*. The *Vaiśiṣṭya* therefore, consists of an extraordinary deviation from the common mode of speech, and this extraordinariness depends upon an imaginative turn of words and ideas, which he calls *Vakratva*. *Bhaṅgi-bhaṅgi*, *Vacitrya*, or *Vicchitti*, which causes a higher and unworldly pleasure (*Āhlada*) or pleasing charm (*Camatkāra*) to those who appreciate Poetry (*Tad vid*). He further explains that this *Vakratva vaiśiṣṭya* or *Bhaṅgi vaiśiṣṭya* rests upon the conception (*Pratibhā*) of the poet or on his skill (*Kauśala*) or on an act of imagination on his part which is termed *Kavi-vyāpāra* or *Kavi karm*. Kuntaka analyses and classifies all poetic expression from this point of view, but what is important to note is that he puts a clear emphasis on the imaginative power of the poet, and considers it to be the source of the characteristic charm of

poetic expression. He refuses therefore to accept the orthodox splitting up of poetic expression into exterior or interior, considering poetic expression as one and indivisible. Whether the *Sūhṛīya* of *Śabda* and *Artha* be the *Viśeṣa* of the outward garb or the inner content, of the *śāstra* of *Vācya* *vācaka* or the *Ātman* of *Rasa-dhvaṃ*, it is the poet's peculiar way, the work of his imagination, the *Kavi vyāpāra* which makes the particular poetic expression what it is, that is the *Viśeṣa*.

In his analysis of poetic expression Kuntaka attempts to develop further the idea of *Vakrokti* vaguely present in *Bhāmaha*, and systematises the views of those who laid stress on the so called *Alaṅkāra* or poetic figure as the essential feature of Poetry, but in the course of his investigation he appears to have indicated, if not fully developed, certain poetic principles which go beyond the sphere of formal analysis. By *Vakrokti*, which Kuntaka considers to be essential in poetic expression, he apparently thinks of figurative forms of speech, for which he often uses the phrase as a collective name, but in reality this is not the entire significance of the term meant by him. Poetry to him is embellished sound and sense, the embellishment being chiefly (but not exclusively) the figurative device known as *Alaṅkāra* in the narrow sense, and as this is the only ornament possible and essential he repudiates the views of those who disregard figurative expression as accidental or non essential. But here he does not stop. He uses the term *Alaṅkāra* also in the larger sense of poetic beauty, not only as the fundamental principle of figurative expression, but also of all poetic expression generally. To this he gives the name of *Vakrokti*, and comprehending under it all forms of poetic expression, he attempts a fresh interpretation of the problem by re thinking and re arranging under this conception the accepted ideas of *Riti* *Guna* *Rasa* *Dhvaṃ* and *Alaṅkāra*.

All this may still be formal analysis but in his conception of *Vakrokti*, Kuntaka shows himself cognisant of the aesthetic problem. He well understood that art could not be the

medium of philosophical or scientific concepts, and insisted upon a clear distinction between Śāstra and Kāvya, between intellective and imaginative work, by stating that words and ideas of the Kāvya differ from those of the Śāstra. He also maintains rightly that expression being the most important thing in Poetry, the poetic speech is an extraordinary deviation from the ordinary mode of common speech, thereby distinguishing artistic expression from the merely naturalistic. This extraordinariness depends on a certain imaginative turn to words and ideas, which he calls Bhaṅgi-bhāṇiti, peculiar to poetic expression and abhorrent of matter-of-fact expression, and which in his system goes by the name of Vakratva or Vicchitti. He also explains that this Vakratva, for which another name is Vaicitrya or strikingness, is the charm of expression of the Vidagdha, the literary man of taste, who must be distinguished from the Vadvat, the mere scholar; and it is his pleasure (tad-vid-āhlāda) which is the supreme test of Poetry, as something which is not Laukika. He further lays down that this expression depends, as we have seen, upon the intuition of the poet (Pratibhā), or in his skill (Kauśala), or on an act of imagination on his part, which is termed Kavi-vyāpāra or Kavi-karman, but which, being indefinable, is not defined or explained.

It is obvious that Kuntaka is one of the few theorists who put a clear emphasis on the imaginative power of the poet and consider it to be the source of the characteristic charm of poetic expression. He regards embellished speech as Poetry, but holds that the source of this embellishment, even if it consists of poetic figures merely, is the poetic imagination. He, therefore, draws a distinction between what may be called a speech-figure, on the one hand, and the so-called poetic figure, on the other. In a formal scheme of Poetry they may correspond; but in a poetic figure, because it is poetic, Kuntaka discovers a specific differentia, which consists of a peculiar or deviating turn of expression (Vakratva), resulting in a characteristic strikingness (Vaicitrya).

or Vicchitti) and depending on the imaginative activity of the poet (Kavi pralibha nirvartitavya) The so called poetic figures of orthodox Poetics are admissible only when they possess this peculiar charm of poetic imagination and expression the word charm apparently meaning nothing but that which gives it its poetic peculiarity Kuntaka therefore holds that embellishments do not belong to poetry that is to say they are not added externally but that poetry = embellished speech itself the particular embellishment depending on the poetic imagination

Kuntaka thus supplies a deficiency in the teaching of the Dhvani theorists who ignored all embellishments unconnected with the suggested sense as mere Vag vikalpa or Ukti vaicitrya To them the ornamental expression of poetry was detachable external and non essential addition but Kuntaka gives a new interpretation of such Ukti vaicitrya and justifies the poetic ornaments as such If they are a part of poetic expression they have a right to be considered for they form thereby the expression itself If the poetic imagination justifies them as a source of beauty the question of their connexion with the suggested sense or of their essentiality or non essentiality need not arise they being themselves essential In Kuntaka's view therefore poetry = always embellished expression as distinguished from plain and matter of fact expression of sciences and scriptures and embellishment in the general sense is always a characteristic of poetic expression The embellishment comprehends in its specific sense the whole domain of rhetorical figures (which Kuntaka includes in the particular province of Vakya vakrata) if they are justified by the poetic imagination and become poetic figures thereby It may also include the qualities (Guna Riti) mere matter (Vastu) or the so called unexpressed (Dhvani) including the suggested sentiment (Rasa) if as form or material they become a part of the poetic imagination and expression The skill of the poet can and does exhibit various forms of Vakrokti in the arrangement of

letters, in the base or termination of words, in the words themselves, in their gender, number and synonym, in their sense, in a sentence, in a particular topic or in the composition as a whole, and all these necessarily comprehend what earlier theories elaborated as *Guna Rūi*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Dhvani* and *Rasa*. Thus, Kuntaka gives an extended interpretation to *Bhāmaha's Vakrokti*, by which Kuntaka connotes and denotes the same thing, namely, the extraordinary form of imaginative expression. He makes Bhamaha's somewhat inchoate suggestion of heightened speech more definite by referring it to the poetic imagination. It is, therefore, inaccurate to suppose that Kuntaka accepts merely figurative expression as the denotation of *Vakrokti* for he brings within its comprehensive scope all known kinds of imaginative poetic expression. The inaccuracy arises from the apparent emphasis which Kuntaka puts on figurative expression but in reality his *Vakrokti* means much more than that.

It is a pity that Kuntaka's explanation of poetic expression was never seriously noticed nor fully developed by orthodox writers. Had it not been so it might have been possible to arrive ultimately at a clear idea of the nature of poetic creation—an aspect of Sanskrit Poetics which has been ignored by Sanskrit theorists. But later writers even if they neglect Kuntaka's work into unmerited oblivion appear to have accepted directly or implicitly, his idea of a poetic figure and applied his test of poetic imagination to their own analysis of individual rhetorical figures. We have seen that though Kuntaka regards the so called poetic figures as particular forms of speech (*Abhādā prakāra vācya*) he would yet find some specific differentia in them which would make them admissible namely, *Vakratva* or *Vaicitrya*, which is a peculiar turn of expression (*Bhaṅgi bhāṣa*) depending on an act of imagination on the part of the poet (*Kavi vyapāra*). The elements therefore which go to make up the being of a poetic figure or rather convert a speech figure into a poetic figure are *Vaicitrya* or *Vicchitti-vācya* and *Kavi pratibhā*.

nirvartitavya. In other words, Kuntaka maintains that a form or mode of expression becomes a poetic figure or *Alaṅkāra* if the fertile imagination of the poet lends a peculiar charm to it. This analysis is accepted by Ruyyaka, and, following him, by most writers of later times. Ruyyaka, for instance, does not elaborate a doctrine but implicitly takes the charm brought about by the productive imagination of the poet (*Kavi pratibhā*) to be the criterion of a poetic figure. Thus, he thinks a form of expression involving the logical *Anumāna* would not *prima facie* constitute the figure *Anumāna*, it should involve a poetical, and not merely logical, *Anumāna*. Similarly, the doubt involved in the figure *Samdeha* should be not an ordinary doubt but a poetic doubt. Hence, Mammaja lays down sententiously that the poetic figure is strikingness itself (*vaicitryam alaṅkārah*). In these and similar cases, the question is not one of a mere form of speech, in which nothing is given but the bare thought, it must be the expression of the poetic imagination. Jayaratha who comments on Ruyyaka's work, cites the authority of Kuntaka in this respect, and informs us that it is not possible to define this poetic charm (*Vicchitti* or *Vaicitrya*), inasmuch as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of individual poetic imagination which is infinite in scope, the infinite individuation of the poetic imagination having been already admitted by *Anandavardhana* as well as by Kuntaka. *Jagannātha*, therefore, defines it generally by saying that this charm is nothing but the poetic imagination with reference to the power of poetic production.

In the same way, Kuntaka acknowledges the concepts of *Marga* and *Guna*, but finds fault with the empirical classification and nomenclature of *Ritis* and *Gunas* adopted by the *Riti*-theorists. He attempts to reinterpret the theory of *Riti* from the point of view of poetic power. He objects to the naming and differentiating of *Ritis* after different localities, for one would then be forced to admit infinite number of *Ritis* as there is an infinite number of countries. In his

opinion a particular Riti cannot be established ■ ■ Desa dharma for it does not depend upon regional characteristics or upon special customs of a particular place but upon the poetic power (Śakti) culture (Vyutpatti) and practice (Abhyāsa) of a particular group of poets which can never conform to mere geographical distribution. He objects also the classification of Ritis into good bad and middling on the ground that the proper diction can be only one namely the best no matter of whatever type it is. Kuntaka believes that if different kinds of Ritis are to be admitted ■ Kavi prasthāna bheda then the character of the poet the Kavi svabhāva alone should furnish the criterion of their distinction. He admits that this Kavi svabhāva is infinite but generally speaking he thinks that there can be three main types. In one class of poets their natural poetic power finds an unhampered scope while in others the art is chiefly decorative and factitious. These may be taken as the two extreme modes of composition which he calls Sukumara and Vicitra Marga respectively but there may still be a third class of poets who would like to steer a middle course and favour a mixed style called Madhyama Marga. Kuntaka therefore admits the Riti to a distinct place in his system but adopts a different basis of classification and nomenclature in accordance with his fundamental idea of Kavi vyāpāra or Kavi prātibha. Here for the first time the Riti is brought in direct relation with the poetic individuality and is understood distinctly as its expression. It is taken as poetic style in the sense in which it is understood by Western criticism. Kuntaka is fully aware that style is neither definable nor classifiable being infinite in variety and subtle in difference according to the particular poetic intuition in a particular case but his object in mentioning these three cases is perhaps to indicate certain broad types of poetic temperament. We shall revert to this question presently but it is clear that by taking the poetic imagination into consideration Kuntaka was able for the first time to assert however imperfectly

that the question of personality is of the utmost importance in any theory of Poetry

It will be seen that these speculations are of the highest value in calling attention to the creative imagination which has been so far practically neglected by Sanskrit Poetics but which Kuntaka may be said to have discovered for the first time. If the Dhvani theorists explained the poetic intuition in the *Samayika* with respect to the aesthetic enjoyment of poetic creations he left out of consideration the question of poetic intuition with reference to the poet himself. In other words they considered the reader's power of reproduction but not the poet's power of production. Kuntaka for the first time posed the question by maintaining that we should on the contrary start with the creative imagination of the poet himself of which the poetic expression or creation is the actuality. If Kuntaka had resolutely pursued his investigations further on this line he could have formulated a proper aesthetic study but he still shows himself a victim of rhetoric in a different form. The scholastic tendency was almost universal and proved a difficult barrier to the understanding of the true nature of the problem. This was so in Kuntaka because while he discovered the importance of the poetic imagination he could not have the credit of developing its implication for the entire aesthetic question. He applied it chiefly to the analysis and classification of figurative and cognate expression. He had an inkling of the truth for instance when he spoke of poetic speech as a kind of expression other than that represented by scientific or popular speech. In making the distinction he spoke indeed of the poetic imagination but he could not clearly see that was much as the intellective and the intuitive were both aspects of the spiritual activity the distinction is not absolute. It depended simply on the nature of the poetic intuition. There is no absolute distinction again aesthetically between the *tumpra* and the *ornate* for both may equally become kinds of poetic expression or better

that is to say, not the haphazard unity of diverse kinds of personality but the intrinsic unity of the work as the synthetic expression of one poetic personality.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we search in vain for a clear discussion of the character and function of the poetic imagination in the whole range of Sanskrit Poetics. Even though Kuntaka recognises it, his Kavi karman limits itself mainly to a normative analysis of empirical canons, and makes his Poetics ultimately assume a verbal and formal character, in which his fundamental idea is lost. His Vakrokti degenerates into a kind of Kavi praudhokti of later writers. No doubt, most writers solemnly affirm the necessity of Pratibhā or poetic imagination, but Pratibhā in their theories themselves does not assume any important rôle, nor is its character or function clearly determined. This imperfect understanding is also shown by what the Sanskrit theorists often say about culture (Vyūtpatti) and practice (Abhyāsa) in relation to the poetic imagination (Pratibhā). It is true that the fact of poetic representation is preceded by various kinds of knowledge, which, like feelings or physical facts, act as a stimulus or material. As adventitious aids in the externalisation of poetic intuition, they have a relative value, and a cultural background is involved in all good poetry. In so far as this is acknowledged, the Sanskrit theorists justly remark that culture and practice should assist innate poetic power. But, protesting their belief in the poetic imagination they sometimes go further and speak of "making a poet into a poet". Rudrata for instance, expresses the opinion that poetic power is not only inborn but also capable of attainment. It is, therefore, prescribed that the poet should be an expert in a long list of arts and sciences and make himself proficient in various kinds of poetical exercises. This demand is in conformity with the learned atmosphere in which Sanskrit Poetry at one time came to flourish and which made Poetics assume a scholastic character. In actual practice, no doubt, the gifted poets aspired to untrammelled utterance, but the general tendency in an epoch

an undoubted aesthetic acumen by always emphasising that the poetic activity in its essence is independent of intellectual utility and morality. Although they do not discuss the question, they tacitly distinguish the poetic activity from the intellectual or the practical and give evidence of a strong common sense by never confusing a poetic with a scientific or didactic work, the Kāvya with the Śāstra or the Nīti. It is curious indeed that these theorists expend a great deal of abstract and intellectualist erudition on a cold and monotonously inflated rhetoric, and yet they enjoy poetry as poetry and hardly ever think of the moral end or the intellectual gain. It is clearly indicated that poetry is not a mass of popularised truth, nor a manifestation of empirical pleasure and pain from the ethical point of view, but that it conveys a state of the mind in its intuitive purity which can be reproduced in an idealised form in the reader's mind. In Sanskrit therefore there never developed an intellectualist Poetics which valued Poetry for the knowledge it brought and regarded it as a semi-science, nor was there a practicist Poetics which emphasised such practical forms of human activity as have an utilitarian, hedonistic or moralistic end as a view.

But the failure to explain and justify poetic expression purely by the poetic imagination is seen in the vacillation and uncertainty of the various attempts to discover a rigid definition of poetry. We have seen that the earlier writers wisely leave the question alone, contenting themselves with the bare mention of Śabda and Artha as the ingredients. Following them the later writers take the Śabdārtha Sahitya in unbroken tradition as essential requisite of poetry, but they attempt to qualify it by the enumeration of certain standardised characteristics or Vīśeṣas as Ālankāra, Guna, Riti, Dhvani or Rasa. But they could not entirely divest the Śabdārtha sahitya of its grammatical and logical associations and erect it into a purely poetic concept. They forget all about the poetic imagination and concern themselves more or less with a normative analysis and classification of general formulas

and categories in order to explain what is an individualised occurrence with each poet. The failure to understand that the poetic intuition differs in different poets in different circumstances led them to make a vain effort to find one universal definition of Poetry one abstract and invariable formula for what admits of infinite individual and concrete variations to determine logically what in its essence is non-logical to immobilise the mobile by throwing a bridle on the neck of Pegasus. Both the approach and the method are not correct. The theorists devote themselves with great zeal to collect analyse and classify methodically after the manner of natural sciences a series of single facts into general principles. Such an empirical attitude admits indeed aesthetic occurrences but nourishes a delusion that like facts of natural sciences they can be grouped formally into classes and types. In the course of their investigation the theorists amass calculate and measure the greatest possible variety of such aesthetic facts formulate laws means modes and models but as they progress they always discover new facts which require fresh adjustment. In this they fail to realise that as each expression is unique and indivisible that artistic facts in their unified concreteness cannot like physical facts be mechanically divided and subdivided, nor can they like intellectual facts be logically comprehended by abstract universals. Such an attitude reduces Poetics to the rank of a formal discipline like Logic; and most of its puerile perplexities arise from this outlook. The theorists unfortunately forget that a work of art is an intuition that intuition is individuality and that individuality never repeats itself nor conforms to a prescribed mould. They believe thus not in unity but in the duality of imagination and expression thereby splitting up what is organic into mechanic parts. They hardly recognise that word and sense are symbols are inseparable from poetic intuition and as such they are not fixed and mechanical but mobile and elusive. Poetry should be taken as a living discourse among diversely ex-

pressive organisms and not as an embalmed collection of dead abstractions capable of scientific dissection. Good sense has always refused to accept a normative formulation of poetic expression. No one except a poor speaker or versifier speaks or writes by rules and no one believes that it is possible to lay down such rules of speaking or writing well. For the real poet as for the real speaker there is hardly any armoury of ready-made weapons; he forges his own weapons to fight his own particular battles.

If these investigations of Sanskrit theorists are meant to explain the principle which lies at the root of Poetry they can never do so completely and successfully by merely analysing and classifying aesthetic facts and categories without taking into account the poetic imagination which makes them what they are. Let it not be supposed that we wish to deny or minimise the usefulness of such analysis and classification from the scientific or scholastic point of view; what we want to stress is that they fail to establish their claim to explain the intuitive activity involved in poetic creation. As logical concepts or natural facts, they are admissible and are of practical value; but they hardly have importance for aesthetic explanation. They are like labels to a thing rather than the thing itself. In the true sense the elaboration of such series of laws is a negation of art itself. By their universality they negate its accidentality; by their abstraction its empiricity; by their mechanism its organic character. Thus Sanskrit Poetics attempting to solve the riddle of Poetry did hardly solve it but delighted itself with the pleasure of abstract thought and formal calculation. Nevertheless these aberrations and insufficiencies are at the same time attempts to reach the truth; and in the midst of unlifted shadows one does often perceive a running thread of silver lining. Even if the Sanskrit theorists could not because of initial handicap arrive at the final goal they still had a clear glimpse of it. Like the mystery in God's creation the mystery of the poet's creation is unfathomable.

able, and struck with wonder and admiration, one can only say

*karer abhiprayam a sabda gocaram
sphurantam ardesu padesu kevalam |
vadadbhir angah sphuja roma-vikriyair
janasya tustum bhavato'yam anjalih ||*

BHĀMAHA'S VIEWS ON GUNA

Of all early writers on Sanskrit Poetics Bhāmaha appears to be the most puzzling in the attitude he adopts towards the Guna doctrine. The only passage in which he employs the term *guna* is that in which he defines (ed. Trivedī iii 52-53)¹ the poetic figure Bhāvika as

*bhāvikatām itī prabandha viṣayam guṇam
pratyakṣaṃ na dīkṣante yatrārtha bhūta bhāvināḥ
citrodattodbhūtarthatām kathamah svabhūnitata
śabdānakulata ceti tasya hetum pracaṣyate ॥*

These verses come practically at the end of the chapter on the classification and definition of poetic figures (*kāvyaśāstrī karas*) and *prima facie* the Bhāvika coming in this context, should be taken as such. Dandin also follows (ed. Rangacarya ii 363-65)² the same procedure regarding the treatment of the Bhāvika repeats the first line of the above definition simplifying it still further in his own way and agrees with Bhāmaha in designating the Bhāvika as a *prabandha viṣaya guṇa*. Udbhaṭa follows Bhamaha generally in this respect (ed. Banhatti vi 6 p. 79)³ and defines it almost in the same way, but he appears to regard it more or less as a specific poetic figure and omits the qualification *kathamah svabhūnitata* as well as the designation *prabandha viṣaya guṇa*. These definitions⁴ are obviously meant to be wider than that of a simple poetic figure in the course of which the Bhāvika is

1 The reference is same in the Kashi Sanskrit Series edition but in the edition of Naganatha Sastry (with Eng. Trs., Tanjore 1927) it is iii 53-54.

2 ii 364-66 in both the Bombay Sanskrit Series edition and the edition of Premacandra Tarkavagīśa (Calcutta 1881).

3 p. 73 in Nandya Sagara Press edition (Bombay 1915).

4 We are not concerned here with later definitions of the Bhāvika as a definite poetic figure.

dealt with by these writers. It is a characteristic which is said to belong to and pervade the whole composition (*prabandha vyapto gunah* as Taranavacaspati puts it) and it does not (as a poetic figure would apparently do) restrict itself to a part of a composition i.e. it is not *eka deśika* as Jayamaṅgala on *Bhaṭṭi*¹ xi. 1 explains it. It is thus difficult to regard it as the elements of the definitions themselves also shew as a limited figure of speech, it should not only be *pada gata* or *vākya gata* but also like *rosa* of later writers *prabandha gata*. In spite of a certain novelty or obscurity of the conception it is clear that the theorists were reluctant or uneasy about treating it as an ordinary poetic figure and therefore defined it in somewhat wider terms at the conclusion of their treatment of such figures². The theory appears also to be reflected in practice. If we are to accept the assurances of the commentators (Jayamaṅgala and Mallinatha) the whole of canto xii of the *Bhaṭṭi* *kāvya* should be taken as an illustration of the *Bhāvika* as a *prabandha guṇa*. It is remarkable also that the *Bhāvika* is not mentioned by Vamana as a poetic figure nor is it included by him in his elaborate scheme of *Guṇas*. Dandin also would not include it in the list of his ten *marga gata* *Guṇas* or in their *viparyayas*.

The position is somewhat puzzling. The clue is furnished by the probable supposition that the *Bhāvika* like the *Svabhāvokti*³ involves the implication of an aesthetic factor to which it must have been difficult to assign a place in a clear cut scheme of *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*. The *Bhāvika* is defined by Bhāmaha generally as a vivid representation of past and future objects as if they are directly perceptible to the eye the vividness of the representation depending on the conditions that the theme must have a picturesque strange

1 The word *prākhyat* in the definition of Bhāmaha and Dandin may indicate that the view was probably traditional and was accepted implicitly without much discussion.

2 See my *Sanskrit Poetics* ii p. 62, f. n.

and exalted significance and therefore capable of being enacted well, and that the words employed must have a consistency. Dandin's definition¹ is more circumstantial, but it is more illuminating. The *Bhāvika* is said to consist in the mutual favourableness of all the parts of descriptive matter, in the non employment of redundant or useless qualifications in describing things in their proper places and in so arranging the expression that the intended depth of the theme comes out clearly. These are matters of detail, but the most important point in Dandin's definition which brings out the essential conception is the statement that the *Bhāvika* is so called because it is *bhāvyatā* and that the *bhāva* is the intention or rather the inward conception of the poet (*lavar abhiprayah*) which controls the details and resides in the poem as a whole, and not merely in its isolated parts. This *bhava* should not be taken as the technical emotional element which Pratiharenduraja, commenting on Bhamaha's phrase *svabhinita* would apparently read into it by the interpretation *īṅgārā samvāsitā*². No such significance is supported by the recognised commentators (*Tarunavacaspati*, *Hṛdayanī-*

1. *bhāvikatvam ī prabhuḥ prabandha viyayāḥ guṇam |*
bhāvaḥ lavar abhī prayāḥ lavayeyv āniddha saṁvāsitah |
parasparyopalāṇitva ī sarveṣāḥ vāsta parāṇām |
videṣaṇāḥ ī vyaṣṭi ānām ākṛtā tādāna-āramāṇā |
vyaktiḥ uktī kṛmā bhāṇā gambhīratyāpī vāstunah |
bhāvyatām idam sarvam īti tad bhāvaḥ ī viduḥ ||

The variant reading in the second line is *lavayevāṣṭya vyavasthīti* in the Madras edition for *lavayeyv āniddhi saṁvāsitah* in the first line and *bhāvikaḥ ī prabhuḥ* (Cal. ed.) and *bhāvaḥ īti sam īti prabhuḥ* (Madras ed.)

2. It is probably in view of such misconceived interpretation that Bhoja at a much later time includes the *Bhāvika* among his twenty-four *śabda-guṇa* (p. 75) as the conduct of a sentence according to its underlying emotion or sentiment (*bhāveti vakya īriti*) a definition which has been copied by Vidyānātha in his scheme of 24 *Gūṇa* modelled on that of Bhoja although his *Artha-guṇa* *Bhāvika* is *subhī prayoktā vāṇī* in a narrow sense (p. 86).

the other hand the view referred to by Bhamaha = implied in the tradition which Rudraja's Riti and the Dhvanikara & Sadighatana follow in later times. The only plausible inference that can be made from this is that Bhamaha was probably aware of some theories which approve of Mādhurya Ojas and Prasada in poetic composition (in what character it is not clear but presumably = Gunas of the exponents of the Riti theory) chiefly on the basis of the desirability of long compounds but either he was indifferent to their literary value or did not think it worth while to treat them as distinct or separate elements of poetic expression.

It is remarkable indeed that Bhamaha does not think it necessary to connect as the Riti theorists have since done the Gunas with Riti which term itself (or the term Marga which Dandin employs) is never used by him and which conception even if it was known to him does not appear to have been seriously entertained. Nor like Bharata does he view the Madhurya etc. as independent Kavya gunas. Bhamaha refers indeed in another context (1.31.35) to Vaidarbha and Gaudiya Kavyas (and not expressly to Ritis of those names familiarised by Dandin and Vamana) in which some theorists of his time have apparently discovered differences of manner and treatment but from his remark it is clear that he himself would not pay much attention to the alleged differences. If Bhamaha was aware of some theory of Riti or its classification he did not apparently subscribe to it nor did he think it necessary to attach as much importance to it in his treatment of Poetics as Dandin did. This is an attitude which is intelligible in view of his belonging to a different tradition of thought which emphasised the interest and importance of those embellishments of poetic speech which are known as *alamkaras*. As a corollary from this it follows that although Bhamaha was aware of some characteristics of poetic expression such as Madhurya Ojas and Prasada which were defined and related as constituent excellences of Riti by the Riti theorists and regarded by them as essential elements of poetry

betrayed disapproval they had still to take the mode of the Gaudas into account presumably because it had attained a commendable position and found favour in an equal degree with a class of writers and readers. It seems therefore, that even long before Banabhatta and Dandin the Gaudas exhibited a distinctive literary diction of their own,¹ which side by side with the widely accepted Vaidarbhi had an established tradition incapable of being completely ignored. Just as Bengal strove politically in these centuries against the constant aggression of Magadha Thaneshwar and Kashmir to maintain its independence it attempted in the literary sphere to withstand the domination of the almost universally accepted Vaidarbha mode of expression and succeeded in establishing its originality.

These references are important in literary history because they supply undeniable evidence that by the 7th and 8th centuries there must have grown up in Bengal a Sanskrit culture which attained such importance as necessitated the recognition of its characteristic method of expression. Apart from the lucubrations of Bhamaha and Dandin Vamana

1 In the absence of proper data it is impossible to determine when the distinction between Vaidarbha and Gauda modes was first recognised. H. Jacobs (*Aśāraṅgi* pp. xvi ff) suggests that the simpler Vaidarbha style was a reaction against the older and more elaborate Gauda style and came into existence probably in the 3rd century A.D. It is possible to argue on the contrary that the Gauda style which asserts itself more and more in the later Kavya was itself a symbol of further development exhibiting a tendency towards greater elaboration. Both the standpoints ignore the possibility of the two styles developing concurrently as rival modes. The controversy of the rhetoricians makes it probable that both the Ritis developed side by side and entered into a competition for mastery—Bharata in his *Nāṭya Śāstra* (ed. Grassi iv 26) speaks of four dramatic modes or Pravyūths viz. *Avantī*, *Pañcīlī*, *madhyamā*, *Dakṣiṇyā* and *Odra* *magadhī*; the last of which is expressly stated to have been employed in the eastern provinces including *Anga*, *Vaṅga*, *Paundra* and *Nepalā* (x v 45-47) there being no special Gaudī Pravyūth.

THE ĀKHYĀYIKĀ AND THE KATHĀ IN CLASSICAL SANSKRIT

The distinction made between the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā* by writers on Sanskrit Poetics is well known. We propose in this paper to consider how far the prescriptions of the rhetoricians apply to the few existing specimens of the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā* by Subandhu and Bānabhaṭṭa, and what light, if any, they throw on the development of these species of prose composition in Classical Sanskrit.¹

The oldest writer on Poetics who deals with this matter appears to be Bhāmaha, who draws a rigid distinction between the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā*. Bhāmaha lays down (1 25 9) that the *ākhyāyikā* is a literary composition (1) which is written in prose in words pleasing to the ear (*śravya*) and agreeable to the matter intended (*prakṛiānukūla*), (2) but which may contain metrical pieces in *vaṭra* and *aparavaṭra* metre, the object of these verses being to give a timely indication of future happenings in the story,² (3) which should have an exalted substance (*udattārtha*) with some characteristics supplied by the poet's imagination as a special mark,³ and

1 The reader need scarcely be reminded that the Sanskrit theorists define poetry so as to include any literary work of the imagination, and absolutely refuse to make rhyming or verse an essential.

2 The text reads (ed. Trivedī, BSS 12v, 1909) *vaṭraṇi cāpara-vaṭtram ca kale bhāvyartha śaṁsi ca*. Śaṅkara, quoting this verse in his commentary on the *Harṣa-carita* (an 11 10), reads *kāvyo lāvṇyārtha śaṁsi ca*.

3 The reading, which is apparently corrupt, is *kaver abhīpraya kṛtāṇi kathāṇi kṛtāṇi anukūla* "marked by certain narration created by the intention of the poet." Premasandra, quoting this half verse in his commentary on the *Kaṇvādarśa*, reads *kaver abhīpraya kṛtāṇi anukūla anukūla kathā*, introducing a grave variant and connecting it with the *kathā*. But it is not intelligible how he connects the next line in Bhāmaha (*āṅya havana* etc.) with the *ākhyāyikā*. From the text as it stands in Bhāmaha both these lines should rightly go with the *ākhyāyikā*, and not with the *kathā*—and for this we have the authority of the text of the *Agni-purāṇa* which appropriates one of these lines.

having for its theme the abduction of a girl (*kanya harana*), a fight (*sangrama*) = separation (*vipralambha*) and the (final) triumph (*udaya*), apparently of the hero, (4) in which an account of his own deeds¹ is given by the hero himself, and (5) in which the story is divided into several pauses called *ucchvāsas*². In the *kātha* on the other hand there are no *vāktra* or *aparavāktra* verses no division into *ucchvāsas* and the story should not be narrated by the hero but by some one else. It may be written in Sanskrit or in Apabhraṃśa³ which indicates by implication that the *akhyayāśā* should always be composed in Sanskrit.

Dandin appears to criticize and reject all these fine distinctions which in his opinion are not essential but more or less formal requirements. He states that some people would

1 *īṣṭam ākhyāyate sarjām nāyakena sva-cessitam* where the word *īṣṭa* in connexion with *sva-cessit* in my inference "actual history or facts of experience as opposed to invented fiction". This should be read with Bhāmaha's prohibition of self-revelation by the hero in the *kātha*. In the *kāśī* Bhāmaha positively says "what noble man flaunts his own merits? It may be asked in this connexion how is it that Bhāmaha allows the hero to narrate his own exploits in the *ākhyāyāśā* in which this objection also apparently applies? To obviate this seeming inconsistency we should suppose that since in the *ākhyāyāśā* what is narrated consists more or less of facts of actual experience the hero (who is the narrator) cannot be suspected of self-boasting but since the *kāśī* is more or less an invented story this trait of vanity should not be allowed in the hero and therefore some other person should be the narrator.

2 The word *ucchvāsa* (lit. breathing out) indicates a pause for breath and so it is a name for a chapter which constitutes the pause for the narrator who cannot be supposed to tell the story "one breath" but should recount it in an easy manner with necessary pauses.

3 The linguistic forms according to Bhāmaha for literary compositions are Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa (s. 16) but it is not clear what Bhāmaha means by the last term. Daṇḍin gives a definite connotation to this term as the language of the Abhīras and others in the *Advya* but in the *Alaṃkāra* it is a name applied to all languages other than Sanskrit (s. 36).

distinguish between the *ākhyāyikā* and the *kathā* by maintaining that in the former the narrator is the hero himself, in the latter the hero or some one else (*nāyakena itareṇa vā vācya*), on the ground that the discovery of one's own merit is not a fault in one who is only stating what is true (*bhūtarthasajitā*). Dandin disagrees with this opinion, and holds that the fact that the hero or some other person is the narrator is not a real ground of distinction, and it is not strictly observed in current poetical usage (*anyamo dṛṣṭa*), for sometimes in the *ākhyāyikā* the narrator is found to be some person other than the hero.¹ Secondly, Dandin urges that the employment of specific metres like the *vaktra* and *aparavaktra* need not be rigorously binding in an *ākhyāyikā*, for they may (like *ṛg* and other metres) incidentally occur in the *kathā*. Thirdly, the designation *ucchvāsa* is sometimes found indeed applied to the divisions of an *ākhyāyikā* like the term *lambhaka* in the case of the *kathā*, but nothing can be concluded from this. Fourthly, themes like the abduction of a girl, fight, separation, or triumph are not special characteristics of these prose compositions, for they are also found in the *sarga bandha mahākavya*.² Fifthly, special marks due to the inventive power of the poet³ need not be a fault else-

1 As in the *Harṣa carita* as Taruṇa vacaspati in his commentary points out.

2 Dandin is here intentionally misunderstanding Bhāmaha. No doubt these themes are found in the *mahākavya* but Bhāmaha probably means that while these things are subordinate in other species of poetic composition they should be prominent in the *ākhyāyikā*.

3 This special 'mark' (*ākṣa* or *anaka*) is interpreted by commentators old and new (Taruṇa vacaspati and Premacandra) as signifying the trick of using special words (like *śrī* at the end of Māgha's poems, *lakṣmi* in Bharavi's *ausaraga* in Pravarasena, etc.) to indicate the end of a canto (*bandhanakṣa*). But perhaps this remark of Dandin connects itself with Bhāmaha's remark that the *ākhyāyikā* may sometimes bear the marks of the poet's inventive power (*kaver ābhāṣṛava kṛtāḥ kathamaḥ kṛtsid anakāḥ*), and refers to the invented episodes or parts in the matter of fact *ākhyāyikā*.

where (i.e. in a *kathā*) for there is no limit as to the means which a poet may adopt for the attainment of his purpose. And lastly Dandin expressly says that the *kathā* may be composed in all languages as well as in Sanskrit for the wonderful story of the *Bṛhat kathā* is said to be written in the *bhūta bhāṣā*¹.

We are not concerned here with the much discussed question whether these remarks of Dandin are directly levelled (as they probably are) against Bhamaha in particular but we should note that while Bhamaha makes a sharp distinction between the two species Dandin does not admit this distinction, and considering the admittedly *a posteriori* nature of these earlier works on *Alaṅkāra* it is not improbable that their respective conclusions were based upon the observance of current poetical usage which they analyse and in which an explanation of this divergence of view should be sought.

Let us now turn therefore to Dana's *Harṣa-carita* and his *Kadambari* which are respectively designated by the author himself as an *akhyāyikā* and a *kathā* and see how far the teachings of these two earliest theorists are illustrated by these two typical works or whether their conclusions were based upon some other prototypes.

The *Harṣa-carita* begins with twenty introductory stanzas in the *śloka* or *anuṣṭubh* metre concluding this preliminary part with a verse in *jagadī*. These verses contain an obeisance (*namaskṛiya*) to Vyasa and to the deities Śiva and Pārvatī and dwell upon poets and poetry generally incidentally praising great poets and poems of the past. After briefly stating the merits of an *akhyāyikā* (ll. 20) the author praises king Harṣa devotion to whom supplies the motive of his literary composition notwithstanding the existence of great works and authors in the world.

¹ By which term Dandin implying the *Pañcāṅga Prākāśa* shows himself conversant with the legendary account of the origin of this work.

After this comes the prose story of which eight *ucchvasas* remain. That the chapters were entitled *ucchvasas* by the author is indicated by the obvious pun in śl 10. With the exception of the first every *ucchvasa* begins with a pair of stanzas which give an indication of what is to follow. The metres of these verses are fairly uniform, consisting generally of *arya* with the single exception of a stanza in the *śloka*-metre in *Ucchvasa* iii.

In the prose part we have a detailed account of the poet's family extending from the first to the third *Ucchvasa*, his youth, introduction to the court and manner of his reception there, his return to his native country and relation of the story of king Harṣa to his relatives. Thus the main story begins with the third *Ucchvasa* and continues to the eighth where it breaks off.

It may be noted that the prose narrative contains some verses in different metres, of which one (ed. NSP 1918 p. 125) is expressly stated to be in the *vaktra* metre, while four (pp. 18, 78, 125, 159) are similarly stated to be in the *apara vaktra* metre. The other verses contained in the prose narrative are in *vasanta śloka* (ii p. 54), *śardula vikṛita* (ii p. 69), *arya* (ii p. 86, iv p. 140, vi p. 185), *śṛṅghara* (iii p. 93) and *śloka* (v p. 153), the last two *Ucchvasas* containing no verses at all.

Before taking up the *Kadambari* we may briefly indicate the nature of the other (and perhaps earlier) *kāvya* in Sanskrit viz. Subandhu's *Vasavadatta* which is apparently referred to by Bana himself in his *Harṣa carita*. This work begins with twelve introductory stanzas in *arya* with an obeisance to Sarasvatī, Kṛṣṇa and Śiva, some praise of good poets and a statement of Subandhu's authorship. The prose story is immaterial for our purpose, but it may be noted here that we do not get this form of the story of *Vasavadatta* elsewhere, the particulars of it being probably due to the inventive genius of the poet. There is no interruption or pause in the narrative and no division into chapters, nor

are there *vaktra* or *aparavaktra* verses although some metrical pieces in *arya śikharinī śardūla vikṛdita* and *śaṅkdhara* occur thrice. The tenor of the story is more or less peaceful love being the prevailing sentiment, and there is no *sai-grāma* or *kanya-harana* (as in Bhamaha's *alhyayika*) unless Vasavadatta's being carried away to the Vindhya mountains be construed as an instance of the last theme.

The *Kudambri* the story of which is too well known to require recapitulation here is similar in form but perhaps less complicated in plot. The prose narrative which is continuous is introduced by some verses in *camṣastha* which contain an obeisance to Brahma Śiva and the author's guru Bhatsu some remarks on the effects of good poetry and an account of the author's race and family. The tenor of the story is similarly peaceful with love as the prevailing sentiment and is not based upon any known *itthasa* the main plot being probably an invention of the poet.

Taking the *Harṣa-carita* as a typical surviving specimen of the earlier *alhyayika* (its date being the first half of the seventh century) we find at once that while it conforms in some points to the requirements prescribed by Bhamaha it cannot yet be taken to typify exactly the *alhyayika* described by him. The work is written in agreeable prose with verse adjuncts but the *vaktra* and *apara vaktra* verses contained in it are merely topical and do not fulfil the requirement that they should indicate the tenor of the plot this work being done by the pairs of verses (generally in *arya*) prefixed at the beginning of each chapter. The story is indeed *udattartha* being the history of a great king and is regularly divided into *acchāsas* but it does not touch the themes of *kanya-harana* etc., and it is difficult to see what special mark of the poet's inventive genius it bears inasmuch as it professes to be the actual life history of a royal personage narrated by an eye witness. But the most important point to note in this connexion is that it does not conform in

the essential characteristic laid down by Bhamaha that the narrator must be the hero himself

Taking these facts into consideration it will not be wrong to draw the conclusion that the prototype of Bhamaha's *akhyāyikā* was probably not the *Harja carita* of Bāṇa but some other work which has not come down to us. From Bhamaha's treatment we may however, conclude that in spite of some controversy in his time on this point two kinds of prose narratives respectively known as the *akhyāyikā* and the *kathā* existed which could be differentiated from each other on very important points. Apart from merely formal requirements Bhamaha's analysis makes it clear that the *akhyāyikā* in his time was more or less a work of the nature of an autobiography where the narrator is the hero himself who recites the facts of his own experience and who (as interpreted by Dandin) cannot therefore be accused of self-boasting unworthy in a noble personage. Bhamaha indeed allows some scope for poetic invention and introduction of interesting themes to prevent its being a bare recital of facts but the prevailing tendency to matters of fact is emphasized by Bhamaha as the distinguishing mark of the *akhyāyikā* as contrasted with the *kathā*. Bhamaha's description of the *kathā* on the other hand is purely negative (excepting his injunction as to the language to be employed) but it appears by implication that the *kathā* as distinguished from the *akhyāyikā* was more or less of the nature of a fiction an interrupted story or narrative where the narrator should be some person other than the hero. With respect to subordinate points viz. the presence of *vāktra* and *apara vāktra* verses and division into *ucchyāsar* Dandin certainly evinces a great deal of common sense in rejecting these formal requirements as essential features. But they do not appear to be altogether immaterial and the animus with which the earlier theorists enter into the controversy can be understood if we consider that some of these formal differences find an explanation in the respective differences in the general character of these two

species. The real issue involved in the *ākhyāyika* however is not whether the name of the chapter should be *ucchvāsa* or whether the kind of metre employed should always be *vāktra* and *apara vāktra* but the fact that ■ is essential that the *ākhyāyika* should be divided into well defined pauses or chapters while the *kathā* should be continuous narrative and that certain verses (possibly inserted at the beginning of each chapter) should foreshadow the tenor of the chapter following. The pauses in the *ākhyāyika* as already pointed out were necessary because the hero who is himself the narrator should be allowed to recount his story in an easy manner while the appearance of the indicative verses ■ excluded in the *kathā* by the fact of its being an uninterrupted narrative. The semblance of reality which the appearance of the hero as the narrator adds to the *ākhyāyika* is similarly out of place in the *kathā* where the poet or some other person should be allowed to weave out the narrative. This was in general the conception of these two species of prose composition in the time of Bhamaha. The *ākhyāyika* was more or less a serious composition dealing generally with facts of actual experience with an autobiographical or semi-historical interest while the *kathā* was essentially a fictitious narrative—which may sometimes (as Dandin contends) possess an autobiographical form but whose interest chiefly resides in its invention. The *ākhyāyika* declined in later times and did not keep strictly to the characteristics detailed above but the *kathā* although ■ was well defined (after Bana's works) in *Rudraja* was less touched by changes in form and substance even from Subandhu's time.¹

1 As the definition of the *kathā* did not undergo much material change in the course of its history Bhamaha's somewhat general characterization is applicable to Subandhu's *Vasa adatta* as well as to Bana's *Kādambarī* but it is possible that the latter was not the prototype contemplated by him just as the *Harsacarita* was not the prototype of his *ākhyāyika*. This would corroborate the date of Bhamaha as a younger contemporary of Dharmakīrti (as conjectured by Jacoby in *Sb. der Pres. u. Akad.* xxiv).

When we come to the *Agni purāṇa* which more or less uncritically copies the dicta of Daṇḍin and other authors¹ we find however the influence of Bana's works reacting upon the theorists and making them change their definitions to suit the new conditions. According to the *Agni purāṇa* we have in the *akhyayika* (1) a praise of the author's family (*kartṛvaṃśa prasaṃsa*) in prose (2) themes like abduction of a girl fighting separation and other untoward incidents (*vipattitayāh*) (3) division into *ucchvasas* (4) presence of *churnakā*² or of *vaktra* and *aparavaktra* verses (5) a brilliant diction exemplifying the excellence of *ritis* and *vytis*. In the *kāṭha* on the other hand (1) there is the praise of the poet's family in verse (2) there may be an episode or another story (*kāṭhantaram*) introducing the main story (*mukhyaśarīra vataraya*) (3) we have pauses or *paricchēdas* but sometimes there may be divisions called *lambhaka*³ (4) *catuṣpadi* verses may be introduced in each *garbhā*⁴. This is practically the conventional enumeration but with a marked difference the most important point being the *kartṛvaṃśa prasaṃsa* and the use of the *kāṭhantara* which are omitted in the discussion of earlier writers but which are admitted here (and more pointedly in Rudraṭa) probably through the influence of Bana's works.

Rudraṭa differs very noticeably from the older writers in his treatment and it may be generally said that he has accepted and generalized the characteristics of Bana's two works as to universal rules governing the composition of the

1 This point regarding the nature of the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Agni purāṇa* is not cited in *Sanskrit Poetics* cited above pp. 10¹-4.

2 Vāmana defines (1.3.23.5) *cūrṇa* (one of the subdivisions of prose dictation) as *anū-dhā-lāṭṭa-padam* (delicate words and no long compounds) *ilāṭṭāprāṇa* being the reverse.

3 Read *bhaṭṭa* *vā* *lambhaka* *h* *k* *ac* *r* for *bl* *aved* *vāṭombakāh* *Avacis* in the printed text.

4 The *Agni purāṇa* speaks of *kāṭha* *kaṭhā* *parikatā* and *kāṭha* *n* *lāṭ* for which see *Locana* p. 141 (with the added *śakāḍa* *kaṭhā*), and Hemacandra who defines various other sub-species (pp. 339-40).

katha and the *akhyaika* respectively. According to him, we have in the *katha* (1) an introductory *namaskriya* in verse to the *devas* and *gurus* and a statement of the author's family and the motive of his authorship, (2) the prose narrative, written in Sanskrit (or in verse in other languages) in light alliterative words the plot including *pura varnana* etc. (as in the case of the *utpada kavya* xvi 3) (3) a *kathantora* at the beginning, which is immediately connected with the main story, (4) a theme consisting of the winning of a girl (*kanya labha*) which being the main issue, the sentiment of love is developed fully in it (*vinayasa sakala frugara*). In the *akhyaika* on the other hand (1) we have the *namaskriya* to *devas* and *gurus* in verse together with an incidental praise of older poets a confession of the poet's own inability and a statement of his motive in writing notwithstanding these drawbacks which motive may spring from the poet's devotion to a particular king his addiction to the praise of other people's merits or from some other special causes, (2) the story should be written in the manner of a *katha* but emphasis is put on the injunction that an account of the poet himself and his family must be contained in it, written in prose and not in verse, (3) there are divisions into *ucchyāṣas* and two *arya* verses should occur at the beginning of each chapter excepting the first.¹

It will be seen at once that these characteristics detailed by Rudraja apply fully and strictly to the cases of Dana's two works. Rudraja along with the author of the *Agni purana* gives interesting remarks concerning the introductory stanzas all the peculiarities of which are minutely observed in the

1 Some matters of detail are added viz. on the occasion of a doubt concerning a past incident or an incident not witnessed by the speaker (*parokṣa*) or concerning a present or future object the poet in order to dispel the doubt should let someone cite in the presence of the doubting person one or two of the poetic figures *anyokṣa samāśokṣa* or *śleṣa* and the metres employed in these cases should be *dr̥ṣṭa aparā vaktra paśpaṣṭra* or according to circumstances metres like the *mālinī*

ment, and this throws into relief the general character of Sanskrit prose *kathā* as an invented love story, which approaches the nature of romantic fiction. Ānandavardhana, who deals with prose composition only topically (p. 141) in connexion with his discussion of *saṅghaṭanā* (condition of compounds in diction), appears to recognize this point. He says that in the *kathā* we have the same kind of diction as in the *ākhyāyikā*, but in the former the rules relating to *Rasa* should be observed (in 8) implying thereby this peculiarity of the delineation of *Rasa* (especially *śṛṅgāra*) as its principal concern. To Abhinavagupta, on the other hand, who accepts the older convention, the two species are interesting only from the point of view of form, the *ākhyāyikā*, in his opinion, being characterized by *ucchvāras* and *vaktra aparavaktra* verses, and the *kathā* being entirely devoid of these. Hemacandra (p. 338) follows the same convention, but admits Daṇḍin's criticism (as do most later authors) regarding the narrator and the linguistic form, and pointedly quotes the *Harṣa carita* and the *Kādambarī* as typical instances. He agrees with Rudraṭa however that the *kathā* may be wholly in verse, citing an unknown *Lilāvastī* as an example. Vidyādhara does not deal with the question at all, and to Vidyānātha the *kathā* is unknown. The latter speaks of *gadya* and *padya kāvya* citing the *Kādambarī* and the *Raghu vaṃśa* as instances, while the definition of the *ākhyāyikā* is attempted, as in the case of Abhinavagupta's definition, mainly from the formal point of view. Viśvanātha, the latest writer who devotes some attention to this question, merely puts Rudraṭa's generalization in a precise form, and his treatment shows that the older distinctions were already forgotten, and the new types evolved on the basis of Bāṇa's works had firmly established themselves. But like Rudraṭa, Viśvanātha emphasizes *sarasa vastu* — the substance of the *kathā*, although he is silent with regard to the question of the subject matter of the *ākhyāyikā*.

Thus we can distinguish two or three well defined stages in the growth of the *kathā* and the *ākhyāyikā* in classical Sanskrit.

The earliest forms of these \equiv we have seen are noticed by Bhamaha, and their characteristics may be summarized thus

Akhyāyika (1) The subject matter gives facts of actual experience, (2) The narrator is the hero himself, (3) The story is divided into chapters called *ucchāśas* containing indicative *vaktra* and *apara vaktra* verses, (4) Scope may be allowed to poetic invention and the themes may embrace subjects like abduction of a girl fighting separation, and final triumph, (5) It should be written in Sanskrit

Katha (1) The subject matter \equiv probably an invented story (2) The narrator is some one other than the hero, (3) There is no division into *ucchāśas* no *vaktra* or *apara vaktra* verses, (4) It may be written in Sanskrit or in Apabhramśa

These characteristics do not apply strictly to Bana's two works which however begin to influence the theorists a little later, and we find a destructive criticism of these fine distinctions as early as Dandin. The new *akhyāyika* and *katha* which arose in later times and which find themselves modified from the older types partly on the model of Bana's two works are distinctly authorized by Rudraṭa who generalizes the characteristics of Bana's two works into rules of universal application. The characteristics may be given thus

Akhyāyika (1) The subject matter gives facts of actual experience (2) The narrator need not be the hero himself, (3) It is divided into chapters called *ucchāśas* which should (excepting the first) open with two stanzas preferably in *arjṣ* indicating the tenor of the chapter in question (4) It possesses a metrical introduction of a literary character

Katha (1) The subject matter is a story generally \equiv love story for the most part invented by the poet, (2) The narrator should be some person other than the hero who may sometimes take that rôle (3) There is no division into chapters (4) It should have \equiv literary metrical introduction

This practically stereotypes the two species in Sanskrit literature and as a natural result of this fixing of the characteristics the *akhyayika* and the *kathā* declined to such an extent that most later theorists do not think it necessary to dilate upon the question.

THE DHVĀNIKĀRA AND ĀNANDAVARDHANA

Ānandavardhana has been assigned by Bühler and Jacobī to the middle of the ninth century, on the strength of *Rājataranginī* v 31, which makes him one of the ornaments of the court of Avantivarman (A D 855-84). The statements of Kalhana, no doubt, must be accepted with caution, but it is unlikely, as we shall see from several other considerations, that the tradition in Kashmir, thus embodied in the *Rājataranginī*, regarding a famous author, should have maintained a false or unfounded account. We are pretty certain of the time of Abhinavagupta Ānandavardhana's commentator, for, as he himself states, his commentary on the *Īśvara pratyabhijñā* was written in A D 1014-15, while his *Krama śloka* was composed in A D 991. This would certainly place him towards the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century. Now, from Abhinavagupta's remarks at the end of his *Locana* commentary on Uddyotakī and vii of the *Dhvanyāloka*, it appears that the study of this famous work was traditional in his family, and that his commentary was composed (ed Nirṇay Sagar Press, p 60), as a rejoinder to another, named *Candrikā* written by one of his predecessors in the same *gotra* (*candrikā kārasya m pāṣṭhanti ity-alanī pūrva varṇitāni sāha mādena bahunā* p 125, *ity-alanī nipa purvaja sagotrāni sakant mādena*, p 123, etc), and four times in his commentary (pp 123, 174, 185, 215) he discusses or controverts the views of this earlier commentator, who is specifically referred to as *Candrikā-kara* at pp 178 and 185¹. This would certainly

1 This *Candrikā* is also referred to in a punning verse at the beginning of Mahimābhūṣa v 3 yakti mēka (i 5) *dhvanyālokaṁ ca gahane śikhitāni vāṇijāḥ padē padē salabham | rabhasena yat pravṛtā prakāśa kārā candrikādy alpaśaraṇa* on which the commentator, probably Ruyyaka remarks *candrikā jyaṣṭha dvau vicarṇa-grantho'pi* (ed NSP p 1)

ly allow some generations to lie between Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, and would negative completely Pischel's contention that in three passages Abhinavagupta speaks of Ānandavardhana as one of his teachers. These passages occur at pp. 37, 183, and 214 of the printed text, and a perusal of them with reference to their context will convince anyone that the honorific word *guru* in the text may either refer to Ānandavardhana, not literally but figuratively, as *paratīparā-guru*, whose work was held in esteem in his family (cf. Jacobi, *WZKM* iv, pp. 237-8), or (which is more likely) the reference is to one or other of Abhinavagupta's teachers, such as Bhajja Taula, Lakṣmanagupta, or Bhāṣṭendurāja, who are spoken of pretty often in this commentary, as well as in his *Tantrāloka* and his commentaries on the *Nāṭya-śāstra* and the *Parātrāsikā*. Again, Kayyaka states that he wrote his commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Devī-śataka* (ed. Kāvya-mālā, Guccaka ix) in about A.D. 977, so that by the end of the tenth century Ānandavardhana was well enough established in fame to have two such learned commentators. It may also be pointed out that Rājasekhara, who lived about A.D. 880-920, mentions and cites Ānandavardhana by name in his *Kāvya-mimāṃsā* (p. 16), and this should certainly clear up any doubt as to the authenticity of the date assigned by Kalhana and accepted by Buhler and Jacobi.

Several works have been ascribed to Ānandavardhana, but what immediately concerns us is the celebrated work on Poetics known as *Dhvanyāloka* (also called *Kāvya-āloka* or *Sahdayāloka*), of which or a part of which, he is reputed to be the author. This work may be divided into two parts, viz. (1) *Kārikās*, consisting of verses and treating of *dhvani*, and (2) the *Vṛtti* or exposition, generally in prose with illustrative verses, as the *Kārikās*. Now the question has been raised whether the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* are of the same authorship or should be attributed to different authors.

Abhinavagupta and after him several writers on Poetics carefully distinguish between the *Kārikāra* and the

Vṛttikara implying thereby that the former is a different and older writer. In several places in his commentary ॥ seems to oppose distinctly the Vṛttikara and the Karikakara and to refer to them respectively as such viz)

Somuctiasth prakāṣaṇa-dīpāna paramēśvara sammutkhyam karoti vṛttikarāḥ (p 1)

Nanu dhvani svarupam bruma iti pratipnaya vacya pratipamanakhyau dvau bhedaṁ arthasya iti vyaakhyaabhidhane ku samgatih karikaya ity asankya samgatim kartum avataraṇikam karoti (p 12)

Ata eva mula karika sakṣat tan nirakarandārthā na śruyate vṛttikri tu nirakṛtam apī prameya samkhyā pīṣanaya kantiḥena tat pakṣam anudya nirakaroti (p 59)

Dvivyoddhote karikakaro vantarā vibhagam viśeṣa lakṣaṇam ca vidadhād anuvāda mullena mula vibhagam dīpīdham sūcitāṁ Tadasaṁsareṇa tu vṛttikṛd ātravoddhote mula vibhagam avocat sa ca dvividha īti (pp 59 60)

Vṛttikarāḥ samgatim uddhṛtasya kurvāṇa upakramāte evam ity adī Prakāṣita īti māya vṛttikareṇa tateti bhavati Na ca itan māyoktam apī tu karikarābhīprayeṇa ity aha tatreti (p 69)

Aṅya pakṣam duṣṭatvena hṛdi nidhaya bhīṣatvat sa pakṣam purvaṁ darśayati vṛttikarāḥ (p 71)

Karikāpy abhīprāya dvayenaiva yojya Na kevalam prathamābhīpraye prathamā karikarīḥa-dṛṣṭāntābhīprayeṇa vjā khyeyam evam vṛtti grantho pi yojyah (p 78)

Vṛttikāro valkyamāna karikābhīprayaṁ darśayann aha (p 85)

Prakṛanta prakāṣa dvayopasannī āram īritya prakāṣa sīca nani caikenāva jānena karomity asayena sadhāraṇam avataraṇa padam prakṣipati vṛttikṛt (p 104)

Uktam eva dhvani svarupam tadabhasa viveka hetutoya karikakaro nivadaṣṭy abhīprayeṇa vṛttikṛd upakaram dādātī (p 122)

Yas tu vyacāṣe vyaṅgyaṇām vastvalamkāra rasanam mulhena īti sa evam prajjanyah etat tatāt trī bhēdātmani mā karī

*kārikāreṇa kṛtam vṛttikāreṇa tu darśitam Na ca idānīm vṛtti
kāro bheda prakāṣaṇam karoti, etc* (p 123)

*Kārikākāreṇa pūrvam vyatireka uktam. Na ca saryathā
na kartavyo'pi tu bibhatsādau kartavya eveti paścād anvayah
Vṛttikāreṇa tvanvaya pūrvako vyatireka itī śailīm anusartum
anvayah pūrvam upāttaḥ* (pp 130 I)

Darśitam eveti karikākāreṇeti bhūta pratyayah (p 138)

*Yadyapy arthananta māt্রে हेतुः वृत्तिकारेणोक्तो तत्तद्वापि करि
क़ाकारेणोक्तो इति* (on iv 3, ed. H. K. De reprinted below), etc

All these passages are important, especially the last four in which Abhinavagupta tries to reconcile the conflicting views expressed by the Kārikāra and the Vṛttikāra. It is to be noted that Abhinava generally applies the epithet Granthakṛt to the author of the Vṛtti and Mūla granthakṛt to the author of the Kārikā (e.g. p 135). An exceptional weight attaches to the testimony of Abhinavagupta, whose opinion assumes a special importance when we consider that he did not live very far apart from Ānandavardhana himself, and that in his family, the study of *Dhvanyāloka* was handed down as a kind of traditional heritage.

If, however, the common authorship of the Kārikā and the Vṛtti be posited, then one would expect to find complete agreement of opinion between the two. On the other hand, it seems that the system as given in its bare outline by the Kārikākāra in his concise verses has been considerably expanded, revised, and modified by the Vṛttikāra, and many problems not discussed or even hinted at by the former are elaborately treated of by the latter. In one place, for instance (p 123), Abhinavagupta clearly points out that the classification of *dhvani* according to *vastu*, *alamkara*, and *rasadi* is not expressly taught in any Kārikā although after the manner of all faithful commentators he attempts in his own way to reconcile this inconsistency. Indeed, it would seem that Ānandavardhana attempted to build up a more or less complete system of Poetics upon the loosely joined ideas and materials supplied by the Kārikās and his success was so

marvellous that in course of time the Kārikakara receded to the background completely overshadowed by the more important figure of his formidable expounder and people considered as the Dhvanikara not the author of the few memorial verses but the commentator Anandavardhana himself who for the first time fixed the theory in its present form. It may also be pointed out that the term Dhvanikara came gradually to be used in the generic sense of 'the creator of the Dhvani theory' and therefore indiscriminately applied by later writers to Anandavardhana who though not himself the founder of the theory came to receive that credit for having first victoriously introduced the system in the struggle of the schools.

It is not surprising, therefore that in the verse ascribed to Rajasekhara in Jahlana's *Sukti-muktavali* Anandavardhana is regarded as the founder of the Dhvani theory. Similarly Samudrabandha (commentary on the *Alamkara-sutra* p. 4) passing in review the five schools of Poetics before Ruyyaka mentions Anandavardhana as the founder of the fifth or last Dhvani school. This would also explain the two groups of apparently puzzling citations from the *Dhvanyaloka* met with in the works of later writers in which they either confuse or identify Anandavardhana with the Dhvanikara (On the one hand we have several *Kārikas* cited under the name of Anandavardhana while on the other several passages which occur in the *Vṛtti* are given under the name of the Dhvanikara¹). This confusion was so complete in later writers that even in the latter part of the eleventh century Mahimabhaṭṭa who professed to demolish the new

1 See for instance Kṛṣṇendra *Aucitya v carn-carced* p. 134 = *Dhvanyaloka* iii 24 Hemacandra *Alamkara-cudaman* p. 26 = Vallabhaśa 5 bhāṣā śloka no 157 = *Dhvanyaloka* i 4 Govinda Thakura *Ārya-pradīpa* p. 16 = *Dhvanyaloka* p. 221 Viśvanātha *Sāntya-darpana* iii Roop p. 108 = *Dhvanyaloka* p. 130 Jayaratha *Alamkara-līlā* p. 29 = *Dhvanyaloka* p. 11 Hemacandra *Alamkara-darpana* p. 64 = *Dhvanyaloka* iii 3 etc.

theory by his fierce onslaught in the *Vyākṛti viveka*, quotes from the *Kārikā* and the *Vṛtti* indiscriminately under the generic appellation of the *Dhvanikāra*. In the same way Kṣemendra, in the last quarter of the eleventh century, and Hemacandra, in the first quarter of the twelfth, make Ānandavardhana responsible for *Kārikās* in 24 and 14 respectively, while still later writers like Govinda, Viśvanātha and Kumārasvamin regard Ānandavardhana himself as the *Dhvanikāra*, to whom the *Kārikā* as well as the *Vṛtti* is attributed. Mammata, generally a careful writer, distinguishes Ānandavardhana from the writer of the *Kārikas*, whom he styles *Dhvanikāra* or *Dhvanikṛt* (pp 213 and 214, 3rd ed Bomb Sans Series 1917), but in one place (p 445) he apparently falls into confusion and ascribes to the *Dhvanikāra* a verse which probably belongs to the *Vṛtti*.

If the *Dhvanikāra*, the supposed author of the *Kārikā*, is thus distinguished from Ānandavardhana, the author of the *Vṛtti*, the question naturally arises—who was this *Dhvanikāra*, and what date should be assigned to him? It is clear from Abhinavagupta's remarks that the *Kārikākāra* was an older writer although his name or date is nowhere given either by Abhinavagupta or Ānandavardhana. It seems likely that even in the ninth and the tenth centuries his name was already forgotten, although tradition of his authorship still remained. Jacoby, in the learned introduction to his translation of the *Dhvanyaloka* and following him, Harichand Sastri in his *L'Art Poétique de l'Inde*, pose the question very ably, without, however, furnishing a precise solution. Sovani's hypothesis (*JRAS*, 1910 pp 164-7) that the name of the unknown *Kārikākāra* was Sahjdaya on the ground that one of the alternative names of the work itself is *Sahjdayaloka* and that the use of the words *sahjdaya* and *kavi-sahjdaya* at the end of chapter iv of the *Dhvanyaloka* and in the beginning of Abhinavagupta's commentary is significantly corroborative, is hardly convincing. For it is well known, as Harichand points out, that the word *sahjdaya* (lit a man

with a heart) is used in innumerable places in Alamkara literature as in the verses in question to designate a man of taste a judge of literary beauty a connoisseur of Rasa. Anandavardhana himself discusses *sahridayata* at some length in his *Vṛtti* (p. 160) and Abhinavagupta arrives at a concise definition of a *sahridaya* thus (p. 11) *yeṣāṃ kavyanuśilana bhīyasa valad viśadibhūte mana mukure varṇanīya tanmāyā bhāvāna योग्या ते हृदया सम्वदabbhōjah sahrdayah* a definition which became so much standardized that Hemacandra does not scruple to copy it literally in his *Alamkara cudamani* (p. 3). Similarly Mammata begins his *Kavya prakasa* [Bomb. ed. p. 10] with a reference to *kavi* and *sahridaya* who are thus distinguished by Vidyādharma in his *Ekavali* (p. 21) *kavyam kṛtum vidanti vindata ita kavya vidah kavayah sahrdayas ca vetti vindatyor āvṛtīya grahanat paris phuratah prakṛti śleṣasya mahimnubhidhīyante* and both Mammata and Viśvanātha declare that the *sahridaya* alone can have a true perception of Rasa in poetry. It is needless to multiply instances to establish a point which is pretty familiar to every student of Alamkara literature but they would go to disprove without any doubt Sovani's conjecture that with *sahridaya* we arrive at the name of the unknown writer of the *Karikas*.

The fact is that we have as yet hardly any material to decide the question finally. But it seems likely that the Dhvanikara was a much older writer than Anandavardhana for even in Abhinavagupta's time his actual name seems to have been forgotten. (It is quite possible as Abhinavagupta seems to imply and Jacobi tries to make out that this unknown Dhvanikara was a contemporary of Manoratha who is placed by Kalfiana's *Rasa tarāṅgini* (iv. 496 and 671) in the reign of Jayapīḍa and his successor Lakṣapīḍa i.e. in the first part of the ninth century (about A.D. 780-823) but there are difficulties which seriously stand in the way of our arriving at a definite decision on this point. While discussing the various theories which deny the existence of Dhvani Anandavardhana

quotes a verse anonymously with the remark *tatha canyena kṛta evatra ślokaḥ* upon which Abhinavagupta in his gloss remarks *tatha canyena its granthakṛt samāna kāla bhaviṇī Manoratha namna kavina*. Now if we suppose that by *granthakṛt* Abhinavagupta means Anandavardhana then Manoratha who is thus made a contemporary of the latter lives in the last part of the ninth century i.e. much later than the date assigned to him by Kāhāna presuming of course that both the Manorathas are identical persons. If on the other hand we suppose that *granthakṛt* refers as Jacobi conjectures to the anonymous Dhvanikāra we are confronted with the fresh difficulty that by the term *granthakṛt* Abhinavagupta invariably means Anandavardhana (pp. 12, 37, 90 etc.). To remove this difficulty we must suppose either (1) that Kāhāna is wrong as Pischel argues in assigning Manoratha to the reign of Jayapīḍa and Lalitapīḍa (2) that the two Manorathas were not identical persons or (3) that Abhinavagupta himself has confused the Kārikakāra with the Vṛttikāra. As there are no definite means of deciding any one of these equally plausible propositions and as the acceptance of the one or the other of these would lead to widely different results the question cannot be regarded as satisfactorily settled and the attempt to make the original Dhvanikāra a contemporary of the Manoratha of Kāhāna does not seem to be in all plausible.

It would seem, on the other hand that the Kārikas date back to a much earlier time than the first quarter of the ninth century in which the Dhvanikāra is placed by Jacobi as a contemporary of Manoratha. The allusion to Manoratha and the apparent discrepancy in Kāhāna's statement need not trouble us nor need we challenge the otherwise trustworthy testimony of Abhinavagupta for it is quite reasonable to suppose that the Manoratha under discussion is perhaps a poet who was Abhinavagupta says contemporaneous with Anandavardhana and therefore quite a different person from the well known Manoratha of Kāhāna. This is perhaps a

much simpler explanation than straining the word *granthakṛt* to mean the *Karikakara* in the face of Abhinavagupta's own distinct indication to the contrary and in this way we are not affected in the least by Kalhana's *Manoratha* with whom we have nothing to do. If on the other hand we place the *Dhvanyakara* in the time of Kalhana's *Manoratha*, this would only leave a bare margin of two generations between the *Karikakara* and the *Vṛttikara*. But a careful study of the *Dhvanyaloka* would show that a longer time must indeed have elapsed between the author and the commentator in order to make room for a period of scholastic exposition of the former of which undoubted traces are preserved to us in the few memorial verses—*parikara śloka*s (pp 34 130 137 147 163) *sa ṅgraha śloka*s (pp 87 223) *samkṣepa śloka*s (pp 44 74 243)—incorporated by Ānandavardhana in his *Vṛtta* which therefore is not likely to be the first of its kind. These śloka's are a sort of recapitulation stanzas which are adduced by the *Vṛttikara* from unknown sources sometimes to explain the meaning of the *Karikas* but more often to amplify and supplement them. A *samkṣepa śloka* as its name implies is a verse which sums up and utters a theory in a condensed and crystallized form. A *parikara śloka* is thus explained by Abhinavagupta (p 34) *parikarārthas : kārīkārthasudhukā : āpā : kartum ślokaḥ parikara-ślokaḥ* and referring to two *sa ṅgraha śloka*s he remarks (p 223) *etam śloka dvayena sa ṅgrahārtham abh dhāya bahū prakaraṇa pradarśikām lārīkā : pajhati*. Again in a rather long digression (pp 81 ff) Ānandavardhana repudiates other explanations of *Dhvani* implying thereby that already before his time such attempted explanations had found champions whose opinions he thought worth refuting. The space of one or two generations as conjectured by Jacoby between the original conceiver of the theory and its first great expounder between its first dogmatic formulation and its deeply thought out exhaustive and classical exposition hardly suffices to make these intermediate controversial activities appear intelligible. The assumption

commends itself, therefore, that a longer period must have intervened to allow the theory to struggle through divergent opinions and establish itself authoritatively, so that in Ānandavardhana's time it could already look back upon a long past during which people had obviously progressed in the way of explaining it and had succeeded in bringing it, through various degrees of opposition and support, to a position of considerable authority. And a century later, in Abhinavagupta's time, even the name of the Dhvānikāra appears to have been lost, although the tradition of his authorship of the *Kārikās*—a tradition which in the next century almost disappeared—still lingered.

If Ānandavardhana gave the final authoritative shape to the Dhvani theory (only the details of which were worked out by Abhinavagupta and others) the anonymous Dhvānikāra, who must have lived at least a century before his *Vṛttikāra*, was not its absolute creator. This is made clear by the first *Kārikā*, which tells us that the theory was already taught by earlier thinkers, and that there existed even at that time at least three divergent views about the nature of Dhvani:

*lāvyasyātmā dhvanir ity budhair yah samāmnāta-pūrvas
tasyābhāvanā jagadur apare līhāntam ahus tam anye/
kecid vūcūḥ sthūsam aṇṇaye tattvam ucus tadāyana/
tena brūmah sahrdaya-mānah prīṇaye tat-svarūpam/!*

Ānandavardhana explains *samāmnāta pūrvah* in this verse as *paraniparajā yah samāmnātah*, and if we are to take Abhinavagupta's gloss on *paraniparā* we understand that the theory came down in unbroken tradition, if not explained in particular books (*avicechinna pravāhena taur etad uktam, imāpi viśiṣṭa-pustakeṣu vivecanād ityabhiprāyah*, p. 2). This implies without doubt that the school existed from a very early time, and some unknown writer in the dim past gathered together, summed up, and fixed the theory in a form which obtained considerable literary esteem for his work and the honoured but somewhat vague appellation of the Dhvānikāra for himself. But

his name and fame in course of time was eclipsed in their turn by those of his great Vṛttikara who succeeded in establishing the theory for all time and to whom posterity began to ascribe not altogether undeservedly all the honours of his predecessor so that one of the latest writers on Alaṅkāra Kumārasvamin (*Ratnapana* ■ 288) glorifies him with the curious but significant epithet—*Dhvanyācarya* ¹

BSPS : 1920

¹ For a more recent discussion of the question in all its aspects see P. V. Kane *History of Sanskrit Poetics* (prefixed to his ed. of the *Saṁkhyā-darpana*) 3rd Ed. Bombay 1931 pp. 134-90

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S TREATMENT OF SĀṂGHAṬANĀ

The term *Saṁghaṭanā* is not defined, but we are told that *Saṁghaṭanā* is of three kinds, namely, *Asamāsā*, *Madhyama-samāsā* and *Dirgha samāsā*. It is thus a kind of collocation of words, depending on the absence or presence, in varying degree, of compounded forms. It thus corresponds roughly to Rudraṭa's idea of *Rīti*.

Older writers like *Udbhaṭa* (as implied by *Abhinavagupta*) are said to have held that while *Alaṅkāras* belong to *śabda* and *Artha* themselves, the *Gunas* pertain to *śabdārtha saṁghaṭanā*, the former being of the *Avayava* and the latter of the *Avayavin*. As *Ānandavardhana* takes great pains to show that this view is not correct, it is clear that the concept of *Saṁghaṭanā* was already conventionally established, even if there was perhaps no systematic thinking or exposition of it.

Ānandavardhana establishes that the real *Āśraya* of *Guna* is *Rasa*, and not *śabdārtha*, nor *śabdārtha saṁghaṭanā*. If *Gunas* are sometimes spoken of in relation to *śabda*, this is done only through *Upacāra*, just like talking of heroism existing in a hero's physical frame.

What then is the relation of *Saṁghaṭanā* to *Guna*, and in what way can the *Saṁghaṭanā* be said to suggest *Rasa*? If *Rasa* is the *Niyāmaka* of *Guna*, what then is the *Niyāmaka* of *Saṁghaṭanā*? These are some of the problems which *Ānandavardhana* discusses.

Some writers hold that *Saṁghaṭanā* and *Guna* are not different, while others hold that they are different. The latter set of writers, again, differ among themselves. Some say that *Guna* is the *Āśraya* of *Saṁghaṭanā*, and others (like *Udbhaṭa*) think that *Saṁghaṭanā* is the *Āśraya* of *Guna*. Considering these views, *Ānandavardhana* points out that if *Guna* and *Saṁghaṭanā* are taken to be identical, or if *Guna* is said to de-

pend on Saṁghaṭana as its Āśraya there is the danger that like Saṁghaṭana which is Aniyata viṣaya the Guna will also become Aniyata viṣaya. But we know that the Guna being forms of Citta vṛtti (of *Druti Vistara* and *Vakāṭa*) have their definite scope (Viṣaya) in relation to particular sentiments or Rasas : e. g. Madhurya in Śṛṅgāra and Karuṇa, Ojas in Raudra and Adbhuta. The Saṁghaṭana on the other hand being dependent on mere compounding of words or Samāsa cannot be said to have any defined scope, as for instance it cannot be said that Dirgha samāsa occurs only in Raudra; it may occur also in Śṛṅgāra; similarly Asamāsa Saṁghaṭanā is not restricted to Śṛṅgāra but it is found also in Raudra. Hence Saṁghaṭana is Aniyata viṣaya but Guna is not so. The Rasa is the Niyamaka of Guna but it is not the Niyamaka of Saṁghaṭana. The Guna and Saṁghaṭana therefore are not identical nor is the Saṁghaṭana the Āśraya of Guna.

It may be objected that if Gunas are Śabdaśraya even through Upacāra they are also Saṁghaṭanāśraya since there is hardly any Śabda which is not in the form of collocation : i. e. Asaṁghaṭita. It is replied that this is not a necessary consequence. Even Asaṁghaṭita Śabda or mere Varna can through Upacāra be the source of Guna. The Saṁghaṭana is Aniyata and indefinite things cannot be the Āśraya of Guna. By Upacāra therefore it may be said that Guna is Śabdaśraya but never Saṁghaṭanaśraya (which is Anitya Śabdārtha collocation) even by Upacāra.

The critic may object that Saṁghaṭana is not always Aniyata for even if it is admitted that no particular Saṁghaṭana is found in Śṛṅgāra there is a Niyama with regard to Ojas inasmuch as Asamāsa Saṁghaṭana is not suitable to Ojas. The reply to this is that the notion that Ojas involves Dirgha samāsa is only a traditional error and that there is Ojas in such verses of Bhaṭṭa Narayana as *yo yuh Sasitram* even though there is no Dirgha samāsa. The Ojas Guna depends on the Dṛṣṭi of the mind which can be brought about with

equal effect by *Asamāsa* and *Durgha samāsa*, and it does not depend upon mere *śabdārtha* collocation.

The *Guṇa* primarily belongs to *Rasa*, which is its *Āśraya*; but since words and their collocation can also suggest *Rasa*, the *Samghaṭanā* can also do so, provided it takes the accompanying *Guṇa* as the *Āśraya* (*mūdhuryādīn guṇān āśritya rasān vyankti*). The *Samghaṭanā*, therefore, is *Guṇāśraya*, it varies with the *Guṇas*, it suggests the *Guṇa*, and through them the *Rasas* to which the *Guṇas* pertain.

From the point of view of *Rasa*, therefore, there is *Niyama* only as regards the *Guṇa*. For it alone *Rasa* is *Niyāmaka*. From the standpoint of *Rasa*, *Samghaṭanā* has no *Niyama*, for the *Rasa* is not a *Niyāmaka* of *Samghaṭanā*, since the rule that certain kinds of *Samghaṭanā* concern certain *Rasas* is often violated. But since *Samghaṭanā* can also be *Rasa* *vyāñjaka*, what is the *Niyama* which controls it? It cannot be that *Samghaṭanā* has absolutely no *Niyama*. Its *Niyama*, we are told is the more comprehensive *Aucitya* of the context, the *Aucitya* of *Vaktṛ*, *Vācya*, *Viśaya* etc., which determines the suitability of *Samāsa* *vṛtti* in particular cases. But since these circumstances also constitute the *Niyama* of *Rasa* and, through it, of *Guṇa*, there appears to be some confusion of thought on this issue. Anandavardhana appears to think that the same comprehensive, even if somewhat vague, *Niyāmaka* of *Aucitya* appears to regulate both *Rasa* (and consequently *Guṇa*) and *Samghaṭanā*.

It is clear that if *Guṇa* is accepted as explained by Anandavardhana in relation to *Rasa*, the *Samghaṭanā* is, more or less, a superfluous concept, the *Samāsa* *vṛtti* being a constituent of the *Guṇa* in their variety. His concern is perhaps not to set forth a theory of *Samghaṭanā*, but to show that the views of earlier writers on the older concept of *Samghaṭanā* is not justifiable, and if it is to be accepted in all, it must be recognised that it is dependent on the *Guṇa*, and admissible only as such, its only *Niyāmaka* being the law of propriety of the context. Later writers, therefore, who generally follow the scheme of

Poetics standardised by Ānandavardhana, almost ignore Saṁghaṣaṇā. Thus Mammata makes only a passing reference to Saṁghaṣaṇā in the same strain, in his chapter on Guṇa, Viśvanātha brings in Saṁghaṣaṇā in his somewhat peculiar exposition of Rīti (*pada saṁghaṣaṇā rītiḥ rītiḥ saṁghaṣaṇā viśeṣatvāt*) which last concept was considered redundant by Ānandavardhana but in which Viśvanātha following Rudraja, makes Samāsa vṛtti, a *sine qua non*. Vidyāśiṥha, however, who belongs to the new school and whose approach to poetry is quite different rather uncritically accepts Udbhaṭa's view expressed in the dictum *saṁghaṣaṇā dharmāḥ guṇāḥ*¹

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1 See *Dharmapadika* 10 61-64

THE RASĀRNAVĀLĀMĪKĀ OF PRAKĀŚAVARṢA

Students of Sanskrit Ālāṃkāra-Śāstra are indebted to Pandit V. Venkatarama Sharma of the University of Madras for publishing in the *IHQ*, vol v, pp 173f the text of Prakāśavarṣa's *Rasarnava* along with an extensive account of the work in English. During a week's stay in Madras in 1924 I had an opportunity of examining an imperfect manuscript-copy of the work in the Government Oriental Manuscript Library (which Pandit Venkatarama appears also to have utilised), but, as I could not devote much time to it, my examination was necessarily cursory, and the brief account which I gave of it in *BSOS*, iv, pt 2, p 283 was not only incomplete but incorrect in one particular in the description of the work. Pandit Venkatarama has now published the text, as well as a fairly full account, from two manuscripts, and I must thank him for the correction he has made of my error, but I still find from a careful study of the published text that I was not mistaken in regarding this work as a comparatively late composition belonging to a period probably later than that of Bhoja.

The Madras MS gives the work of Prakāśavarṣa in five chapters, the first four of which deal with Guna, Doṣa and Ālāṃkāra, and the last (incomplete) with Rasa. Venkatarama Sharma claims that the *Rasarnava* is "the earliest work on Poetics after the *Naṭyaveda*" of Bharata, and that 'Prakāśavarṣa must have flourished before Bhāmaha and Dandin and after Bāṇabhaṭṭa, i.e., between 650 A.C. and 750 A.C." But it appears, however, that the learned Pandit is entirely on the wrong track in his views about Prakāśavarṣa's relation to Bhāmaha and Dandin. Apart from the very elaborate treatment of Guna, Doṣa and Ālāṃkāra which one can hardly expect in such a presumably early work, there is a distinct reference in it to Dhvaṃs, and in most of his definitions and apparently

novel classifications Prakāśavarṇa appears to follow very closely the school of opinion which is represented in Sanskrit Poetics by the work of Bhoja. If Pandit Venkatarama had closed his Bhamaha and Dandin and opened his *Sarasvatī laṅkābharana* he would have at once found out the source of most of Prakāśavarṇa's information and would have seen that like Bhoja Prakāśavarṇa does not hesitate in appropriating and copying verses from Dandin and Bhamaha in procedure which appears to have misled his editor.

I have already attempted to shew in my *Sanskrit Poetics* in pp. 261f. that Bhoja like the author of the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Āgama-piṭaka* follows a tradition of thought and speculation which is different in many respects from that of the earlier established writers on Poetics although his work is essentially an eclectic compilation which conforms to the teachings of no particular orthodox school but gathers its material from all sources. The importance given to Rasa in conformity with the general standpoint of the earlier Rasa and Dhvani schools (in spite of a somewhat elaborate treatment of Guṇa Doṣa and Alaṅkāra which are not directly correlated to Rasa) as well as the presence of verses culled from different older writers (especially Dandin and Bhamaha) need not surprise us in such a work. Prakāśavarṇa's *Rasarnava* is marked by the same features and he shows the same reverence to Dandin and Bhamaha whose works supplied to him as to Bhoja a large number of unacknowledged quotations and ideas. The very fact that he refers to and quotes from a Bhamaha or a Mahābhamaha (although these quotations are not to be found in Bhamaha's known work) precludes us apart from every other consideration from placing Prakāśavarṇa before Bhamaha.

Coming to the subject matter of the work itself one can see at once that there is a close agreement in the definitions and classifications of Guṇa Doṣa and Alaṅkāra between Bhoja's *Sarasvatī laṅkābharana* and Prakāśavarṇa's *Rasarnava*. No doubt Prakāśavarṇa here and there adds to or

rejects a Guna or an Alamkāra from the enumeration of Bhoja. Thus of the 24 Śabda gunas mentioned by Bhoja Prakasavarṇa accepts 22, leaving aside Gati and Praudha mentioned by Bhoja and to the 24 Arthalamkāras of Bhoja Prakasavarṇa adds four more. Apart from such legitimate additions and modifications the Gunas Doṣas and Alamkāras in Prakasavarṇa are named defined classified in the same way and mentioned almost in the same order (but for exigencies of metre) as in Bhoja. But the agreement is more than that. The definitions and classifications are mostly copied *verbally* by Prakasavarṇa from Bhoja. Some of the classifications and definitions are peculiar to Bhoja mentioned by him for the first time and some are mentioned by no other rhetoricians. All these are also copied by Prakasavarṇa. It would be futile therefore to compare Prakasavarṇa's treatment with those of Bhamaha and Dandin and it is not surprising that Pandit Venkatarama has found more points of confusing divergence than agreement in such a procedure.

As the *Sarasvatī kaṇṭhobharana* is a well known and easily available text, it is not necessary to cite here all the points of agreement occurring throughout Prakasavarṇa's *Rasarnava* wherever the topics dealt with are common to the two works. But a few typical instances may be adduced here in support of the statements made above. The general scheme and classification of Gunas and Doṣas are almost identical in Bhoja and Prakasavarṇa and the same ideas and terminology are employed throughout. The division of Doṣas into three classes (as relating to *pada vakya* and *vākyaartha*) which is accepted by both is indeed much older but while Bhoja for the sake of a certain symmetry and uniformity of treatment enumerates sixteen Doṣas respectively of *pada vakya vakyaartha* Prakasavarṇa accepts from them only fourteen *pada doṣas* fourteen (but really fifteen) *vakya doṣas* and sixteen *vakyaartha doṣas* using nearly the same nomenclature and almost identical definitions. We give them here in

parallel columns so that the striking agreements as well as the slight differences will be clear at a glance

*Bhoja*¹

1 *Pada doṣas* (16 in number)

asādhu (śabda śāstra viruddham yat)

aprayukta (kavibhir na prayuktam yat)

kaṣṭa (padam śruter asukhadam)

anarthaka (pada pūrṇa matrartham)

anyartha (rudha cyutam padam yat)

apustārtha (yat tu tuccha bhidheyam syat)

asamartha (asamgatam padam yat)

apratita (prasiddham śāstra eva yat)

kleṣṭa (dūṣṭa yanyartha-sambhūtiḥ)

gūḍhartha (aprasiddhārtham prayogam)

neyārtha (sva saṁketa-prakīrtarthaṁ)

saṁdigdha (na yat padam niścayakṛt)

*Prakāśa*²

1 *Pada doṣas* (14 in number, slightly different order)

asādhu (śabda śāstra viruddham yat)

aprayukta (na prayuktam kavindraiḥ yat)

kaṣṭa (śravaṇa durbhagam)

anarthaka (pada pūrṇa mātṛam yat)

[To this really corresponds Pkv's *asamartha* see below]

apustārtha (tuccha-tayā kṣiptam)

asamartha (yad baddham ruḍhi varṇa vyatikramite)—cf Bhoja's *anyārtha*

apratita (śāstra eva prayuktam yat)³

kleṣṭa (paramparyeṇa cāsthasya sucakam)

gūḍhartha (aprasiddhartha sambaddham)

neyārtha (svayam kalpita saṁketaṁ)

saśaṁśaya (yatrarthantara sambandhaḥ)

1 The references are to the Kavyamala edition (Nir Sag Press Bombay 1925) of Bhoja's *Sarasaṅgāṅghabhāṣya* but A. Borsook's edition (Calcutta 1884) has also been consulted

2 The reading actually is *śāstras* *yuktam pad* (with lacunae)

<i>Bhoja</i>	<i>Prakāṣavarṇa</i>
viparīta (viruddhārtha prakāṣanam)	
aprayojaka (avisēṣa vadha yakam)	aprayojaka (vivakṣita pra meyasya nopakari)
deśya (avyutpattimat padam)	deśya (deśa rudhī gatam padam)
gramya—(a) aślīla or asabhyā tīa (b) amaṅga la and (c) ghṇavat 3 kinds	gramya—(a) asabhyā (b) amaṅgala and (c) ghṇa kara 3 kinds

The agreements are no less close and striking in the case of *vakya-doṣas*

2 <i>Vakya doṣas</i> (16 in num ber)	2 <i>Vakya doṣas</i> (14 in num ber but really 15 slightly different order)
śabda hina (apaśabdavat)	śabda hina (bh āna bhāṣa padaviddham)
krama bhraṣṭa (arthah śabdo va yatra na kramah) ¹	krama bhraṣṭa (śabdārtha vyutkramo yatra)
visandhī (visambhito virupo va yatra sandhī h)	visandhī (viruddha sandhī nāhsandhī)
punarukt mat (padam pa darthas cabhinna yatra)	punaruktimat (tadrk pada padarthanam nibandhe)
vyākṛta (mitho yasmin vibhaktinām asaṅgatiḥ)	vyākṛta (aseka pada santana vyahata smṛti bhīh padair yojana yatra)
samkṛta (vakyaantara pada s meṣam)	samkṛta (vakyaantara padonmiṣam)
apada (vibhinna prakṛt stha di pada yukti)	

1 This is the reading of A. Borsook's text: the Kavyamala edition reads a ti of *śabdo vā yatra tatkrāmah*

Bhoja

vakya garbhita (vakyantara
sagarbham yat)

bhūna liṅga (yatropama
bhūna liṅga)

bhūna vacana (yad bhūna
vacanopamam)

nyūnopama (nyūnam upa
mana viśeṣanaiḥ)

adhikopama (adhikam yat
pūnas tath eṣat)

bhagna chanda (yac chan
dobhāṅgayad vacan)

bhagna yati (asthane viro
tir yasya)

2 śarīra (kriyā pada vibh
nani yat)

a rūtimat (gūṇanam drśyate
yatra śleṣādīnam vipar
yasya) 9 kinds accord
ing as each doṣa is
a viparyaya of each
of the corresponding
9 guṇas with the ex
ception of samadhi

Those who are not yet convinced by these instances will find the scheme and classification of *vakṣarthā doṣas* even more strikingly close

3 *Vakṣarthā doṣas* (16 in number)

apartha (samudayārtha
śūnyas yat vacan)

vyārtha (gatārtham yat,
yac ca śyan asprayojā
kam)

1 The text reads *asprayojanam*

Prakṛṣṭārtha

[vakya] garbhita (vakya
ntara sagarbham yat)

bhūna liṅga (alīṅgatvad
upamanopameyayoh)

bhūna vacana (yasmīn
vacana vaiśamyam upa
manopameyayoh)

nyūnopama (nyūnam upa
maya viśeṣanaiḥ)

adhikopama (viśeṣanadhik
aupamyam)

bhūna vṛtta (chando lak
ṣana hīnam) 2 kinds
tad varna yati bhedenā
dvividha

khaṇja (kriyā virahitam
vakya)

śleṣādī gūṇa hīnam—10
kinds in the same way
as in Bhoja but sama
dhi gūṇa is included

3 *Vakṣarthā doṣas* (16 in number)

apartha (samudayārtha
śūnyam yat)

vyārtha (yad aprayojakam¹
yac ca gatārtham)

Bhoja

ekārtha (uktyabhināmartham)

śaśaṁśaya (śaṁśadūḥar-
tham)apakrama (vākyaṁ yat tu
krama bhraṣṭam)khuṇṇa (jātyādyuktāvanir-
vyūḍham)atimātra (yat sarva lokāti
tārtham)paraṣa (yat tu krūrārtham
atyartham)virasa (aprasuta rasaśi
yat)hinopama (hinaṁ yatropa-
mamānam syat)adhikopama (tad eva yas-
minādhikam)asatśopama (yat tv atulya-
opamānam)aprasiddhopama (aprasid-
dhopamānam yat)niralanākāra (yad alā-
nāka-hinam)

aśīla (aśīlārtha-pratita kṛt)

viruddha—3 kinds (a) pra-
tyakṣa viruddha (b)
anumāna-viruddha and
(c) āgama viruddha each
of which again is of
three kinds—9 kinds
in all

*Prakāṣavarsa*ekārtha (uktyabhinānār-
tham)¹śaśaṁśaya (yatārthe yasya
na niścayaḥ)apakrama (paurvāparya-
viparyayaḥ)khuṇṇa (jātyādyuktāvanir-
vyūḍham)²atimātra (lokānta ivārtho
yah)paraṣa (atī krūas tu vākya-
arthah)

virasa (apṛākṣta ratam)

hinopama (hinaṁ yatropa-
mamānam syāt)adhikopama (yatropama-
nam adbhikam)asatśopama (atulyam
opamānam cet)aprasiddhopama (aprasid-
dhopamānam cet)niralanākāra (alānākāra
vivarjitam)aśīla (yad asabhyārtha
sambaddham)

viruddha—3 kinds (a) pra-
tyakṣa viruddha (b)
anumāna viruddha and
(c) āgama-viruddha,
each of which again
is of three kinds, as in
Bhoja—9 kinds in all

1 The reading *ekārthabhināmartham* is obviously a mislection

2 The text has *śaśaṁśaya* here

It may be urged that most of these Doṣas and their descriptions will be met with in other writers and that in the definition and arrangement of Doṣas which are more or less standardised the verbal or other agreements need not be taken as absolute proofs of borrowing. But when we come to the treatment of Gunas the case is more convincing. It is well known that in spite of the influence of Dandin and his school as well as of the tradition of opinion followed in the *Alaṅkāra* section of the *Āgri purāṇa* Bhoja adopts a terminology and scheme of Gunas which are peculiar to himself and which differ in many points from those of his known predecessors but here also Prakāśavarṇa follows him pretty closely. To the orthodox ten Gunas of Śabda and Artha respectively of Vamana viz. *śleṣa prasāda mūdhyā samāta saukṣmyā artha-vyakti ojas kanti udarata* and *śamadhī* (which are however, sometimes defined slightly differently by later writers who accept them) Bhoja adds *aurjya uddātata preyas anśabdāta saukṣmyā gambhīrya saṁkṣepa vīratā sammitatva bhūṣikāta rīti ukāṣi gati* and *prauḍhi* thus enumerating 24 Gunas in all which unique arrangement gives us perhaps the largest number mentioned by any author. Prakāśavarṇa accepts the nomenclature and definition of the first 22 almost verbally omitting *gati* and *prauḍhi* from his list.

<i>Bhoja</i>	<i>Prakāśavarṇa</i>
<i>Śabda guṇas</i> (24 in number)	<i>Śabda guṇas</i> (22 in number)
<i>śleṣa</i> (sa śleṣa padāta)	<i>śleṣa</i> (yatra bandho saḥ śi gāh)
<i>prasāda</i> (prasāddhartha padatvam)	<i>prasāda</i> (prasāddhartha padā nyasah)
<i>śamāta</i> (yan mṛdu prasphuṣṭamīśra varṇa bandha vādīnaḥ prāṇa va śamyena bhāvanam)	<i>śamātā</i> (bandho mṛdu sphuṣṭamīśra varṇa janmāna saṁkārash)

Bhoja

mādhurya (yā pṛthak-pada
tā vākye)
sukumāratā (anīṣṭhurāk-
ṣara-prāyam)
artha-vyakti (yatra saṁpūr-
na-vākyatvam)
kānti (yad uṣṣvatatvaṁ ban-
dhasya)
audārya (vikaṣṭākṣara-ban-
dhatvam)
udāttatā (ślāghyair viśeṣa-
nair yogah)
ojas (samāsa-bhūyastvam)
aurjitya (gāḍha bandhatā)

preyas (priyatarākbyānam
cajñaktau)
susabdātā (vyutpattiḥ sup-
tinām yā)
samūdhi (anya dharmā-
nām yad anyatādharo-
panam)
saukṣmya (antaḥ saṁjalpa-
rūpatvaṁ śabdānām)
gāmbhīrya (dhvanimattā)
vistara (vyāsenoktiḥ)
sahkṣepa (samūsenābhi-
dhānam)
sammitatva (yāvadārtha-
padatvam)
bhāvikatva (bhāvato vāk-
ya vṛttiḥ yā)
gati (kramaḥ yah syad
arohāvarohayoḥ)

Prakāśavarjya

mādhurya (arīhocita-vaco-
bandhah)
sukumāratā (akāṣhorākṣara-
-nyūṣah)
artha vyakti (saṁpūrṇa-
vākyatā)
kānti (bandhasyoyjvalatā)¹

audārya (bandha-vaikaṣ-
yam)
udāttatā (ślāghyair viśeṣa-
nair yuktam)
ojas (samāsa bhūyastvam)
aurjitya (bandha gāḍhat-
vam)
preyas (preyastha-pada-
vinjñāṣah)
susabdātā (yā subanta-
tīḥantānām vyutpattiḥ)
samūdhi (anya-dharmasya
bhaved anyatra ropā-
nam)
saukṣmya (śabdānām antaḥ
saṁjalpa rūpatā)
gambhīrya (dhvanimattā)
vistara (vyastam)
sahkṣepa (abhedbhānam
samāśena)
sammitatva (yavadārtha-
padatvam)
bhāvikatva (bhāvābhivyā-
śjalā vāpī)

1 The text has kaunte here

Bhoja

riti (upakramasya nirva
hah)
ukti (viśiṣṭa bhanati ya
syāt)
praudhi (ukteḥ praudhah
paripakah)

Prakāśavarṇa

riti (upakramasya nirvā
hah)
ukti (arthantarena¹ cartha
sya bhāsanat)

It is not necessary to dilate on this point further and mention the Artha gunas which betray similar parallelism. Prakāśavarṇa's discussion as to how Doṣas sometimes become Gunas which follows this topic closely copies from Bhoja. Indeed the borrowing goes on practically throughout the whole work. It is a pity that the Rasa chapters which give the name to the work are incomplete in Prakāśavarṇa's published text. If we had the whole of it we would perhaps have seen the same influence not only of the somewhat unique Rasa chapters of Bhoja's *Sarasvatī kamlābharana* but also probably of his much larger and more extensive *Śṛṅgāra prakāśa*. Coming to the treatment of the Alankaras one finds that Bhoja's classification of figures as *bahya abhyantara* and *bahyabhyantara* is also accepted. In order to preserve a certain uniformity and symmetry of treatment (which is also noticeable in his classification of Gunas and Doṣas) Bhoja mentions six kinds each of *riti*, *vr̥tti*, *chaya*, *mudra*, *ukti*, *bhanati*, *gumphaṇa*, *śayya* and *pañcīti* which are included in the treatment of *Sabdalanakaras*. Most of these are admitted and dealt with in the same way by Prakāśavarṇa but as in the case of Gunas and Doṣas he is eclectic with regard to the number he accepts in many cases omitting one or two kinds from the enumeration of Bhoja. Of the six *Ritis* of Bhoja Prakāśavarṇa accepts five omitting *Magadhī* to the four orthodox *Vr̥ttis* Bhoja adds two more but Prakāśavarṇa mentions only five. Of the six kinds respectively of *mudra*, *chaya* and *bhanati* again (which

1 The text has lacunas here which is supplied by the editor as *vinamāyana*

reproduced by Prakāśavarṣa.¹ Again, Bhoja admits the philosophical idea of *upamāna* (as a means of knowledge) in a poetic figure of that name and distinguishes it as a figure from the more well known *upama*.² This is a treatment peculiar to himself and is accepted by no writer on Poetics (so far as we know) except Appayya Dikṣita in his *Kimālayānanda*. The figure *upamāna* as conceived and defined by Bhoja is also to be found in Prakāśavarṣa.

This wholesale similarity of phraseology and ideas occurring throughout in the two works (even in the matter of peculiar schemes and treatment of characteristic points) cannot indeed be explained as accidental coincidences, or mere repetition of standardised technicalities. It may be contended, however that what is said above does not necessarily prove that Prakāśavarṣa has actually borrowed from Bhoja for it is possible to hold that Bhoja might have modelled his bigger compilation upon the smaller manual of Prakāśavarṣa or that both of them belonging to the same tradition of thought probably drew upon the same source. All this may be argued, but it cannot be maintained that Prakāśavarṣa is a very early writer earlier even than Bhamaha and Dandin. The supposition however of Bhoja's borrowing from Prakāśavarṣa appears to be very unlikely. While Bhoja's work displays a systematic and elaborate treatment (in spite of its peculiar theoretic standpoint) reinforced by abundant wealth of illustrations which lifts it much above an average compilation Prakāśavarṣa's work is nothing more than a short compilation of definitions and classifications. The *Rasarnava* has the appearance of having been a practical manual or text book, and it is not unlikely that it was compiled chiefly by wholesale

1 The definition is also copied by Vidyānātha who is one of the few writers who follow Bhoja's elaborate classification of *Gūṇas* although Vidyānātha accepts *Dhvani* as essential.

2 See *Sanskrit Poetics* : p. III

appropriations from Bhoja's standard work with just a few pieces of supplementary information culled from other sources. In whichever way the question of borrowing be decided it is clear however that Prakāśavarāga like Bhoja belonged to a tradition of opinion which is distinct from that of the established schools, and of which the earliest known example is to be found in the *Alamkāra* section of the *Agni purāṇa*. The date of this section at least of the *Purāṇa* cannot be fixed too early. Since it is not unaware of some theory of *Dhvani* it is perhaps later but not much later than the *Dhvanyaloka* and probably belongs to the latter half of the 9th century A.D. Prakāśavarāga must at any rate be later than this date. He must also have been later than Anandavardhana who established the *Dhvani* theory in the struggle of the schools. For Prakāśavarāga like Bhoja is aware of the concept of *Dhvani* and includes it as we have already seen in the *śabda-guṇa-gaṇbhīṣa*. The very elaborate treatment of *Guṇa* and *Doṣa* would by itself place him later than Dandin and Bhamaha upon whose scheme this treatment attempts in its own way to improve while the treatment of the *Alamkāras* in the same way supports and confirms this conclusion. The statements therefore that Prakāśavarāga's *Rasārnava* is the earliest work on Poetics after the *Nāṭyaveda* and that he must have flourished before Bhamaha and Dandin appear to be misconceived and uncritical.

Nevertheless the work is interesting and important in representing like Bhoja's work from which it presumably draws its material a peculiar line of speculation different in some respects from accepted views of the established schools of Sanskrit Poetics. As such its publication has been well deserved.

MAMMAṬA'S KĀVYA PRAKĀŚA

The *Kāvya prakāśa* of Mammata is one of the classic works on Sanskrit Poetics and Rhetoric which has always maintained a great authority and popularity throughout India. There is perhaps no other technical work in Sanskrit which has been so much commented upon and so often edited. The number of commentaries so far discovered comes up to more than sixty and they count as their authors not only independent writers on Poetics like Ruyyaka and Viśvanatha but also authors having other literary interests like the Naiyāyika Jagadisa the grammarian Nag-śa the Smṛta and Mīmāṃsaka Kamalakara the Jaina Maṇikyacandra the Vaiṣṇava Baladeva and the Tantrika Gokulanatha.

The reason for this great popularity lies in the fact that Mammata is the first and foremost as well as the most typical writer of the new school of Poetics the *Navya*, and his far famed work occupies a unique position in the history of Sanskrit *Alaṃkāra* literature. It is neither a very extensive nor a strikingly original work but in only one hundred and forty three *Karikās* and about six hundred and twenty illustrations it traverses the whole field of Sanskrit Poetics (with the exception of *Dramaturgy*) and combining as it does the merit of fulness with that of conciseness it sums up and explains in the succinct form of a brilliant text book almost all the previous speculations in the subject becoming in its turn the starting point of endless text books and exegetic works.

The history of Sanskrit *Alaṃkāra* covers a period of more than a thousand years but it is marked by several well defined stages. The dim beginnings of the discipline like the dim beginnings of most other branches of Indian speculation are hidden from us until we enter upon the first historic stage of its formulation in a more or less self conscious form in the works of Bharata and Bhamaha. Bharata's well known *Nāṭya śāstra* is principally concerned with *dramaturgy* music

and allied topics and deals with Poetics in so far as it applies to the theme in hand, but in Bhamaha's *Kavyalankara* we find for the first time an exclusive treatment of Poetics proper and a more or less systematic scheme of the subject which undoubtedly betoken a preceding period perhaps of several centuries of unknown beginnings. All that we can surmise of the unknown period consists of glimpses of rhetorical speculations such as we find in Bharata in the recorded opinions or stray references to pre-Bhamaha writers like Medhaviṃśa or in such schemes of *Alaṅkāra* as was presumably utilised by the earlier Kavya poets in general and by Bhaṭṭi in particular. This period begins with the enumeration and definition of only four poetic figures: ten *Gunas*, ten *Doṣas* and thirty-six Kavya *laṅkāras* mentioned by Bharata, but it ends with the elaborate characterisation of thirty-eight independent poetic figures in Bhaṭṭi. But what is important to note in this period is Bharata's more or less standard exposition of dramaturgy and incidentally of *Rasa*, which aesthetic element however is considered not particularly in relation to poetry and poetics but in connexion with drama and dramaturgy.

This is followed by a comparatively brief but exceedingly important period of great fertility and creative genius beginning with Bhamaha and ending with Anandavardhana in which we find most of the fundamental problems and concepts of Sanskrit Poetics discussed and settled in their general outlines. This fruitful and creative stage which covers more than two centuries and includes some of the great names in the history of the discipline gave rise to four distinct schools of opinion represented respectively by the *Alaṅkāra*, *Rīti*, *Rasa* and *Dhvani* systems. We have on the one hand Bhamaha, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa devoting themselves to the consideration of those decorative devices of poetic expression which are known as *Kavyalankaras* or poetic figures and confining themselves chiefly to a somewhat external art or theory of embellishment from which the discipline itself takes its name and its original tradition. Daṇḍin and Vamaṇa on

the other hand emphasise in poetry the objective beauty of representation realised by means of what they call *Marga* or *Riti* (roughly poetic diction) which consists of a harmonious combination of certain fixed literary excellences of sound and sense known as *Gunas*. Both these systems which respectively bring into prominence the elements of *Alamkāra* and *Riti* in poetry content themselves with the somewhat mechanical working out of the outward form of poetic expression, the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry. They point out the blemishes to be avoided and the excellences to be attained and describe elaborately the poetical embellishments or devices of literary expression which enhance its beauty so much so that the whole discipline came to receive the significant designation of *Alaṅkāra śāstra* or the discipline of poetical embellishment.

Side by side with these early writers however, we have the commentators on *Bhārata* like *Lollaṭa Śaṅkuka* and *Dhātta Nāyaka* who were bringing into prominence the aesthetic importance of *Rasa* the consideration of the poetic feelings and sentiments which should regulate the outward expression of poetry. Their exposition however concerned the dramatic art and their theories did not yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics which was entirely dominated by the systems of *Alaṅkāra* and *Riti* but we find them gradually influencing poets of rival persuasion who betray themselves more and more alive to the significance of *Rasa* in poetry. The bearings of this element however on poetry were not fully realised until the *Dhvanyālu* and *Ānandavardhana* came into the field and worked it up into their new system of *Dhvani*.

These new theorists headed by *Ānandavardhana* maintain that no system of Poetics like no system of Dramaturgy can ignore the moods feelings and sentiments as essential factors of poetry and must therefore find an important place for *Rasa* in its scheme. What was already established in the drama was taken over and systematically applied to poetry.

profoundly modifying as it did the entire conception of Kāvya. The Rasa came to be considered as the essence of poetry, and in order to harmonise it in the poetic theory the new school evolved a theory of suggestion or *Vyañjana* = the means of its expression.¹ At the same time not fully satisfied with the working up of the concept of Rasa into their system the new theorists devoted themselves to a re-examination of the already accumulated ideas of *Alaṅkāra* and *Riti* with a view to correlate them to the new theory of *Dhvani* and Rasa and thus by synthesis evolve a comprehensive scheme of poetics.

The *Dhvani* school in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the content of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words whether directly explicit or metaphorically implicit, the other is not expressed but suggested springing immediately from that which is expressed. The unexpressed or suggested part which is not something vague but = distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is manifested by a peculiar power of suggestion (*vyañjana*) inherent in word and sense = taken to be the essence of poetry. To grammarians and learned writers it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegory. But suggestive poetry according to the new theorists is something different from the merely metaphorical which Vamaṇa had already amply recognised and on which the *Alaṅkāra* and the *Riti* systems had placed so much emphasis. (The metaphorical or the allegoric however veiled is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such, but the suggested is always unexpressed and is therefore a source

of the proper charm of poetry by its very capacity of concealment. The Dhvani school postulates that the unexpressed or inexpressible which is the soul of all good poetry is called into being by a particular function of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings.

But the unexpressed manifested by the suggestive power of sound and sense may be an unexpressed matter of fact (*varṣa*) or an unexpressed imaginative mood (*alamkāra*) but in most cases it is an emotional state which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani school therefore took up the poetic feelings and sentiments (*bhāva* and *rasa*) as an element of the unexpressed and thus tried to harmonise the concept of *Rasa* with the theory of *Dhvani*. Ānandavardhana distinctly says in one place (*Dhvanīśloka* p. 163) that his object is not merely to establish *Dhvani* but also to harmonise it with *Rasa* already recognised in dramatic theory by Bharata and others. It was realised that poetry was not as Dandin thought the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable words. Feelings and sentiments also play an important part in it. But the feelings and sentiments are in themselves inexpressible. We can give a name to them but naming a feeling or sentiment is not equivalent to manifesting it. At best therefore we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or communicate is not the feeling itself but the ground of the feeling or its excitant and attendant circumstances. With the help however of these expressed elements which must be generalised and conceived not in a personal (*laukika*) but in an impersonal (*alaukika*) form the poet can awaken in us through their inherent suggestive power a particular impersonal condition of the mind in which the relish of the natural feeling is possible — a poetic sentiment. It is true that the poet cannot cause the same feeling as for instance Rama whom he describes felt but by the suggestive power of the expressed circumstances of Rama his conduct and his associate the poet can call up a reflection of it and evoke in the reader's mind a similar mental condition in which the reader identifies

the predominant implicit factor, the outward expression being important as a means of pointing to this implicit significance. The analysis is comprehensive enough to include in its scope descriptive, ornamental as well as emotional poetry, but it is also perceived, if not directly stated, that the emotional mood which the poet succeeds in suggesting to the reader's mind in the form of that delectable subjective condition of impersonalised enjoyment which is called *Rasa*, is of the highest importance in poetry. In a complete scheme no doubt, the *vastu dhvani* and the *alamkara dhvani*, tacitly recognised by older writers and practised by the poets, must also be justified and the *Dhvani* school could not at least from the standpoint of theoretic consistency, definitely make the suggestion of *Rasa* the exclusive end of poetry. But the central question to which attention is devoted by the school is as to how a composition should help the *Rasa* to expression, for it is repeatedly laid down that neither mere embellishment nor mere narrative but the suggestion of poetic sentiment should be the guiding principle of the poet in his composition of word and sense. In other words the school practically, if not theoretically, recognises that the *Rasa* should be the centre of gravity towards which everything else in a poem—*vastu riti*, *guna doṣa* and *alamkara*—should move, and stress coming to be laid upon the underlying poetic sentiment, the suggestion of *Rasa* came to prevail over other kinds of suggestion. The *Dhvanikāra* and *Ānandavardhana*, no doubt, wisely refrained from going into the extreme position of such later writers as *Viśvanātha* who regard the suggestion of the emotional mood to be the exclusive end of poetry even to the extent of ignoring the imaginative and the realistic, but the attitude of the *Dhvani* school towards the importance of *Rasa* tends practically towards such a proposition and probably inspires the later theorists to a further development of the theory out of itself into the inevitable extreme thesis that the *Rasa* alone is the essence of poetry. One of the triumphs of the new school was indeed the admission of the old idea

exponents of older traditions : who appear to have been untouched by the implications of the *Dhvani* theory and stood apart in many respects from the school of Ānandavardhana. Able as they were, these attempts languished for want of support, and the more or less complete scheme of Poetics outlined in the *Dhanyaloka* which wanted to harmonise and bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation, was worked out in detail by Mammata and his followers and was ultimately standardised as the finally dominant scheme. The success of Mammata's work was indeed so complete that the authority of the *Dhvani* school came to be unquestionably accepted by most later writers and the systems which emerged after Mammata could no longer be strictly regarded as entirely independent systems.

It will be seen from what is said above that the divergent currents of thoughts and tendencies in Sanskrit Poetics flowing in different directions through many centuries ultimately ran into one clear and dominant stream in the classical work of Mammata. In the progress of the discipline the *Alamkara* school proposed to confine itself to a theory of embellishment of expression consistently with what was probably the original tradition of the *Sastra*, while the *Riti* school laid stress on the objective beauty of expression realised by means of diction which consisted of a harmonious combination of certain fixed literary excellences. The *Rasa* school, however starting with the consideration of the drama was responsible for introducing into poetic theory the subjective element of *Rasa* represented by feelings and sentiments. The *Dhvani* school headed by Ānandavardhana admitted the underlying truth of all these doctrines but elaborated a peculiar theory of suggestion in poetry, including the suggestion of *Rasa* to which all other poetic factors were correlated. It will be seen that a relative emphasis was laid by each of these schools on the different elements of *Alamkara*, *Riti* (including *Guna* and *Doṣa*), *Rasa* and *Dhvani*.

respectively, and the currents of speculation thus flowed in different directions. It was however realised in the end that all these gleams of thought should be gathered into a focus and all these currents should be made to flow into one stream (Indeed one of the obvious objects of Anandavardhana's work was not only to define and establish the concept of *Dhvani* in poetry but also to work up and rationalise into a synthetic and comprehensive system these accumulated ideas of his great predecessors). A final and authoritative shape was given to Anandavardhana's work by Mammata who gathered up the results and uttered them in the convenient and concise form of a systematic text book.)

(The work was however destined to be more than a mere text book. It came to dominate the thoughts of generations of theorists and eclipsed by its thorough and systematic exposition even the masterly work of Anandavardhana on which it was chiefly based.) No doubt Jagannatha one of the latest but not the least important writers on Poetics speaks of the *Dhvanikara* and Anandavardhana as the *alamkara-saram* *vyavasthapaka* inasmuch as the tentative efforts of earlier thinkers and the accumulated stock of recognised ideas are brought together and rationally adjusted in their work in a more or less complete system (but it was due greatly to the influence of Mammata that this *alamkara-saram* was finally standardised and raised to almost exclusive authority). The period which followed is necessarily a stage of scholastic elaboration. With regard to matters of general theory or the main problems the majority of the post *dhvani* writers who accept the final determination of Mammata as almost canonical find nothing that is new to set forth; they consequently fall back upon matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing scholastic bent for fine distinctions and endless analysis. Here and there we come indeed across a few writers who do not entirely sacrifice independent thinking and sometimes we find a few isolated and struggling followers of the older school but most of the writers who come after

Mammata display indeed great scholastic acumen but hardly any remarkable originality or creative genius. It is also the age of numberless commentators and commentators on commentators who busied themselves with the hardly inspiring task of explanation expansion or restriction of the already established rules and formulas. We have also the rise of a number of popular writers and text book makers who wanted to codify the discipline or simplify it for general enlightenment the lowest stage being reached when we come to numerous manuals and school books of comparatively recent times.

It is important however to note that even accepting in the main the general position of the Dhvani theorists some of the writers of the new school headed by Mammata are yet not entirely free from the influence of older schools. In spite of his adherence and support of the Dhvani theory Mammata himself could not for instance explicitly state *kavyasyatma dhvanir ity* (that the soul of poetry is Dhvani) and he betrays a willingness to include compositions devoid of Dhvani within the meaning of the term *kavya*. He accepts after Ānandavardhana the great importance of Rasa in poetry but his well known definition of poetry *śaḍ a-doṣaḥ śabdārthan saguṇa vanālamkāraḥ punaḥ kāvī* (poetry consists in word and sense devoid of defects and possessing the excellences and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures) follows the time honoured custom of starting with Śabda and Artha and mentioning the Guṇa Doṣa and Ālambhāra without however explicitly including Rasa as well as Dhvani. In the same way Ruyyaka follows Udbhaṭa and Kuntaka extensively in the principle as well as the detailed analysis of poetic figures a question which was left untouched by the Dhvanīkara and Ānandavardhana who had either dismissed the poetic figures as mere *vāg-vikalpas* or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed in poetry. Viśvanātha again in declaring that poetry consists of a sentence of which the soul is Rasa betrays the unmistakable influence of the Rasa school and maintains the extreme position

regarding the exclusive essentiality of *Rasa dhvani* which was practically meant but wisely left unsaid by the authors of the *Dhvanyaloka*. Even one of the latest and most thoughtful writers of this group Jagannatha revives in a new form the old definition of poetry given by Dandin. This reactionary tendency is interesting as indicating that these post *dhvani* writers were not unconscious of the importance of earlier views and it cannot be said that even though they accept the authority of the *Dhvanyaloka* they are yet entirely content with its clear cut scheme. Rightly or wrongly they attempt to bring back old ideas in the elaboration of the new, and it is difficult for this reason to take these writers in a lump and affiliate them directly to the *Dhvanī* school. It is better therefore to call them post *dhvani* writers who naturally recognise the new concept of *Dhvanī* but who cannot be regarded as out and out supporters of all the details of the theory. It is also remarkable that most of these writers attempt to arrive at a precise definition of poetry a task which was left alone by the *Dhvanīkara* but in doing so they probably meant to find out a comprehensive formula which would cover the old ideas as well as the new although it must be said that they succeed less often than they involve themselves in hopeless theoretical inconsistencies.

It is not surprising therefore that from the purely theoretical point of view Mammaja's definition of poetry was subjected to much criticism although his critics were writers whose own definitions were not entirely above such criticism. Viśvanatha, for instance, undoubtedly takes Mammaja's work as the basis (*upajyva*) of his own but begins his *Sāhitya darpaṇa* with a vigorous attack on Mammaja's definition. He points out in the first place that the *Gunas* being merely properties of *Rasa* should not have been logically included in the definition of essentials which omits even a mention of the essential *Dhvanī* and *Rasa*. In the same way no mention even negative

should have been made of the Doṣas in the definition. He holds that if faultless compositions alone are to be called poetry then some of the best poems will have to be given up inasmuch as it is almost impossible to keep clear of blemishes. Nor can it be said that faults mar only those particular words or their meanings in which they occur for if they are faults at all bearing relation to the underlying sentiment in the composition they must mar the whole poem. Lastly he maintains that no reference even if negative to poetic figures ought to have been made in the definition as they are admittedly non essential. Jagannatha's criticism is more fundamental although he agrees with Viśvanatha as to the impropriety of including a reference to Guna Doṣa and Alankāra in the definition. He objects that a word and its sense are not what is denoted by poetry, for the universal experience that a poem may appeal without its meaning being understood shows clearly that a particular kind of Subda alone constitutes poetry. Artha being secondary. If it is said that the essence of poetry lies in its capability of awakening a sentiment (Rasa) and inasmuch as a word and its sense possess this capability both constitute poetry then it may be replied that according to this too wide view musical tones and theatrical gestures will have to be called poetry, some of these and other arguments appear no doubt fastidious and pedantic and have been met with equal ingenuity by the commentators and supporters of Mammaṣa but the whole controversy indicates not only the futility of arriving at a precise logical definition of poetry but also the difficulty of combining all the conventional elements in such a definition. The authors of the *Dhvanyaloka* probably realised this and carefully avoided the task for they content themselves with describing its general nature and its divisions an omission on which Mahimabhaṭṭa ridicules him by saying *Alu ca kavasya svaripaḥ vyutpādayitularaṇā matimāḥ tattatparāṇā eva sāmānyamukhyatā* 1301.

But from what we have said above it will be clear that the apparent inconsistencies of Mammaṭa's definition which are to be explained by a reference to the views of older schools are interesting from the historical point of view. They indicate the lurking regard which Mammaṭa, belonging as he does to the new school, possesses for the views of such older theorists as Vamāna. No doubt Mammaṭa severely criticises and rejects Vamāna's theory and classification of Rūpa, but the mention of Guṇa, Doṣa and Alamkāra in the definition apparently indicates that he would like to take them after Vamāna as properties of Śabda and Artha and not of Rasa which is omitted from the definition. At the same time he defines the Guṇa and Doṣa as well as the Alamkāra later on in terms of their relation to Rasa, a procedure which is hardly justifiable if the essentiality of Rasa is not declared in the definition. On the other hand if it is maintained that Rasa is too well known and established a fact in poetry to require explicit mention, then the prominence of threefold suggestion and the division of poetry on its basis becomes inexplicable. The fact that Mammaṭa accepts the Citra-kāvya (which develops no Rasa or Dhvani) grudgingly admitted by Anandavardhana and rejected by Viśvanātha, also indicates probably his unconscious leanings to the views of the Alamkāra school which were in conflict with his theoretical acceptance of the Dhvani doctrine in regard to the essentiality of Dhvani and Rasa.

(There can be no doubt however that in spite of such inconsistent attempts to incorporate the old stock of ideas Mammaṭa comprehends both Dhvani and Rasa in his scheme by implication as well as by express treatment. Following up his definition Mammaṭa begins with the discussion of the functions of śabda and artha incidentally establishing the function of suggestion (vyāṅjana) and the superiority of the suggested sense (vyāṅgya artha or dhvani) and divides poetry into three classes viz. Dhvani, Guṇabhūta-vyāṅgya and Citra in relation to the suggested sense. This leads him to enumerate and exemplify

the various subdivisions of the three classes of poetry and in this connexion dilate upon the nature and theory of *Rasa* which is included in the scope of what is called 'the suggestion of imperceptible process' (*asamlakṣya krama vyangya*). In this context he examines and rejects the views of Lolāta Śāṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nayaka all of whom are said to have commented on Bharata's theory of *Rasa* and accepts the *vyākṛti vāda* which he ascribes to Abhinavagupta the great commentator on Anandavardhana's work as well as on Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*. Mention is made of the eight orthodox dramatic *Rasas* but the ninth the *Śānta* or the Quietistic sentiment is added apparently as relevant to poetry even if inadmissible in the drama.

Mammaṣa then proceeds to discuss the *Guna* and the *Doṣa* not in relation directly to *śabda* or *Artha* as his definition would imply but in relation to the subserviency or otherwise to the awakening of *Rasa dhvani*. The *Gunas* as excellences of composition are interpreted not after Vamaṇa but after Anandavardhana in a new sense and are brought into effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a work as qualities which serve to awaken and heighten its charm. The verbal form of a work the expressed *śabda* and *Artha* cannot be said to possess the quality of energy or sweetness unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The *Gunas* therefore may be taken as properties of *śabda* and *Artha* only in a secondary sense (*upacāra*) but they are in reality intimately related to *Rasa* even as virtues like heroism do not reside in the body but in the soul of man. The verbal form the mere sound and sense produces the excellences only as a means or instrument - the real cause is the *Rasa* just as the soul is the true cause of virtues like heroism in a man. The same consideration applies also but more strongly to the case of the so-called poetic figures (*ālvāṇavikāras*) and their place in poetry should be justified only by their relation to *Rasa*. They are likened to ornaments on a man's body - as embellishments they adorn words and

meanings which constitute the 'body' of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly, through word and sense, the underlying 'soul' of sentiment, but they do not do this invariably. If there is no Rasa they resolve into mere strikingness of expression (*ukti vaicitrya*), but even sometimes when the Rasa is existing they do not help it. In other words, it is maintained that the poetic figures can exist without the Rasa in the form of charming turns of expression, and even when the Rasa is present, they are not invariably necessary.

It should also be noted that Mammaṭa accepts, after Ānandavardhana, only three Gunas and maintains that combination of particular letters signifies particular Gunas. Thus, the three Ritis of Vāmana are resolved into three Gunas defined by himself, and the letters whose particular arrangements produce these three Gunas being almost the same as those given by Udbhaṭa respectively for his three Vṛttis (viz. Upanāgarikā, Paruṣā and Komalā), Udbhaṭa's three Vṛttis are roughly approximated to his own three Gunas. In this connexion Mammaṭa demonstrates with some care that it is not necessary to accept the sets of ten śabda-gunas and ten Artha-gunas of Vāmana, but that it is enough if we postulate three comprehensive literary excellences, viz., Ojas (energy), Prasāda (lucidity) and Mādhurya (sweetness). It is shown by a critical examination of Vāmana's Gunas that some of them can very well be included in the three defined above, that some discharge the same functions as the recognised poetic figures, that some constitute mere absence of defects while others are sometimes positive defects. Thus, Vāmana's Śleṣa, Samādhī and Udātā are comprehended by Mammaṭa's Ojas, Vāmana's Arthavyakti is an aspect of Mammaṭa's Prasāda but it corresponds also to the Svabhāvokti Alankāra of Daṇḍin. Vāmana's Samatā, consisting of a certain uniformity of diction, is sometimes a fault, while Vāmana's Saṅkumārya and Kānti defined respectively as freedom from harshness (or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity is simply the reverse of such

defects as *Śruti kaṣṭa* and *Śruti duṣṭa*. These considerations simplify the classification of the *Gunas* and put a limit on their endless multiplication or differentiation such as one finds for instance in Bhoja's elaborate scheme of 24 *Gunas*. Mammaja therefore thinks that the distinction between *śabda-guna* and *artha-guna* is meaningless and the old differentiation resting on a mere adjustment of sound and sense should be superseded. As the *Guna* is an invariable property of the *Rasa* the mental condition involved in the relish of a sentiment should alone justify all classification of *Gunas*. Such a position warrants the acceptance of only three (and not two sets of ten *Gunas*) which are brought into intimate relation to the principal sentiment of a composition. Thus the *Ojas* is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion (*viśāra*) of the mind and resides in the sentiments of heroism, horror and fury, the *Madhurya*, residing normally in the erotic sentiment of love-in union but also appropriate to and residing in successive degree in pathos, calm and love in separation is regarded as causing a softening of the heart (*drut*), while the *Prasāda* proper to all the poetic sentiments is taken as the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense extending over the mind at once (*vyapti* or *vikāsa*) like a stream of water over a cloth or like fire on dry fuel. The three conditions of the mind viz. expanding, pervading and melting which accompany the different poetic sentiments are thus made the basis of the three *Gunas*, and even if these mental states are sometimes mixed up and lead to other mental conditions these latter effects are too many and too complex to be taken as the basis of further multiplication of fresh *Gunas*. This exposition of Mammaja follows and expands *Dhyanaloka* II 811, but it is possible that the original hint of association of these three mental conditions with the three *Gunas* was supplied by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka who speaks of the enjoyment of *Rasa* as being characterised by the mental states of expansion (*viśāra*) pervasion (*vikāsa*) and melting (*drut*). Viśvanātha substantially agrees with

this view of Mammata but he objects that the Ojas etc are not the causes of but identical with the process of expansion etc

In his discussion of the defects (Doṣas) of poetry Mammata admits defects of words of sentences of meaning as well as of Rasa. But he prefaces this chapter of his work by the statement that since Rasa is the principal thing in poetry the defects of Rasas are the principal defects. The Rasa however depends upon the expressed word sentence and meaning the defects of these are also in reality defects of the Rasa. In other words the Doṣa like the Guna should be considered in poetry mainly in relation to the underlying sentiment. Although the poetic figures are not in Mammata's opinion always necessary to poetry he yet rounds off his treatise with an elaborate analysis and illustration of figures of sound and sense (including a limited number of figures which are both of sound and sense) enumerating as many as sixty seven independent poetic figures. Here he accepts implicitly Kuntaka's principle of analysis of the poetic figures and applies it for the most part to the detailed examination of individual figures a procedure which is followed also by Ruṣṣaka Viśvanātha Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha. This topic was left untouched by the authors of the *Dhvanyaloka* but the principle which Kuntaka enunciated in his able analysis of poetic expression gained ground in later times and Mammata tacitly acknowledges that the elements which go to make up the being of a poetic figure consist of a peculiar turn of charming expression called *Vaicitrya* or *Vicchitti viśeṣa* and the peculiar conception of the poet which brings into existence the peculiar charm (*kaavi pratibhā nirvartitatva*).

{ From this brief and rapid summary of the principal topics of Mammata's work it will be seen that its value consists not in its originality but in the orderly concise and clear discussion of the main issues of Sanskrit Poetics and his definition as well as his general treatment attempts to cover almost all the

field of thought traversed by his predecessors. He quotes more than six hundred verses from various poets to illustrate his doctrines, and shows himself familiar with the works of almost all the distinguished writers on Poetics who preceded him. The great popularity and authority which the *Kāvya-prakāśa* has always enjoyed and which is indicated by the large number of commentaries on it, must be explained as due not to any creative genius or remarkable novelty of treatment, but to the systematic and lucid (albeit obscurities due to extreme brevity of exposition, necessitating commentaries) working out of the already recognised stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in the *Dhvanyāloka*.

Although exact dates cannot be determined it is possible to fix approximately the period of time in which Mammata flourished. The lower limit may be fixed with reference to two commentaries on the *Kāvya prakāśa*. The *Samiketa* commentary of Manīyacaṇḍra who belonged to the Kojika gana Vajraśakha, Rājagaccha of Guzerat, is expressly dated in Sathvat 1216 = circa 1159 A.D. The exact date of the other commentary, also called *Samiketa* by Ruyyaka is not known but we can ascertain from other sources that Ruyyaka probably flourished in the second and third quarters of the 12th century A.D. Mammata therefore cannot be placed later than the middle of the 12th century. The upper limit is more difficult to settle. But the nearest predecessor whom Mammata quotes is the Kashmirian Abhinavagupta who must have been still living in 1013 A.D., as this date is borne by his *Brhat Vṛtti* on the *Īvara pratyaśhīpa*. Mammata also quotes from the *Nava sahasanka carita* of Padmagupta Paramala, a protégé of the kings of Dhara first of Muñja Vakpatiraja and then of his successor Sindhuraja at whose direction the poem appears to have been written within the first decade of the 11th century. In an illustrative verse (on the figure Udatta in chapter x) Mammata also refers to the liberality of Bhoja ■ learned men. This Bhoja is identified with the well known Paramara king Bhoja of Dhara the son and successor of Śaṅ

dhuraja and nephew of Munja Vakpatiraja as well as the reputed author of *Sarasvatī kaṇṭhabhāraṇa*. It is curious however that in spite of his extensive references to his predecessors Mammaja does not appear to refer to this well known work on Sanskrit Poetics but this omission may have been due to the fact that Bhoja paid no allegiance to the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana. If, however the verse in question refers to Bhoja of Dhara who himself had literary predilections and was a patron of learned men then it would indicate that Mammaja could not have flourished earlier than Bhoja. Bhoja could not have ruled beyond 1055 A.D. From all these considerations we can roughly place Mammaja in the period between the middle of the 11th and the middle of the 12th century A.D. Allowing two generations to intervene between him and his commentator Ruyyaka we can approximately assign Mammaja's activity to the last quarter of the 11th and the commencement of the 12th century.

Mammaja's name itself and his title *Rajanaka* as well as Kashmirian tradition indicate that he probably belonged to Kashmir. A very late commentator Bhamasena in his *Sudhasagara* or *Subodhini* commentary (date in Samvat 1779 = 1722-23 A.D.) on the *Kavya prakāṣa* informs us that Mammaja was the son of Jayyaja and had two brothers Kayyaja and Uvvaṇa of whom Uvvaṇa is taken to be the well known commentator on Vedic works. But this story is doubtful as Uvvaṇa himself tells us that his father's name was Vajraja and not Jayyaja. The story relied upon by Hall and Weber that Mammaja was the maternal uncle of the author of the *Naiṣadha* may similarly be relegated to the region of fantastic fables which often gather round famous names.

The *Kavya prakāṣa* has the appearance of a compact treatise which is carefully planned and systematically worked out but the unity has been called in question and enough evidence has been brought forward to show that *Kāṭika* and *Vṛtti* of nearly the whole work was indeed composed by Mammaja but

a small portion of the last chapter probably left incomplete by him was completed by another author whose name is given as Alaka Alaja or Aliaja. It is not necessary for us to enter here into the details of the question of the joint authorship of the *Kavya prakāśa* but it is now generally accepted on the indications given by some of Mammaja's commentators as well as by some manuscripts of his work that Mammaja composed the *Kavya prakāśa* up to the treatment of the figure Parikara (x 32), but the rest consisting of a small portion of the concluding chapter was composed by the author mentioned above. That the fact of joint authorship is skilfully concealed is supposed to have been alluded to in the concluding verse given in some manuscripts which apparently says that this way of the learned men different yet appearing identical is not strange for here the only cause is a properly constructed plan of combination'. It is possible to explain this statement as meaning that the work claims the credit of having skilfully removed by its systematic plan all conflict of opinions held by different authors on Poetics - but most commentators early as well as late agree in finding here a hint implying that the work left incomplete by Mammaja was completed by some other person and that traces of joint authorship are cleverly obliterated. This view is distinctly expressed by an early commentator like Ruyyaka who himself a Kashmirian and living in a period not very remote from Mammaja must have been recording a well known tradition and in this view he is followed by Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, Somēśvara, Nāṭhara, Sarasvatīśūrtha, Kamalakara, Ānanda, Jayeśvara and other early as well as late commentators while some manuscripts of the *Kavya prakāśa* record the tradition in the colophon by mentioning the names of Mammaja and Alaja as joint authors. Rajanaka Ānanda also a Kashmirian commentator is however more explicit and quotes a traditional verse which records Mammaja's authorship up to the topic of Parikara Alakikara (x 32) and attributes the rest to Alaja Aliaja or Alaka.

This statement about the dual authorship of the *Kāvya prakāśa* receives confirmation from an independent source but the reference would indicate that Allāṭa had a hand not only in the 10th as the above tradition makes out but also in the 7th chapter of the work which deals with the topic of Doṣa. For this chapter on Doṣa *anvaya* is cited by Arjunavarma who flourished in the first quarter of the 13th century in his commentary on the *Amaraśataka* with a distinct attribution of this chapter to Mammaṭa and Alakā or Alakṣa. Arjunavarman's remark while quoting the verse *prasāde vartasva* from *Kāvya prakāśa* vii 14 is clear enough: *yathodahrtam doṣa anvaye māmṇaśalakabhyam* and it is not possible to take || as implying a general reference to the fact of joint authorship without particularly meaning collaboration of any special chapter. This has led some scholars to find traces of collaboration of Allāṭa in other parts of the work also but the question still awaits a thorough and careful examination.

Some late Bengal commentators among whom Mahāśvara Nyayalākṣa is one would impute the authorship of the *Kārikā* (here called *Sūtra*) portion of the *Kāvya prakāśa* to Bharata and the prose *Vṛtti* alone to Mammaṭa while Bharata himself is said to have drawn upon the *Alamkāra* section of the *Agni purāṇa*. While the last assertion about the *Agni purāṇa* has no foundation in fact and is apparently prompted by the amiable but unhistorical imagination of later writers which delights in exalting the antiquity and authority of Purāṇas in general the suggestion of Bharata's authorship of the *Kārikas* is too unauthentic and fanciful to be accepted. Apart from the fact that the evidence of the text itself goes directly against such a supposition Mammaṭa's authorship of the *Kārikas* in general has been declared by Hemacandra in the first quarter of the 12th century and has been accepted by a series of important authors. The source of this tradition is probably the great reverence paid to the sage Bharata but it

may also be due to the fact that Mammata himself has made considerable use of Bharata's dicta as he has also drawn extensively upon Bhūnātha Vamana Udbhaṭa Rudraṭa and the *Dhanyaloka* even to the extent of sometimes directly appropriating or paraphrasing well known passages or illustrative verses.

That the work of Mammata was studied extensively in Bengal is indicated not only by the popular printed commentary of Maheśvara Nyayalamkāra Bhāṭṭācārya but also by a large number of commentaries written by well known writers of Bengal which have not yet been printed. Among Bengal commentators one may mention the names of Jagadīśa Tarkapānānāsa Bhāṭṭācārya (*Rahasya prakāśa*) Gṛadhara Cakravartin Bhāṭṭācārya (*Tīka*) Jayarama Nyayapānānāsa (*Tīka* or *Jayaram*) Devanātha Tarkapānānāsa (*Kavya kaumudī*) Ramanātha Vidyavācāspatī (*Rahasya prakāśika*) and Śrīkṛṣṇa Śarmaṇa (*Rasa prakāśa*) the last of whom describes Nyayalamkāra author of the *Adarśa* (i.e. Maheśvara Nyayalamkāra) as his Guru. Baladeva Vidyabhūṣaṇa the well known writer on Bengal Vaiṣṇavism also wrote a commentary on the *Kavya prakāśa* entitled *Sahitya kaumudī* but he belonged to Orissa and wrote under the patronage of Gajapati Prataparudra of Orissa. And yet Maheśvara Nyayalamkāra laments

काव्यप्रकाशस्य कृता नृदे नृदे

येन तदाप्येव तथैव दुर्गमः ।

The *Kavya prakāśa* has not been so often printed in Bengal as it has been in other provinces of India where it is perhaps much more extensively studied. For in Bengal Viśvanātha's *Sahitya darpaṇa* appears to be a more popular text book. But it certainly deserves wider circulation and study in Bengal not only as a brilliant text book but also as one of the most remarkable classic works on Sanskrit Poetics.

‘MĀLĀ TU PŪRVAVAT’


In an article with the above heading (which is itself a quotation from Mammaṭa's *Kāvya prakāśa* x 8b) in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute*,¹ Mr Divekar attempts to throw doubt on the interpretation of most commentators of Mammaṭa that the word *pūrvavat* in this Kārikā refers to *mūlopanā* which, though not mentioned before in any of the Kārikās, is dealt with in the Vṛtti on x 4b. The interpretation referred to is of some importance. It implies that the figure *mālā rūpaka* follows the rule laid down for the figure *mūlopanā* but since *mūlopanā* is not taught in any of the previous Kārikās and is explained only in Vṛtti on a previous occasion, the reference apparently indicates that the Kārikā and the Vṛtti of the *Kāvya prakāśa* must be taken *en bloc* as the work of one and the same author.² The passage, therefore, has been taken as supporting the tradition of the identity of the Kārikākāra and the Vṛttikāra of the *Kāvya prakāśa*. Mr Divekar, however, thinks that the word *pūrvavat* does not refer to *mūlopanā* which is not to be found in immediate context nor in any preceding Kārikā, but to the *sāṅga-nirāṅga bheda* mentioned in the very line of which the quotation forms a part. The doubt raised is legitimate, and the suggestion is indeed striking, but there are difficulties in accepting the solution proposed by Mr Divekar of the whole problem.

Mammaṭa is dealing in the context with *rūpaka* and its classification, and it is necessary to consider his treatment in some detail in order to understand the bearing of the passage in question. Defining *rūpaka* in x 7a Mammaṭa

1 Vol. vi, pt. I (1925), p. 50f.

2 See S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i p. 166.

etc on *prīya* in the illustration of *mala* given in the text.¹ The classification discussed may then be tabulated as follows



Now, from what has been said above it is clear that *mālā rupaka* can in its nature be only *nirāṅga*, for here the successive superimpositions on one object have not the relation of principal and subordinate metaphorical representations. As explained by Nagoji Bhatta in his *Uddyota* commentary 'ekaviśaya nana-padartharopa rūpaivaṁ mālātvam paraspara sapekṣatva virahac ca nirāṅgatvam itī tad arthah'.² Now such serial representation of one *upameya* with successive *upamānas* may take the form either of a simile (*upamā*) or of a metaphor (*rupaka*) according as there is *bheda* or *abheda* between the properties of the *upameya* and the *upamānas*, but the two figures are essentially of the same nature in having successive representations (in the one case under similitude in the other under metaphorical superimposition) of one *upameya* in connection with successive *upamānas*. This is what Mammata wants apparently to

1 It is conceivable that there may be successive superimpositions on successive objects standing in the relation of principal and subordinate thus in this case each metaphor can be taken separately and be considered as such.

2 Ed. Chandorkar 1915 *Uḥāta* v p. 34. Similarly Cakravartin quoted by Vāmanācārya (*Kāvya* pr. ed. 1917 p. 599) says *māla* ca *nirāṅga-rūpā rūpyamanānam angaṅgibhāsa virahāt*. Commenting on the example of *mālā rupaka* given by Mammata Bhaṅkyaśāstra (ed. Anandāśrama p. 234) says *atra prīyā rūpa eka eva-ropa-viśayo mālā itī jangā r vīṇā nirāṅga-padyas rūpa itī nirāṅga*.

indicate by the word *pūrvavat* in the Kārikā viz. that the *mala rūpaka* which is one of the sub-divisions of *nirangarūpaka* is of the same type as the *mālopanāḍ*¹. In other words the term *pūrvavat*, considered in this light, implies that, as there is in *malopamā* a connection through similitude, of one *upameya* with successive *upamānas*, so in *mālā rūpaka* there is a metaphorical superimposition of successive *upamānas* on one *upameya*. And yet Mammata is not presumably justified in referring to *mālopanāḍ* which he has not defined in any previous Kārikā. The *malopama*, however, is dealt with in the Vṛtti on x 4b. The conclusion, therefore, is forced that Mammata is referring to his own Vṛtti where he has already dealt with *malopamā*, unless the word *pūrvavat* can be shown to refer to something else in the same or in some previous Kārikā. Let us now see that other interpretation Mr. Divekar has to offer for the much discussed word *pūrvavat*.

In the light of what is said above, we should translate the line in question as follows: 'This (twofold division is called) *saṅga* or entire², but the *niranga* or partless metaphor³ is single also serial (which is) as before (i.e., as in the case of

1 This is made clear by the Vṛtti on the passage which says: *mālopanāḍm iva ekasmin bahava āropatāḥ* where *mālopanāḍm* is clearly a commentary on the word *pūrvavat*. It is not correct to presume that the Vṛttikāra generally quotes the words of the Kārikākāra when he gives the meanings in the 'vṛtti' for one need not go far but merely point out that the Vṛtti on *saṅgam* does paraphrase every word of the Kārikā without repeating the original words.

2 In the absence of better terms, I borrow the terms *entire* and *partless* from Chanderkar's rendering of the text.

3 See *Pradīpa* ed. NSP 1912, p. 129. It is noteworthy that the *Pradīpakāra* whom Mr. Divekar quotes as his authority on this point explains the Kārikā in question as referring to *malopamā* by the word *pūrvavat*: *yathāśāstra bahupamāna-yoge mālopanāḍa tathāśāstrādheya-dharmarope mala rūpakam ity-arthah*. On this Vaidyanātha remarks: *etad eva sūtra vṛtti kṛtor ekasme jālopanāḍa mālopanāḍyāḥ sūtravahitāḥ vṛttaveva kathanat*.

serial simile) Mr Divekar however translates the line somewhat differently. This is *sanga* an unmixed (*ni paka*) is however *niranga* but *mala rupaka* is similar to the former. He infers from this that the word *purva* which he translates as former refers to the division of *sanga* and *niranga* (and not presumably to *malopama*). He adds. If we translate as given above *mala rupaka* will have to be considered as *sanga* implying thereby that *purva* or former in this passage refers to *sanga*. This is no doubt a novel interpretation but it is untenable for it will be clear from the exposition given by us above that the *mala rupaka* in its very nature cannot be considered as *sanga*. Mr Divekar quotes the opinion of the Pradipakara in support. No doubt the Pradipakara apparently takes this view for commenting on this passage he states *atha sangasyaiva vaicitryan tarām āha—mulā tu purvavat*. It appears however that the words *atha sangasya* must be taken as a misreading which is commented upon by Vaidyanātha Tattai and Nagoji Bhaṭṭa. Vaidyanātha appears to read instead *atītasangasya* (for *atīta saṅgasya*) and understands *a sanga* as *śuddha* adding *pūrva śabdenopamaṃ parumarśah*. Nagoji goes further and discusses the reading thus *kvacit tu n rangasyaiveṣi pīṣṭaś cān jāya nānā padārtharopa rūpatvaṃ mōlatvaṃ paraspāra supēkṣa virāḍ ca i ras gāṭhāṃ iti tad arthāḥ āyam eva yuktāḥ pūjīḥ*. He would therefore regard *nirāṅgasya* which he finds in some manuscripts to be the proper reading. Vamanacarya in his learned edition of *Āvya prakāśa* (3rd ed 1917 p 599) agrees with this view and remarks *m lī rūpa n n rangam darsayati—mala tviti āta evaivaḥ prūṇah—nirāṅgasyaiva vaicitryāntaram mōlā tviti* *iti pradīpe tu atīta sāṅgasyaiva vaicitryāntaram ala mōla tu pūrvavat nyūktam tad upapattis tuddhote nagojibhāṣāyāṃ ālī ākūḥamait kṛīṇeti tatraiva draṣṭavyaḥ* *alam āsara granīḥa vicāreṇa*. It cannot be determined whether this is slip on the part of Pradipakara otherwise a very careful and discerning writer or a mere misreading (as Nagoji's remarks would indicate).

which subsequently crept in. It is clear however that the reading *sanga* of the Pradīpakara has not escaped the notice of commentators on the text and should be considered as incorrect, and nothing is gained by relying on a doubtful text. It may also be pointed out that all subsequent writers on Poetics who have taken Mammata more or less as authoritative have agreed in regarding *mala rūpaka* as *niranga* or *niravayava* and never as *sanga* or *savayava*. This appears to be the view of Ruyyaka (ed. Nir. Sag. p. 36), Vidyadhara (p. 213), Vidyānātha (ed. Bom. Sansk. Ser. p. 374), Viśvanātha (ed. Durgaprasada, 1915, p. 495) and Jagannātha (ed. Nir. Sag. p. 233).

The difficulty about regarding *mala* as *sanga* was probably present before Mr. Divekar's mind for he adds: "If we now ever translate 'This is *sanga*' and *mala rūpaka* is as before *mala rūpaka* will be *niranga*." It must be confessed that this proposed alternative translation is far from clear, but since *pūrvavat* appears to be translated by 'as before' it may be concluded that Mr. Divekar means to imply that *pūrvavat* in this case does not refer to *sanga* (as in the other translation he has given) but to *niranga* so that *mala rūpaka* as he says should be classified as *niranga*. Having regard to the classification proposed by Mammata and his followers this explanation is certainly not open to serious objection, but the difficulty in accepting this translation apart from its vagueness is that it would make the word *pūrvavat* redundant in the *karika* as it stands. If it were Mammata's intention only to say that *mala* like *suddha* is *niranga* it would have been enough for him to state: *nirangam* *iv* *suddham* *mala ca*. There would be no need of adding *pūrvavat* after the word *mala* if the purpose was only to refer thereby to *niranga* which immediately precedes it in context. Even if it were supposed that the word *pūrvavat* is necessary for referring pointedly to *niranga* as distinguished from *sanga* occurring in the same line the term would not be happy for in that case applied to two successively mentioned things in the same

being composed by himself he was justified in making such a reference. At any rate, whatever may be the explanation of this procedure adopted by Mammata, one cannot, in the absence of any better interpretation of this passage, find any reason for not accepting the interpretation given by Mammata's innumerable commentators.

THE ŚANTA RASA IN THE NĀṬYA ŚĀSTRA AND THE DĀŚA RŪPAKA

It is extremely doubtful if the *śanta* as *rasa* is at all accepted by Bharata for the genuineness of the portion of the text of the *Nāṭya śāstra* in which the mention of *śanta* as a *rasa* occurs is certainly not beyond question.

In all the four editions of Bharata's work (Grosset Kavya mala Kashi and Gaekwad) the enumeration of only eight Rasas excluding the ninth *śanta* occurs at the outset of ch. vi and elaborate treatment of these eight Rasas with their corresponding *sthayins vibhavas* etc. their colour and deity follows. It may be noted that Kalidasa (*Vikram* ii 8) credits Bharata with the mention of eight (and not nine) Rasas. It is only in the Gaekwad edition that the text on *śanta* occurs at the end of ch. vi and speaks of *śanta* as the ninth *rasa*. This additional text on *śanta* is commented upon by Abhinavagupta and appears to have been known to Bhaṭṭa Nayaka. Abhinava makes an elaborate attempt to meet the objections against *śanta* and establish it as a *Rasa*. He gives instances of Bharata's awareness of *śanta* but his arguments are based not upon Bharata's mention of it but upon his silence and are meant to explain why Bharata does not expressly speak of it as a *Rasa*.

In spite of the importance of *śanta* which so much attention is devoted the insertion of the *śanta* text at the end of the chapter on *Rasa* is in itself suspicious even if this may not be put forward as a conclusive argument. Abhinava himself however admits that this is the reading not of all but of those who read that there are nine *rasas* (*ye punar nava rasu ti pajhanti sammatē* p. 333) implying that the Rasas are generally counted as eight but some old MSS (*cirantana pustakēṣu*) add a ninth. Elsewhere commenting upon Bharata's enumeration of eight Rasas and their corresponding *sthayins*

(p 267) Abhinava remarks that the opponents of *śanta* read eight (*śantapālāpinas tu aṣṭavite paśhanti*) and that some read *vismaya śama* (in the text of *sthāyin*) for *vismayaś ceti*

On the other hand Abhinava adduces passages like *kvacic chomah* which indicate that Bharata had some knowledge of *sama* or *śanta* but it is also clear that the instances quoted only show Bharata's recognition of *śanta* as an element and they do not mean Bharata's acceptance of *śanta* as a *Rasa śama* is not mentioned by him as one of the forty nine *bhāvas*. Abhinava himself draws attention to the fact that Bharata's definition of the drama emphasises that it is *kṛīḍanaka prakhyā* and *vinodajanana* and should therefore depict worldly matters from this point of view *śanta* is *apradhana* and not the leading motif. Again Bharata gives *laya śaraṇa guṇa ālākara vṛtti* etc. of the eight *Rasas* only in several sections of his work but *śanta* is not mentioned in this connexion. He gives also musical *pātyangas* suggestive of several *Rasas* but here also *śanta* is not mentioned (ch xxix 1-4). Abhinava notes that those who admit *śanta* read *śvachha* as its colour and the Buddha as its deity. But Dharmika states distinctly that Bharata did not characterise *śanta* as a *Rasa* by mentioning its *vibhāvas* etc. As a matter of fact except what is stated in the interpolated text on the *śama* at the end of ch vi Bharata does not mention the aspects of *śanta* and its attendant conditions.

A further argument may be added. Regarding the admission of *śanta* there has been no uniformity of opinion while its *sthāyi bhāva* has been enumerated divergently. Abhinava refers to various views which show that all are not agreed that *śanta* is its *sthāyin*. Among different *sthāyins* proposed we have *śarīra-citta-vṛtti prāṇama samyag jñāna nirveda nirviṣaya citta-vṛtti tyāga kṣaya sukha dhṛti utsaha jugupsā rati* any of the remaining *sthāyins* or all the eight *sthāyins* together. The non admission of *śanta* and the positing of various kinds of *sthāyin* for it perhaps indicate that Bharata whose authority is highly respected could not have definitely promulgated

śanta-rasa or its *sthāyin* and the divergence arose from the absence of his express authority in this matter. It is noteworthy that Abhinava (*Locana* ed NSP p. 176) remarks that it is Bharata's non mention of the *sthāyin* of *śanta* which leads Anandavardhana to formulate *irṣya kṣaya* as its *sthāyin*.

The objections against *śanta* are thus summarised but not discussed by the *Dattarupaka*. (1) Some say that there is no *śanta-rasa* because Bharata has not mentioned its *vibhava* etc. and therefore has not characterised it as he has done in the case of other Rasas. (2) Some entirely deny its *de facto* existence (*vastutas tasyabhāvam varṇayanti*) because in their opinion men are eternally incapable of exterminating *rāga* and *dveṣa* (*anadī kṛtā pravahayata rāga dveṣayoḥ uccheṣṭum aśakyatvat*). (3) Some would include *śanta-rasa* in *vīra* and *bhātsa* apparently taking *utsaha* and *jagrupsa* as its *sthāyin* respectively. (4) The real nature of *śanta* which in the total absence of all feeling and activity involves a state of inaction (*samastā vyāpura vilaya rūpa*) which cannot be represented on the stage. The development of *śanta*, therefore, is inadmissible in the drama (*puṣṭir nāṭasya natyeṣu*). The *Nāgananda* which is regarded by some as a *śanta* play is plainly not so because (a) the end here is not *śanta* but lordship over the *Vidyadharas* and (b) the attachment to *Malayavati* being antagonistic to the feeling of non attachment essential to *śanta* both cannot where in the same *alambana* namely *Jimutavahana*. The conclusion therefore is that the *vīra* (*ś c dayā vīra*) and *śṛṅgāra* are the Rasas in this play.

Dhananjaya himself would object to *śanta* only in the *Nāṭya* which requires the delineation of the *Rasa* through its *anubhavas* etc. but he would permit it in the *Kavya* because what cannot be acted can at least be described. But his commentator *Dhanika* would not allow *śanta* even in poetry. There can be in his opinion no such *sthāyi bhāva* as *śanta* or *nivṛtta* for the development of that state (if it is possible at all to destroy all feelings of love or hatred) would tend to

the absence of all feeling and action. Such a state is the very negation of the possibility of affirming anything about it and any description of it would be an inadequate description in worldly terms of what is unworldly. Dharmika would regard Jimutavahana as an *udatta* and not as a *śānta nayaka*. To the objection that Jimutavahana is depicted not as a conquering hero (*jigishu*) but as devoid of such a mental state he replies that *anulūtya* as an excelling eminence of the mind is not lacking in Jimutavahana. *jigishu* or heroism need not be only of one variety of warlike attainment. One may conquer self and excel in *dayā dharma* or *tyaga*. Jimutavahana may not be a *śiddhāvira* but he is a *dayāvira*. Here the main *Rasa* being *vira* and not *śānta* he is certainly an *udatta nayaka* and *śringara* being not incompatible with *vira* the episode of Malayavata is justifiable. Viśvanātha also takes Jimutavahana to be a *dayāvira* but very ingeniously he attempts to establish that *śānta* can be a *Rasa* because in that state the soul is about to be emancipated (*yukta viyukta dāsa*) and is not completely detached so that the presence of feeling and activity would not be incompatible while *sukha* is not entirely absent what is absent is the worldly *sukha*. The attainment of *sama* in his opinion does not imply cessation from all activity.

It is held therefore that the objections to the *śānta rasa* are not all valid. A *śānta* play is bound to appeal to persons of devout mind just in the same way as *śringara* and *vira* plays appeal to men of a different attitude. It is bound to be uncommon but that does not disprove that it is capable of being depicted and relished while it is not true to say that men are eternally slaves to *raga* and *dveṣa*. There has been a continuous stream of literature which depicts *śānta* as a *Rasa*. The non mention by Bharata is at best a technical and trifling objection. The objection that *śānta* can be easily included in *vira* and *bībhatsa* is misconceived. The *śānta* may involve *utsāha* or energy for spiritual attainment is not without effort but the two terms are not co extensive. There

may be *daya utsaha* *dharma utsaha* and so forth but *santa* comprehends many kinds of *utsaha* and is much more than mere *utsaha*. The *daya vira* and *dharma vira* are as Abhinava points out really two aspects of *santa* which covers a much wider field. The *santa* includes *daya* and *dharma* but is not included or exhausted by them. In the same way, *jugupsā* may be an accessory of *santa* but *santa* is not entirely *jugupsatmala*.¹

Siddha Bharati Hoshiarpur 1950

1 The entire question is discussed fully by V. Raghavan in his *Number of Rasas* *Adyar (Madras)* 1948.

BHANUDATTA AUTHOR OF THE RASA MANJARI

In my *Sanskrit Poetics* : p 249 a tentative approximation was made of the date of Bhanudatta author of *Rasa manjari*, *Rasa taranginī* *Gita gaurāṣa* *Kumara bhārgavīya* and other works to the period between the period between the 12th and the middle of the 14th century but it was indicated that the date was not beyond doubt. One passage however, of the *Rasa manjari* which was overlooked seems to throw fresh light on the question and enables us to fix Bhanudatta's date with a somewhat greater precision.

In one of the illustrative verses of the *Rasa manjari* which exemplifies the Sattvika Gunas¹ there is a description of such Gunas in a young girl at the sight of one *Nijama dharampala*². As the name of some other better known kings of antiquity might as well have served the purpose of the poet the mention of the Nizam in this verse is curious and cannot be dismissed easily as insignificant. It would not be improper to assume that here we have in the usual manner of Sanskrit poets an indirect compliment paid to a reigning sovereign whose patronage the poet probably enjoyed. If we can decide who this Nizam was our enquiry will be narrowed down to a considerable extent.

As a commentary on *Rasa manjari* called *Rasa manjari vākya* by Gopala (alias Vopadeva) son of Nrsimha is expressly dated in 1572 A D³ it is clear that by the words

1 Called Sattvika Bhāvas by other writers.

2 Ed Denares Skt Series (1904) stanza 121 p 232. The line in question runs thus *tasā Lākṣmī-rajā-pāthā nijama-dharampalaḥ sam alokitah*.

3 The verse which gives the date of composition is thus quoted by Stein (*Jamuna Catalogue Extracts* p 273)

śaṅkṣaḥ sa ya gaṇadhī na vedā-dharmāḥ-gaṇye guru-śeṭhore ḥ
manjaryas tu vākya eṣa vacita bhūṣīt satāḥ pratyaje ḥ

nijama dharanpāla, the poet cannot refer to kings of the modern Nizam dynasty which dates from the comparatively recent time of Nizam ul mulk Asaf Khān. A probable clue to this problem is furnished by Ananta Pandita author of the *Vyangyārtha kaumudī* commentary (1636 A.D.) on *Rasa māñjarī* who explains the phrase in question as *nijamakhyo devagiri rajah*. If this interpretation is accepted¹ then the Nizam referred to would be a king of Devagiri whose name was Nizam. It is well known that Ahmad Nizam Shah obtained possession of Daulatabad (Devagiri) some time between 1499 and 1507 A.D. and founded the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Dekkan which continued in power till 1637 A.D.² The name Devagiri however, was changed to Daulatabad as early as 1339 A.D. when Muhammad Ibn Tughlaq removed his capital from Delhi to that place³. The reference by Bhanudatta therefore seems to indicate a date at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century for the *Rasa māñjarī*.

Stein interprets *yuga sandhya veda-dharaṇ* as 1484 with a query but it really gives as 1494 (as corrected by Stein himself at p. 421). He thinks however that the Saka era is used so that the date of composition of the commentary would be 1438 A.D. But Sridhar Bhandarkar (*Report of Second Tour* 1904-6 p. 36) is probably right in holding that the Śaka era is used in which case the date of the commentary would be 1572 A.D. See *Sanskrit Poetics* i pp. 251-52.

1. Although Ananta Pandita is a fairly late writer belonging to the 17th century his native place was near Ahmadnagar (see *Sanskrit Poetics* i p. 251) and it is probable that his interpretation was based upon some current tradition for the older Nizam dynasty was all but extinct in his time. That the explanation is not a fanciful one is indicated by the fact that Ananta himself gives immediately afterwards another (and this time an obviously fanciful) interpretation of the passage applying it to Śrīkṛṣṇa: *yad yā nijam oimājan amata prapnoti it nityam sa catur dharan polah duktasah-dāmaradī v dāraśatīad it bhāvah etadrajah Śrīkṛṣṇa ty arthah* I.

2. Briggs *Ferishtas* ii 200f.

3. Briggs *op cit* i 419.

It is somewhat surprising that Bhanudatta who describes Videha as his native place and represents the river Ganges flowing through his country¹ should eulogise a prince of Dekkan. It is possible that at some time or other of his career he might have come to the South. This would perhaps explain the fact of Bhanudatta's having more southern commentators than northern. The insertion *vidarbhabhuh* for *videhabhuh* in some manuscripts of *Rasa-manjari*² indicates probably some tradition which connected him with Vidarbha although this was not his native place.

B. H. Bhattacharya refers³ to a tradition among Bihar Pandits that Bhanudatta's father wrote a work called *Rasa-ratna-dīptikā*⁴, and that his grand father Śaṅkara who wrote a commentary on Śrīharṣa's *Khandana-khanda-khadya* (ed. Pandit xii 672) flourished about 1405 A.D. Although the date of Bhanudatta's grandfather does not seriously conflict with the date of Bhanudatta proposed by us the tradition does not agree with Bhanudatta's genealogy as given by himself in his *Kumara-bhāgavīya*⁵ which tells us that the name of his grandfather was Mahadeva and not Śaṅkara. In this genealogical account mention is made of one Sureśvara son of Ratneśvara who was an ancestor of Bhanudatta separated by six generations from himself and who wrote a *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya-varttika*. We need not identify with Eggeling⁶ this Sureśvara with the famous Sureśvara who was a disciple of Śaṅkaracarya for this would

1 *deho janya videhabhuh sura sarit latitoto kum r sah atanta 138*
p. 247

2 *Sanskrit Poet. cs.* 1 p. 249 fn. 2

3 *Journal of the Dept. of Letters Cal. Univ.* in 1923 p. 163

4 This is probably the work cited by Bhanudatta in his *Rasa-ratna* = (ed. Granthamālā on 1 31 ed. Reprinted II 44 l. 3). The remarks on this work at p. 245 of *Sanskrit Poet. cs.* now require correction.

5 *Sanskrit Poet. cs.* 1 p. 248

6 *Ind. a. Office Cat. of Sanskrit MSS.* v p. 1540 where the genealogical verses are quoted in full.

unwarrantably push back the date of Bhanudatta to a time which would be inconsistent with other data furnished by his works

As to the identity of Bhanudatta with the poet Bhanukara Har Datta Sarma¹ relies chiefly on the ascription of large number of Bhanudatta's verses to Bhanukara by some late Anthologies. By far the largest number of Bhanudatta's verses are found assigned to Bhanukara in a compilation entitled *Padya racana* by Lakṣmana Bhaṭṭa Aṅkolakara, but for this work its editors themselves (ed. Kavyamala 86) would not claim a higher antiquity than a hundred years (between 1625 and 1650)². Of the other Anthologies the *Rasika Jivana* belongs to the 17th century, and the *Subhāṣita haravali* m. m. K. Gode has shewn³ to be end of the 17th century. One would require more substantial evidence than the notoriously careless and confused attributions in modern compilations of uncertain value.

1 In *Annals of BORI* xv : 1936 pp. 243-58. See also on this quest. on G. V. Devasthali in *New Ind. Antiquary* vi : 1244 pp. 111-17. J. B. Chaudhuri *Muslim Patronage to Sanskrit Learning* Calcutta 1942 pp. 2-32.

2 See P. K. Gode in *JOR* Madras xv : 1940 pp. 184-93 on the date of this anthology.

3 In *ABORI* xvi : 1935 pp. 262-91.

THE CURTAIN IN ANCIENT INDIAN THEATRE

A great deal of controversy has centred round the word Yavanika which signifies the curtain employed in ancient Indian theatre. The object of this paper is not to reopen the entire question but certain assumptions made since the time of Windisch Weber and Wilson appear to have received currency without much justification and a critical examination of certain relevant facts has therefore become necessary.

It is now generally admitted that the word Yavanika can not be taken as an argument for proving Greek influence on the Indian stage or drama. The word is taken to be a derivative from Yavana meaning Ionian the Greeks with whom Indians came into contact. But since the word was not confined to what was Greek alone and since there is no proof that the Greek mime had any use for the curtain it has been suggested that the word refers not to the curtain but to the material of the curtain for which the practice of using foreign cloth possibly Persian tapestry brought to India by Greek merchants is presumed. But it should be clearly understood that there is no evidence to support this presumption even though it has been repeated in all recent text books on the subject. The attempt¹ again to remove this difficulty and derive the word Yavanika from the root *yu* (*yunakti anynoti anaya iti*) is too ingenious to be seriously considered. But it is important to note in this connexion that the word Yavanika is such as rarely recognised by old Indian lexicographers at

1 Sten Konow *Indische Drama* (Berlin and Leipzig 1920) p. 4.
A. Berriedale Keith *Sanskrit Drama* (Oxford 1924) pp. III-359. M. Winternitz *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* (Leipzig 1922) I, pp. 175-76.

2 T. M. Tripaṭh *Commentary on Damodaragupta's Kāśhīnāṭya* p. 339.

is not included as a synonym of the curtain by Amara, Śāsvata, Hemacandra, Halāyudha, Yādava-prakāśa or Keśava.

In the second chapter of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*, where the construction of the stage is detailed, neither the word *Yavanikā* nor any description of it occurs, but it is apparently known, as it occurs later in 5.11-12 in the description of the elements of the *Pūrva raṅga*

*etāni ca bahir gītāny antar-yavanikā gataih/
prayoktrbhiḥ prayojyāni tantrī bhānda kṛtāni tu//
tataś ca sarva kutapair yuktānyanyāni kārayet/
vighaṭya vai yavanikān nṛtya pāṭhya-kṛtāni ca//*

This is the text given by the more recent Benares edition¹ (1929) which does not notice any variant reading, but it should be noted that the older Bombay edition² (1894) records the variant *Javanikā* in both places, while the edition of Grosset (1898) reads *Javanikā* in both places, only one of its manuscripts having the form *Yavanika*.

This variation of reading raises an important point, for the word *Javanikā* (and not *Yavanikā*) occurs regularly in the lexicons e.g. of Amara (2.6.120) Halāyudha (2.154)³ and Keśava (p. 53, śl. 300)⁴ as the name of a curtain, but not necessarily of the theatre curtain. The commentators on Amara, rightly or wrongly, derive the word from the verbal root *ju* thus

Kṣurasvāmin *javanīe syam javanikā*
Sarvānanda *javanam vego'sya astati javanika*
Bhānujī Dakṣiṇa *javary asyām juḥ santro dhātuh
gatau vege ca, lyuḥ, svārthe kan*

1 ed. Batukmahārī Sarma and Baladev Upadhyay, Kashī Śikṣa Series, Benares 1929. The later works on Dramaturgy (*Daśarūpaka Nāṭya darpana* etc.) do not throw any light on the question.

2 ed. Nirṇay Sagar Press, Bombay 1894.

3 Paris and Lyon, 1898.

4 *Abhidhāna ratna-māla*, ed. Th. Aufrecht, London 1861.

5 *Kaśīpadra kōśa*, ed. Gachwad, Oriental Series, Baroda 1923.

Similarly Hemacandra in his *Abhidhāna-cintamani* (2 344) includes Javanī ॥ a synonym for curtain and explains in the commentary *jānante syāṃ javanī*. The word seems to be old and occurs in the sense of theatre curtain in the *Harī vaṃśa* ¹

[*prekṣagorani*] *rejur javanikāḥgepaṭh sapaḥṣā va kṛhe nagah* and in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (1 8 19)

m i ya javanikacchannam aṃśa dhokṣajam avyayam /
na lakṣyase m i lha dṛṣa naṣo naṣya dharo yathā //

Although the form Javanika is thus authenticated the etymology of the commentators is considered too fanciful and brushed aside by modern scholars who assume that the word Javanika is nothing but a Prakritic form of the word Yavanika ². But it is clear that this assumption proceeds with the acceptance of the Yavanikā-Ionian equation and thereby really begs the question.

There is yet a third form Yamanika which does not appear ॥ have received any serious consideration. Through the influence chiefly of the Yavanika-Ionian theory this form has been summarily dismissed by Böhtlingk and Roth as a scribal mistake for Yavanika and by Sten Konow as merely secondary but it is recognised independently by Indian lexicographers and found in some manuscripts of Sanskrit plays and poems. Thus Mahēśvara³ commenting on the passage quoted from Amara above (2 6 120) gives for the curtain the synonyms *pratisira javanika yamanika uraskarani* (a fact which is noted in the modern *Sabda-kalpadruma*). Bhanuji Dikṣita explains further *yamanika iti va pīṭhah yamaṣṭi yama uparama lyuṣ* and Sarvananda similarly notes '*dr̥ṣṭer uparatiṣṭi aṣṭi*

1 Ed. Bombay 2 29 7 ed. Calcutta 45-48. In later Kavya the word occurs in *Śiṣupala* adī 1 a v 54 *Hara v jaya xi* 38 etc.

2 But contrary. P. schel. n. *Gött. n. g. sche. geles. r. t. Anze. gen.* 1891 p. 354.—The *Deś-nama-māla* gives both ॥ an d (4 1) and ja an? (2 25) in the sense of screen but obviously these are derivatives respectively of Sanskrit *javanīka* and *janī*.

3 As in Bombay ed. 1896.

va yamanika¹. Hemacandra in the passage quoted above commenting on the word *yavam* adds *yamanu ity api*. In the absence of critical editions of Sanskrit plays and poems the editors of which usually adopt the form *yavanika*² the evidence therefrom is uncertain but a few important occurrences of the form *yamanika* may be noted here. In Hillebrandt's critical edition of the *Mudra rakṣasa*³ the reading accepted in two places in the stage direction is *yamanika* although the usual variants *yavanika* and *yavanika* are also noted p 192, 17 *tataḥ pravṛṣati yamanikavṛta śaruro mukhamatra dṛśyaś cañak* yāh p 193 l 11 *yavanikam apantiyopasriya*. In Megha prabhacarya's *Dharmabhyudaya*⁴ one of the stage directions occurs as *yamanikantarad yati veśa dhari putrakas tatra sthapaniyah* p 15 (no v l noted). In a verse of Bhartrihari *Śataka* given in P von Böhlen's edition (no 51)⁵ and reproduced in Böhtlingk's *Indische Sprüche* (no 779)⁶ the word preferred is *yavanika*

*jarā śirṣaṁ ungāṁ nāṣṭa iva valī mandita tanuḥ
narah saṁsāraṇe viśaṁ yama dhari yavanikam*

but both von Böhlen and Böhtlingk conscientiously record the *variae lectiones* namely *yamanika* and *yavanika*

1 The printed text (ed. Trivandrum Skt Series 1914/17) evidently wrongly reads *yavanika*³

2 As in *Svapna viśvānātha* Act vi after sl 16 *paśyamas tavad rūpa tadāśyam samāḥ pyatām yavanika* in *Pratimā* at the end of Act iii after sl 21 *kāñcukīyo yavan* *Lāṭāraṇaś keror*. Also *Mālavikāgn m ita* vi 18/19. As no variants are usually recorded it is not clear whether the editors of plays and poems proceed strictly on manuscript evidence or on a preconceived bias regarding greater desirability of the *Yavanika* form.

3 Breslau 1912. H. H. Dhruva's edit. on reads *yavanika* which is translated as 'a fine coat of mail'.

4 HM Jaina Ātmananda Grantha-mālā Series no 61 Bhavnagar 1918.

5 Berlin 1833. The verse is missing in Telang's edition (Bombay Skt Series Bombay 1893).

6 St Petersburg 1863/65 (in 3 vols.)

It is clear therefore that Yamankā is as much a recognised form as the word for curtain is Javanikā and perhaps more than Yavanikā. If we accept the etymology proposed by commentators on lexicons the form Javanikā makes some sense however fanciful, while Yavanika derives its validity only from the rather far fetched explanation that it referred to the foreign material of the cloth. The form Yamanka, on the other hand, perhaps makes a better and more natural sense. It is obviously derived from the root *yam* (1 1009), 'to stop or restrain', signifying a covering or curtain, and it would not be unjustifiable to suggest that it was perhaps the original form, which is almost lost or replaced by the other two forms Yavanika and Javanikā. That it is not a fictitious derivative of lexicographers is clear from the fact that the word *yamani* from which it is directly derived appears to be old, being traceable as far back as the *Vājasaneyi Samhita* (14 22).

As the Raṅga pīṭha or stage appears to have had no wings¹ (as in modern theatre) the question of drop-curtain does not arise. The curtain was presumably meant (there having been no scenes) to screen off the Nepathya gṛha or tiring room which was behind the Raṅga pīṭha or stage. The exact location of the curtain however is not given in the *Nāṭya śāstra* nor in later dramaturgic works. Wilson was of opinion that curtains were suspended transversely so as to divide the stage into different portions open equally to the audience but screening one set of actors from the other.² But this theory of transverse curtain as Keith has already

1 Unless the two Mattavāraṇḍas whose function is obscure on the two sides of the Raṅga pīṭha acted as such, but this is very unlikely. See Mankad (Hindu Theatre in *IQ* viii 1932 pp 485f 494 95) who is inclined to believe that there were no wings nor was there any drop-curtain in ancient Indian stage. The Mattavāraṇḍas are probably emblems in the form of elephant with up-lifted trunks.

2 The passage from *Śvapna viśvānāṭa* quoted above in p 151 foot-note 2 cannot be urged in support for the word *yamankā* there can be explained simply as a screen or veil which hides Vāṣaṇadatta from the king. The first Act of *Mr̥cchakatika* again is not a relevant instance.

pointed out lacks corroboration². The same remark applies to the conjecture of Monier Williams (*Saluntala*, p. 4) that the curtain was "suspended across the stage, answering the purposes of scenes, behind which was the space called *Nepathya*"³. We have only the authority of Abhinavagupta who, in his commentary on the *Nāṭya śāstra*⁴ locates the curtain between the *Raṅga pīṭha* and the *Raṅga śirṣa* (*rātra javanikā raṅgapīṭha tacchurṣayor madhye*, p. 212). But there is some difficulty in accepting this location. The *Raṅga śirṣa* as its name implies, was presumably the place at the head or extreme end of the *Raṅga pīṭha* : i.e. between the *Raṅga pīṭha* and *Nepathya grha*. Its use is thus explained by Abhinavagupta *taṭ pāṭraṇāṃ vidrūṅtyaś agacchasiṃ ca guptāś raṅgaśaśobhāyā ranga-śirṣaḥ kāryam* (p. 63). But since the musicians are also allowed to sit there, it has been urged that there is no point in making them sit behind the curtain, along with actors tired or about to enter, for the curtain in the position suggested would screen them off from the *Raṅga-pīṭha*. Even allowing that the orchestra may be screened off there is no point in making tired or entering actors sit there when the retiring room is just immediately behind. This might have been the case in Abhinavagupta's time, but in the original plan of the theatre given in the second chapter of the *Nāṭya śāstra*, the curtain appears to have had no place there, and its absence is perhaps in conformity with the original practice of musicians sitting openly in the *Ranga śirṣa*. In the face of these difficulties it is not possible to determine exactly the position of the curtain, but it is not unlikely that its employment was meant (as *Nāṭya śāstra*, Bombay ed. 12. 23, Benares ed. 13. 23, indicates) to screen off the way of entrance of the actors from the tiring room to the stage. But since the *Nepathya grha* is allowed to have two doors for

for here obviously we have to imagine six shifting scenes which take place in Cāradatta's house and in the street outside and such unmarked scene-shifting is common enough in Sanskrit plays.

1. G. G. Gokhale's Oriental Series, Baroda 1926.

entrance of actors (*kāryam dāra-dvayam cātra nepathya-grhakaśya tu*)¹ apparently into the Raṅga-śiṅga and thence to the Raṅga pīṭha it has been sometimes presumed that there must have been two curtains covering the two doors. But if Abhinavagupta's view is accepted, the curtain, suspended across between the Raṅga pīṭha and Raṅga śiṅga would have screened off the entire stage from the Nepathya grha with its two doors, thus forbidding the necessity of any presumption of two curtains for the two doors. There is again no ground for assuming that the curtain was parted in the middle, or that the actors entered through the parting drawn aside. At least, no such description or reference is found in dramatic texts. The curtain appears to have been simply tossed aside when actors entered. Even in the case of hurried abrupt or violent entrance the position of the curtain, whether between the Raṅga pīṭha and Raṅga śiṅga or between the Raṅga śiṅga and the Nepathya grha, would not hinder it. The stage direction for hurried entrance *apāti kṣepena pravṛṣati* would, therefore, simply mean "enters without a toss of the curtain."

Some of the commentators however explain the phrase differently. Quoting Helayudha, who gives *Apāti* as a synonym of *Paśi* or *Javanikā* (*apāti kundapaśali śyaṭ pravṛṣitā jana-nukā* 2 154), Raghavabhaṭṭa (on *Sakuntalā* II and VI) explains *apāti kṣepeneti* *uraskaram uraskurenety arthah*. Kātyavarma's explanation is similar *harṣa śakadī saṁbhramā yuktasya naśasya pravṛṣah paśakṣepena kṛyate*. This interpretation would imply that normally the entrance of actors was effected by drawing aside the curtain but in the case of hurried entrance the curtain was tossed aside. But Saṁkhara appears to agree with our view when he says *apāti kṣepena*

1 *Atra*=raṅga śiṅga from the context. Bharata *Nāṭya-śāstra* Benares ed. II 70. Abhinavagupta explains (p. 68) *dāra-dvayam eva raṅga-śiṅga upanītya gata-patra-pravṛṣāya*. The position of the doors rather obscurely given is discussed by Mankad at pp. 489-90.

akasmad ity arthah pasiksepo na kartavya ariraja pravesayoh it bharatah (we have not been able to trace this quotation in the present text of Bharata) That the curtain was tossed aside when actors entered is indicated by the following passage from Bharata's *Natya śāstra* (ed Bombay 12 23 ed Benares 13 23)

*yatha marga rasopetam prakṛtinam praveśane/
 dīruvayam sampravṛttitayāḥ paṭe can apakṛṣite]]
 karyah praveśah patraṇam nararitia rasa saḥ bhāvīti]*

The passage from Damodaragupta's *Kuṣṇānīmata* cited by Mankad (p 494) need not go against this view the tossing of the curtain being indicated equally by the words *ākṣipta apakṛṣita* or *apanita* Bohtlingk (*Śakuntala* ed Bonn 1842) has a long note after the commentators on this stage direction (Act iv p 46 p 208) but this was written long before definite knowledge of ancient Indian stage was available

THE PROBLEM OF BHARATA AND ĀDI BHARATA

The recently published English translation of Bharata's *Nāṭya-sāstra*¹ by Manomohan Ghosh, as well as P. V. Kane's revised *History of Sanskrit Poetics* prefixed to his new edition of the *Sāhitya darpaṇa*² reopens some important questions about the text, one of which is the much discussed problem of Bharata and Ādi Bharata.

As early as 1912, P. R. Bhandarkar³ first pointed out that "Rāghavabhaṭṭa mentions a work called Ādi Bharata" and that "a MS with the name exists in the Mysore Oriental Library". An actual examination of the MS in 1932 by P. K. Gode,⁴ however, revealed the fact that the work which the Mysore MS contained was nothing more than the *Nāṭya-sāstra* of Bharata itself. This is what P. K. Gode gives as the result of his examination.

The MS is described in the Catalogue of the Mysore Oriental Library (1894) as follows

590 आदिभारतम् श्रीभारताचार्यप्रणीतम्

(474) आ० ८५ प० अक्षयप्रम् ।

With the kindness of the Curator of the Mysore Oriental Library I was able to get on loan the so called MS of the *Ādi Bharata* tallying outwardly with the description of the catalogue given above. On actual examination, however, this work in Āndhra characters turned out to be a regular MS of the *Nāṭya Sāstra* in an incomplete condition, only 15 chapters being extant in this copy with a folio of matter from the 16th chapter.

Gode further notes that the colophon to the first, as well

1 *Bibliotheca Indica* Calcutta 1951

Third edition, Bombay, 1951

2 *Indian Antiquary*, xli p 158

4 *ABORI*, xii, pp 92-93

as the last 15th chapter, rightly gives the name of the work as *Bhāratīya Nāṭya śāstra*. The evidence of this MS, therefore, becomes useless in establishing the existence of an independent work of the name of Ādi Bharata.

But in 1930, Maṇomohan Ghosh¹ collected and discussed the quotations from Ādi Bharata as well as from Bharata, found in Rāghavabhaṭṭa's commentary *Aṣṭa dyotanikā* on Kālidāsa's *Abhijñāna sakuntalā*.² He gives nineteen quotations³ from Ādi Bharata, of which, however as many as twelve are traceable in the present text of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*. Of the remaining seven quotations four are, in Ghosh's opinion, untraceable and three have parallels in it. Of nine quotations from Bharata seven are shown to be directly traceable.

Rāghavabhaṭṭa appears to have been fairly widely acquainted with works and authors on *Alaṃkāra*, *Nāṭya* and *Saṃgīta*.⁴ Besides Bharata and Ādi Bharata, he quotes (ed NSP) for instance, from Bhaṃṣa (p 10) Kāvya-darśa (p 19, 68), Udbhaṭa (p 110), Vāmana (p 3, etc), Dhvanikāra (p 11, 110), Mahimabhaṭṭa (p 44, 67), Sarasvatī-Lanṭhabharana (p 19, 98) Bhoja (p 73 199) Rajanaka Mammata (p 85), Rajanaka Rucaka (p 58, 161, 193), Rucaka (p 179) Abhinava bhārati (p 6 20) Daśarūpa (p 6 8 50, 53, 84 110, 146 189 195, 204, 225 226, 230), Dhanika (p 8 20, 51, 64, 115), Māṭṛgupta or Māṭṛguptacārya (all verse quotations p 7, 8 9, 13 15, 20 57, 62, 74 110, 126, 151, 154, 156, 199, 230) *Nāṭya darpaṇa* (p 6) *Nāṭya pradīpa* (p 6), *Nāṭya locana* (p 7), *Bhava prakāśikā* (p 7, 9, 168) *Rasarnava sudbhāra* (p 114 17.), *Sudhā*

1 *IIIQ* 1930 pp 75-80

2 Our references are to the 8th edition Nāṭya Sagar Press Bombay 1922.

3 Ghosh appears to have overlooked one quotation from Ādi Bharata on p 168 which deals with *Nṛtyāpti*. This makes the total number of Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotations twenty.

4 His citations from grammatical, lexical, poetical and dramatic works are not listed here.

kara (p 8, 13, 15 33, 55, 58, 69, 73 75 84, 115, 163, 188, 254),
 Saṅgita sarvasva (p 6), Saṅgita sudhanādhī (p 242), Saṅgita
 ratnakara (p 191, 209, 229) *Nagara sarvasva* (p 50), and
Rati-vilāsa (p 76) Raghavabhaṭṭa's date is not known but
 since the latest work he quotes is the *Rasārnava-sudhākara*
 of Śiṅga bhupala, he could not have flourished before 1330
 A D By following a different line of investigation P K
 Gode¹ arrives at a more precise date of Raghavabhaṭṭa in the
 last quarter of the 15th century (1475 1550 A D) This is a
 fairly late date, and since a very large number of his
 quotations from *Ādi Bharata* are directly traceable in *Bharata's*
Nāṭya śāstra, his testimony cannot be taken as conclusive
 But at the same time it is clear that whatever may have been
 its character, some text or author under the name of *Ādi-*
Bharata was known to him, as distinguished from *Bharata*
 from whose *Nāṭya śāstra* also he makes independent citations

The only other work which purports to give us a portion
 at least of an *Ādi-Bharata*² is contained in a curious MS,
 existing in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute and
 entered in its Catalogue³ under the title *Nāṭya sarvasva dipika*
 An account of this MS was given by D R Mankad⁴, but
 since he was unable to come to a definite conclusion and since

1 *Calcutta Oriental Journal* in 1936 pp 177-84 Raghavabhaṭṭa
 was a *Mahārāṣṭra Brāhmaṇ* whose father *Prthivīdhara Bhaṭṭa* migrated
 to Benares before 1450 A D He was also the author of the *Padārthā-*
darśa commentary on the Tantric work, *Sāradāśīlaka* (ed. Kashī
 Sanskrit Series 1934)

2 Hanukishna Kavi (ed *Ādya śāstra* GOS 1, p 5 of the preface)
 states that he possesses a fragment of a work called *Saṁhita bhārata*
 which according to him may be the *Ādi Bharata* But he gives no
 account of it nor does he appear to have consulted the Mysore and
 Poona MSS Similarly he speaks of a *Vyākhyāna Bharata* in 12000 granthas
 (*Journal of Andhra H R S* in p 23) But these statements are not
 authenticated

3 *Descriptive Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Bhandarkar*
Oriental Research Institute xii (Alaṅkāra, Saṅgita and Nāṭya) 1936
 p 453f

4 *ABORI* xiii p 173

it has a bearing on the *Adi Bharata* problem we give here a detailed study of the MS which is necessary for understanding the value of its testimony

The MS obtained on loan through the courtesy of the Curator of the Bhandarkar Institute consists of 61 folios size 10 x 8 written in clear and bold Devanagari characters on country made paper with marginal borders ruled in double red lines having generally 10 to 11 lines to a page. The general appearance of the MS is not old.

Other notable characteristics of the MS are folios 15 contain a list of contents in three columns separated by double red lines and read at the end इति सकेतप्रकरणं संपूर्णं folio 6 begins the text with the *Mangala* verse श्रीनागदाक्षप्रतिपुराधिप रेवित्तापि, folios 12 13 and 14 are numbered twice but the repeated folios contain different matter folio 14 which abruptly breaks off without completing the matter in hand is left three fourths blank thereafter the repeated folio 12a is blank the repeated folio 12b begins the text again with श्रीगणेशाय नमः and another *Mangala* verse विष्णु सोक्तुम् प्रणम्य शिरसा, folios 26 29 and 44 are not numbered folio 43b breaks off abruptly without completing the matter and leaves one fourth of space blank folio 47b is blank after folio 47a ends with इति द्वावरादलप्राया यमासा folio 48a begins with *Aṅgabhinaya* folio 57b ends with श्रीरामाय नमः सीतालक्ष्मणवत्सलमुद्रादनुमन्मतेऽभी रामाय नमः, leaving the page half blank the last folio 61a ends with इति अष्टमः (१) प्रकरणं यमासा ॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥ धीरेस्तु ॥ leaving three fourths of the page blank 61b is blank and bordered with flowery design.

It will be clear even from this brief description that the MS is neither continuous nor complete. But what is not noticed in the *Catalogue* as well as by Mankad is that it is a composite MS written at least by two different hands. In this respect it appears to consist of different units or fragments of text. For the first hand appears on folios 1 14 (end of

Samavaya skandha) 26 (beginning of Purvarāṅga) -47 and 51-61 the second hand is distinctly seen on folios 14-25 (end of Adhy 6) and 48-57

At the outset there is a curious list of contents (folios 1-5) prefixed to the work and called Samketa prakarana. We shall see that in the beginning of the text itself there is a similar account of the contents and the section is called Samketa dhyaya. The lists give a total of 5 Skandhas 32 Adhyayas and 221 Prakaranas covering the entire work.

They are enumerated thus

Samavaya skandha	Adhyaya 6	Prakaranas 54
Śikṣa skandha	Adhyaya 6	Prakaranas 69
Dhava nirupana skandha	Adhyaya 11	Prakaranas 53
Ullasa skandha	Adhyaya 6	Prakaranas 34
Vaiśeṣika skandha	Adhyaya 3	Prakaranas 11

5 Skandhas Adhyaya 32 Prakaranas 221

The prefixed list of contents (folios 1-5) ends with the words एतद्वर्तत [स्त्रदि on margin probably *secunda manu*] भरतस्य । अथ प्रथमं नाम नाट्यसर्वस्वदीप्तिः ॥ We shall see that so far as the text is available the contents as detailed here do not actually conform to the matter respectively dealt with in the work itself. As the pagination and handwriting are continuous it cannot be said that this prefixed list was compiled and added later on. But it is curious that it contains words like Prakaranakā (=Prakaranas) Dṛṣṭi bhedaḥ (=Dṛṣṭi bhedaḥ) Strī sthānakalā (=Strī sthānakam) etc. where the Telugu plural affix *lu* undoubtedly indicates its Andhra origin.

After this comes the text of the work itself which commences on folio 6a but the MS is corrupt and incorrect throughout. It begins thus

[folio 6a] श्रीनाथदासविष्णुपिपठेनिनाधि
सिधूभासुरवर्गुगिदिनासहाय ।

कोटीस्योत्तरविधु कक्षारसान्धि
मां पातयेत्तरशिवः प्रियशाङ्करस्य ॥

एषा ग्रन्थकर्तृस्सोपासितदेवताध्यानानुसूया नान्दीति नरयति (१) केषा-
चिन्नान्या पदनियमो नाभ्यु(प)गत । आशीर्गमस्त्विमा वस्तुनिर्देशो वापि
तन्मुक्तम् (Dandin : 14) इति प्रमादवात् । तत आशीर्वादनान्दी करोति—

भ्रवद्विषभराणि भ्रमितमुवनकुम्भिकुम्भीयसानि
कुब्जसागि रिबुद्धरविधरशिर येक्षिशीर्गदन्ति ।
दिक्षाणोदन्वतोये द्वयमरम्भमूचकचक्षुद्विनि
व्यस तु म्यापदस्क (१) त्रिपुरविजयिनस्त्राएडवाडम्भराणि ॥

एषा आशीर्वादरूपा नान्दी । अत आरम्भग्रन्थापेक्ष सूचित । अथ
नमस्कारनान्दी न करोति—

आश्रित मुवन यस्य वाचिक सर्वैवाङ्मयम् ।
आहार्ये चन्द्रतारादि तन्मस्तुगलिक शिवम् ॥

एव नमस्कारनान्द्याग्रणि आरम्भग्रन्थार्थज्ञातकथ (१) भवति । अनन्तर
वरदुर्निर्देशप्राधान्या नान्दीमाह—

महा ताक्षधरो हरिस्तु पटहो वीणाधरा भारवी
महासौ शक्तिभास्वती धृतिरता धीरेवमेते स्विता ।
न ही शक्तिरिदी श्रवन्नलसितौ मेयो मुनिस्तुमुद
शशुभृत्तकरान्नुजो विजयते नाम सर्वैव भवे ॥

[folio 6b] एव शिवस्य नाट्यसामादिवनिष्पत्त्यायेतच्छास्त्रप्रतर्नाय-
वस्तुनिर्देश विवक्षित चाभवत् । इदं नाट्यमहं सदा भवे इत्यत्र निरन्तरा
भ्याषाद्यलक्षानुभव इति भावः । एव त्रिभिः श्लोकैश्चिपयनान्दी सूचय-
तिविप्रपरिसमाप्त्यर्थं विष्णेश्वर स्तौति—

विद्याध्यातनिवारणैकतरसिर्विघाटवीह्वयवात्
विघोस्तुत्रगिरिभेदनपरिविघ्नान्पिङ्गुमोद्भव ।
विघ्नाद्योषपत्यचक्षुद्वयवर्तो विघ्नेभयघाननो
विघ्न्यासकुलप्रमत्तयदो विघ्नेश्वर पातु न ॥

After another Namaskriya to Bhumi devi, we have prelimi-
nary remarks on the subject matter of the work (folio 6b)

एवं नमस्तुत ततः शास्त्रारम्भं समाचरेत् । आदौ भरतशब्दार्थस्वरूपं विप्रोचति—

यकारो मावसंयुक्तो रेफो रागाधितोऽथ हि ।

सकारस्तातसहितस्तस्याद्भुतं वच्यते ॥

[folio 7a] अतो माव इति नृत्तं राग इति गीतं तात इति वार्य तन्मातृव्यक्तिकं भरत इति अक्षरात्मकशब्दस्य भावः । स्वस्वमाह—

गीतं विष्णुस्वरूपं तु वाचं ब्रह्मात्मकं तथा ।

नृत्तं शिवात्मकं प्रोक्तं ततो मन्त्रा प्रयोजयेत् ॥

एवं शिखिंस्वरूपत्वाद्देवस्वरूपं च तदिति विद्वेषानो—

जातस्तु वाचो ऋग्वेदाद्युपोऽभिनयस्तथा ।

सामपेदाद्भवेद् गानं नृत्तमाचरं खातकृत्तम् ॥

एवं नृत्तगीतवाचाग्निपञ्चताः पञ्चताभेदस्वरूपान्वाञ्छासप्तमाश्रयणद्वितकरणशेषः सम्बलीत्याह—

ध्रुविर्माता पिता गीतं वाचं चैव मुतो भवेत् ।

तातस्तद्दीदृक्षस्व क्लृप्तं रसपद्विति ॥

एतत्कुटुम्बं कथितं नाट्यं पुरुषस्य हि ।

एकेन हीनं न्यूनं स्वाश्रयोक्ता दोषमागमेत् ॥

In this way, after elaborate Śāstra prasaṅgā, the work refers to the mythical origin of the Śāstra, and proceeds to give some information about its own purpose and its author (folio 7b):

तदेतदाममं वयि शोके भरततंश्रुम् ।

आदौ महानटः कथुरक्तवान्मण्डले स्वयम् ॥

नाट्यवेदं ददौ साञ्जं भरताय चतुर्मुखाः ।

ततो धीमान्भरतमुनिः¹ कृतवान् साधुमुत्तमम् ॥

गात्रा स्वेनैव सोवानं द्वितीयकरुणाय वै ।

तस्याज्ञोके भरतविति¹ प्रतिदम्भवत्किञ्च ॥

तच्छ्रुत्वा भरतं शास्त्रं गन्धर्वोत्तरसा गच्छात् ।

ततश्च गीवाणीं सर्वे भरतं प्रशस्तयिरे ॥

1 The Pada is metrically defective (hypermetric)

ततो मुनि शार्ङ्गभक्तकण्ठ
पैताक्षिर कोहलदत्तिलादि ।
इत्यादिराङ्गुलपाणिनां च
राज्ञा जनानामुपयोज्यमेतत् ॥

सन्ध्याञ्च शिथिलीभूत जनैर्नितप्रयाविमि ।

पुनरुद्धारयाम्यथ प्रज्ञया दैवतन्त्रया ॥

स शास्त्रोद्धारक इत्याद्यद्वयं नारायण शुद्धशिष्यश्रीरामानन्दयोगिराज
प्रभुर्द्वारस्वामी विद्याभोगोद्भो गुरुदत्तो हि योऽङ्गुलीतानि नामैकमेकस्त्वेव भविष्यति
(folio 3a) इति ग्रन्थभर्तुर्भविष्यते च रहस्य (१) । इदानीं प्रस्तुतोपशेष
मनुसरामाह—

वैद्यप्यमन्त्रितनव कोकिलाम्बातनुभव ।

नारायण सिद्धशिष्ययोगिराजो निराग्रते ॥

वरकोटि कलवूडिचराजो प्रज्ञावेता

इ(अ?)सपलकुसलश्रीकृतगोत्र कवीन्द्र ।

भरतमन्त्रितमापस्तम्बसूत्र पवित्र

स्फुटतरङ्गरोत योगिनारायणार्च ॥

देवस्त नामैकग्रो^१नाज्यसर्वलदीपिका ।

सप्तद्वीपुलस कवेरारम्भस्मृष्यते तत ॥

वैद्योद्भव संशुद्धनाथमह प्रणम्य

सम्यग् निषाद्य हृदि साम्प्रतिनाडि वधम् ।

सस्तुल्य देवमुनिपूर्वकमि शुद्धामु

ज्वातुमादिभरत स्फुटमारुहानि ॥

This rather long quotation from the beginning of the work is given not only because it will give some idea of its mode of composition which consists of verse *karika* and running prose commentary but also because it furnishes information about the author or authors and the purpose of the work. It would appear that the MS contains the text of what is called the Ādi Bharata along with its commentary called *Natya sarvasva d pika*. The author of the Ādi Bharata appears to be Nara

1 As the metre is Māhār the read ॥ वरकणि ॥ suggested

2 MS नामेति करो

yana or Naiṣṇanyaya, also called Rāmānanda Siddhaśiva jogurāja, who was the son of the minister Vaidyappa and his wife Kokilambā, and belonged to the Varakojakalapūḍi family of the Vatsa gotra. The name of the author of the commentary is not given, but he bows to his preceptor, named Vaidya, before he commences his exposition of the Ādi-Bharata which is apparently a late work of South Indian origin.

As no other MS of the so called Ādi Bharata is available we will have to examine the subject-matter of the work itself, as presented by our MS, and find out, if possible, (i) whether our MS contains the entire Ādi Bharata, along with its commentary, or gives only a part of it, and (ii) whether the MS contains a continuous and single work, or fragments of different works.

On folios 2a-11a we have a general synopsis of topics dealt with in the work in the order of Skandhas Adhyayas and Prakaraṇas. The section is called Samketadhyāya. Although less detailed, it corresponds generally to the prefatory list of contents (hereafter called Contents) given on folios 1-5, of which we have spoken above. It is entirely in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre, with no prose commentary. A verse towards the end (folio 10b) says that all this was taught by Śiva himself.¹

उदितेनेवेतावच्छ्रुण्वेवोपदिदिषम् ।

and then summarises the extent of the work thus (folio 10b)

सर्वोपि मरते नामोदितप्रवरकानि तु ।

तत्त्वैर्विरादिशत द्वाविंशत्यायसहस्रम् ।

श्रोतवन्ता पन्सहस्राणि पत्र स्कन्धा विनिर्मिताः ॥

¹ Abhinavagupta (Abhis Bhārata ed GOS p 8) informs us that Sadāśiva like Brahmin is sometimes spoken of by some teachers who were foremost among Nāṭikas (nāṭika-dhuryopadhyayaḥ) as one of the exponents of the Nāṭya Śāstra. Śaradatanaya also refers to Sadāśiva (II 152). Apparently Abhinavagupta considers such Sadāśiva Bharata to be heretical !

समनावसृत शिक्षा स्वर्गो भावनिस्तुतम् ।
 उल्लासो वैशेषिक इति स्वप्नानामेव निर्णय ॥
 एतद्व्यकरणानां च क्रमादेकैकत स्फुटम् ।
 सन्ध्या पूर्वसाञ्जोक्तं तद्वत् परिशीर्यते ॥

This enumeration corresponds with that given in the preliminary Contents namely that the work contains 5 Slandhas called respectively Samavaya Śikṣa Bhava nirupana Ullāsa and Vaiśeṣika 32 Adhyayas and 221 Prakaranas in 6 000 Ślokas

Then we have an interesting passage in which different traditions of the Śāstra as well as the scope and character of the present work are mentioned (folio 10b)

भरता बहुधा स्मृति मन्दिसरस्त्रदादयः ।
 तेषां प्रमथशमादिषु भरतस्य उमापतिः ।
 अतएवादिभरतप्रचार नटनं स्मृतम् ॥
 नाट्यस्तु कथाप्राया दराहपक्षस्तथा ।
 शैलपुस्तकपारायै पुस्तिकाप्रतिमादिभिः ॥
 नैपभाषाविचारादिकल्पनाभिर्विद्वद्भिरना ।
 तस्माद्विद्वदस्य नृत्तस्य प्रमाणं न भवति ते ॥
 नटनं नाटिकानां च तेषां कारणमेव हि ।
 तस्मान्नान्यस्य कुद्वाङ्गं शास्त्रसिद्धं प्रवक्ष्यति ॥

The purport of this passage seems to be that there are various Bharata śāstras of which the authority as well as the original is that Bharata who is Umapati (i.e. Śiva). Hence dancing¹ is known as the mode of Adī Bharata. The Nāṭakas called Dāśarupakas which consist mostly of words and are variously represented by actors etc. are not the standard for pure dancing (Nṛtta) which is indeed the source of both Nāṭakas and Nāṭikas. Hence this work speaks according to the Śāstra of the unmingled element of the Nāṭya (namely Nṛtta). In other words Nṛtta is believed to be the proper

1 The Pada is hypermetric.

2 We are taking the word Nāṭyanaṭya as equivalent to Nṛtta below which is essentially *śāla layaś cā* according to Dharmapala.

subject-matter of the present work, and the varieties of Nāṭakas, known as Daśarūpakas, have no place in it. This statement is indeed borne out by the Contents (on folios 1-5) where no Rūpaka prakāra, nor any matter directly bearing on it, is found, this is also confirmed, as we shall see, by the topics actually dealt with in the rest of the present work available in our MS.

This, however, raises a difficulty. The avowed object of the Ādi Bharata namely, that its treatment is entirely confined to Nṛtta, does not appear to be consistent with what is revealed in the text of the Ādi Bharata as it was known to Rāghavabhaṭṭa. Most of Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotations, which are to be traced also in the present text of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*, deal with the topic of Rūpaka, rather than with that of Nṛtta. For instance, the quotation on p. 6f deals with construction of the stage, Sthāpaka and Sūtradhara, on p. 13, 69 with elements of the plot Bija Bindu etc., on p. 23 with Upakṣepa on p. 69, 115 with Prayātina and Garbha saṁdha, on p. 15, 21 with language to be employed in case of different characters, on p. 40 with Pataki sthānaka, on p. 168 with Niyatapi, on p. 248 with Nirvahana saṁdha. It would appear, therefore, that the text of the Ādi Bharata known to Rāghavabhaṭṭa, which in its subject-matter greatly overlaps the present text of Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra* was probably not the same text as the Ādi-Bharata found in our MS, which is devoted exclusively to Nṛtta, and not to Nāṭya. There is, however, a passage of four lines in one of Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotations from his Ādi Bharata which almost literally agrees with a passage of four lines (folio 13a lines 3-5) in our text of the Ādi Bharata. It speaks of the characteristics of a Saṁhita thus:

Rāghavabhaṭṭa's quotation (p. 9)

मध्यस्था सावधानाश्च शक्तिमन् न्यासवेदिनः ।

सुदृढास्तटित्वमिष्टं दिनान्तरमन्वराः ॥

अथर्वं रसभायहासौर्वहितयकोविदाः ।

असद्वाननिषेदारश्चतुरा मत्परच्छिदाः ।

continues up to folio 14b, but breaks off abruptly leaving the rest of the page blank. On the corner of the right hand margin of folio 14b we have (probably *secunda manu*) the caption नाट्यसर्वस्व. Thereafter the folios are numbered over again as 12, 13, and 14, of which folio 12a is left blank, but the subject matter of the repeated folios is not the same. The repeated folio 12b begins afresh with श्रीगणेशाय नमः and another Maṅgala verse as follows

विष्णु लोचनं प्रणम्य शिरसा परमार्थदर्शकं
 श्रीविष्णुचरणं जनस्य सुखदा कालेन कामप्रदम् ।
 सैव सद्यस्तिगुरुत्वात्पुनरित्याद्यास्तल्लोकतः
 तालानां कथयामि लक्ष्यमहं पूर्वोक्तं तादृशमाह ॥

Only on this verse there is prose Anvayārtha but the Karika-form in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre continues thereafter, and ends on the repeated folio 14b with the colophon इति आदि भरतशास्त्रे समवायस्कन्धे नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकायां सभोदारादिपरेष्वन्ताष्टप्रकरणं नाम तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥ धीराय ॥ The marginal caption नाट्यसर्वस्व occurs again (apparently *secunda manu*) on the repeated folio 13b, but it should be noted that with the exception of three lines of Anvayārtha on the Maṅgala verse mentioned above the text is not accompanied in these folios by any running prose commentary.

The text continues in Anuṣṭubh metre, without any commentary up to folio 18a and ends with the colophon इति धीमदादिभरते समवायस्कन्धे नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकायां आचार्यन्यादि भारद्वाज्ये नवप्रकरणं नाम तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥ The next fourth chapter deals generally with the topic of Tala in Anuṣṭubh metre (without any commentary), but it is not clear where it ends, for no colophon is found. The colophon to the fifth chapter occurs on folio 23a as follows इत्थं रचितोऽत्र भरते महापद्यमत्त्वान्धवचोऽप्यविहितो मुपेनाय आचार्यनवरो ज्येष्ठः (१) पदस्वटीको दे राजः (२) नारायणसिद्धेशिवयोगिनाथेन सम्मन्वयपदेन रम्यं हि इति पद्यमस्तु ॥ Parts of this colophon which is faithfully transcribed here, is not intelligi-

ble, but Gode conjectures¹ that it was written by the scribe who transcribed the original work in Āndhra characters (andhra vacah) into the present Devanāgarī copy.

The next sixth chapter, which begins on folio 23a in Anuṣṭubh metre (without any commentary) ends on folio 25b with the following colophon नारायण विदुषिदरामानन्दयोगिराज-
विरचिते आदिभरते नाट्यानां नाट्याहस्यमप्यादि हस्तादिदेवतान्त सप्तप्रकरण
निरूपणं नाम अष्टमोऽध्यायः ॥ श्री ॥ It is notable that the *Nāṭya sarvasva dipikā* is not mentioned in this as well as in the previous colophon to the fifth chapter.

Here ends the first *Samavaya skandha*. The next seventh chapter begins on the unnumbered folio 26a with the topic of *Purva raṅga* in the same manner in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre and without any prose commentary and ends on the unnumbered folio 28a with the following colophon इति श्रीभारविभरते
शास्त्रे शिष्टाहस्ये नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकाया पूर्वपद्यादि सप्तमस्तवत षष्ठप्रकरण-
निरूपणं नाम सप्तमोऽध्यायः ॥ The next eighth chapter begins on the unnumbered folio 28a with the topic of *Nāṭya sāruga* similarly in Anuṣṭubh metre and without any commentary and ends on folio 32b with this colophon इति आदिभरते शिष्टा-
हस्ये नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकाया नाट्यमेवप्रकरणं नाम अष्टमोऽध्यायः ॥

Here ends the *Śikṣa skandha* of which only two out of six chapters are given here. After this the next folio 33 should have taken up the topics detailed in the Contents under the rest of the *Śikṣa skandha* or under *Bhava nirupana skandha*, but the topic actually dealt with does not correspond. It deals in Anuṣṭubh metre and without any commentary with 23 *Lasyaṅgas* of which only 15 are defined and the folio 33b abruptly breaks off without completing the topic. It is not known whether all this should come under the remaining portion of the second *Śikṣa skandha* or under the third *Bhava nirupana skandha* for the Contents mention a variety of topics for the *Śikṣa skandha* and give III *Hasta*

dvadaśa prañah 30 Asahyuta hastah and 16 Samhyuta hastah as the subject matter of the first Adhyaya of the Bhavanirupana skandha. A fresh text appears to begin from folio 34b (folio 34a b-ing left blank) with the repetition of the Mangala verse विष्णु शेकगुह प्रणम्य शिरसा (see above ■ 168). No colophon occurs hereafter up to the end of the MS.

As the successive colophons up to this point show there is a kind of homogeneity of the text up to the eighth chapter or up to the second chapter of the second Śikṣa skandha i.e. from folios 1 to 32b and perhaps it continues a little till the text breaks off with folio 33b. As far as the work these folios contain goes it is more or less orderly and coherent. But it should be noted that there is the intrusion of a Maṅgala-verse on folio 12b and what is more remarkable is that there is an almost complete absence of any commentary from folio 7a the text consisting almost entirely of Kāvya verses in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka metre. With reference to this portion of the text it is therefore the question arises that if the Adī Bharata is the original and the Nāṭya sarvasva dīpikā is its commentary the Kāvya verses may be allowed to constitute the text of the original but where is the systematic commentary thereon? Curiously enough the Contents profess to index the Nāṭya sarvasva dīpikā and say at the end अथ प्रथमं नाम नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिका, but mention is made at the same time that एतत्सर्वं आदि [more sec manā] भरतसाधु । If we take notice of the marginal caption नाट्यसर्वस्व appearing twice on the repeated folios we should be inclined to take the Kāvya as belonging to an unknown Nāṭya sarvasva of which the Nāṭya sarvasva dīpikā is apparently the commentary. But the difficulty is that the colophons to different Adhyayas say quite clearly इति आदिभरते नाट्यसर्वस्वदीपिकायां, the name Nāṭya sarvasva alone never appearing except in two doubtful captions written probably by a different hand. Or perhaps it is possible that the Adī Bharata itself was called Nāṭya sarvasva. But there is hardly any trace of the commentary

on these Adhyāyas throughout. As no other copy of the text of the Ādi-Bharata is available, the points raised cannot be finally determined; but we can state with some confidence that although the extent of the commentary and its exact relation to the text are uncertain, the text from folios 1 to 32b is at least one homogeneous whole.

Turning to the text which follows on 34b, we find that it commences afresh with श्रीपरोत्तम नमः and the Maṅgala-verse दिग्गुप्तं लोकगुप्तं प्रणम्य शिरसा repeated from folio 12a, with just a slight verbal variation. The subject matter of what follows is Tāla, in accordance with the last Pada of this Maṅgala-verse:

तालानां कथयामि लक्षणमहं पूर्वोक्तासकृन्मातः ।

According to the Contents on folio 4a, the Tālas come under the heading Tāla-vidhāna in the 7th Adhyaya (saptamādhyāyo (tāla-vidhāne) under the Bhāva-nirūpana-skandha. The Tālas are also mentioned on folios 14a and 18b. But it should be noted that there are considerable differences between the topics enumerated in the Contents and those actually dealt with in the folios following 34a. With reference to the Tālas these folios discuss six Sthānas (folio 35b), and then proceed to Tāla-prāṇa mentioned thus as ten in number:

कालो मार्गः क्रियाङ्गाणि ग्रहो वासि कला लवः ।

यदि प्रस्तारकथेति तालप्राणा दश स्युताः ॥

Accordingly, the treatment of Kala-lakṣaṇa follows (folios 35b-36a), six Mārgas are mentioned and defined (folio 36b), the total number of Mārga prakāras being given as twelve. We have then the treatment of Kriya (folio 36b), Aṅga (folio 36b), Graha (folio 37a), Jati (folios 37a-37b), Kālā (folio 37b) Laya (folio 38a), Yati (folio 38a) and Prastara (folio 38b). These elements are given respectively as 8, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3 and 4 in number, but it should be noted that the Contents (folio 4a) enumerate them respectively as 16, 6, 6, 5, 3, 4, 6 and 4. The text (folio 38b) enumerates 101 Tālas, and then Gura-

not entirely tally. The MS ends इति प्रत्ययः (sic) हस्तप्रत्ययः समाप्तः ॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु । श्रीरस्तु ॥ There is no final colophon to the work.

It is clear from what is said above that these supplementary folios 44 to 61 contain fragments of three or four unrelated texts on diverse topics one of which is actually a reproduction of a part of the Citradhyaya of Bharata's Nāṭya śāstra and the others have topics which are similar to its corresponding topics. While the preceding folios give regular colophons to each Adhyāya and Skandha these fragments are devoid of them and do not appear to contain a single work. From citations one fragment at least cannot be assigned to an early date. From all this it is reasonable to conclude that these fragments are hardly related to the fairly continuous text contained in the preceding folios 1-33 and cannot be regarded as forming a continuation.

The foregoing description and discussion would point to the following conclusion.

- (1) Raghavabhaṭṭa probably had some text called Ādi Bharata before him which he distinguishes from that of Bharata. But most of the quoted passages from his Ādi Bharata are directly traceable in the printed text of Bharata or have parallels in it. From his quotations it also appears that his Ādi Bharata did not exclude the various topics of Nāṭya of Daśarupaka. But since the Ādi Bharata contained in our MS professes as well as actually deals mainly with Nṛtta and Saṁgīta and directly excludes topics proper to Nāṭya or Daśarupaka it cannot be taken as identical with Raghavabhaṭṭa's text only one short passage of four lines quoted by him being directly traceable in our MS.
- (2) The text of the Ādi Bharata presented by our MS professes to be a fairly extensive work consisting of 5 Skandhas 32 Adhyāyas and 221 Prakaraṇas in

6 000 ślokas. It was probably a late work of South Indian origin declared to have been composed by Nārāyaṇa or Nārāyaṇārya, also called Rāmānanda Siddhaśiva-yogirāja.

- (3) It was chiefly a work on Nr̥tta or Nr̥tya, as distinguished from Nāṭya, contained no matter peculiar to works on Doṣarūpaka, and probably followed a different tradition which is said to have originated from Umāpati or Śiva himself. If we accept Abhinavagupta's testimony, this tradition was regarded as non-orthodox in his time. Of course it knows Bharata as an exponent of the Nāṭya śāstra. Although some matters inevitably overlap, the present Ādi-Bharata does not appear to have any direct relation with the text of Bharata.
- (4) Whatever may be its intrinsic value, the text of Ādi-Bharata presented by our MS appears to be contained in folios 1 to 33, but it is incomplete. It gives eight chapters and ends with only two chapters (out of six) of the second Śikṣa skandha (out of the five declared Skandhas). It cannot be determined if the text is given in extenso or only in synopsis here, but the text up to the point it goes is fairly orderly and coherent even if it is often corrupt and incorrect.
- (5) There are occasional prose comments especially at the beginning of this text which is written mostly in Anuṣṭubh or Śloka Kāvya but there is no regular running commentary. The name of the work Ādi Bharata, appears connected, in the colophons and also in the preliminary remarks with Nāṭya sarvasva dipikā which last appears to be the name of the commentary. The name Nāṭya sarvasva dipikā itself would suggest the existence of a work called Nāṭya sarvasva on which it might have commented. It is not clear if such a work existed or if the Ādi Bharata itself went by the name Nāṭya sarvasva.

laghu nirṇaya is spoken of on folios 39a-40b. Then comes (folio 42b) the treatment of Sadhikṛmā tāla (which ends on folio 43a with the remark चोदयते सकीर्णवादितालानि¹), and of Śhādināśh Guru laghu nirṇayah (folio 43a). This is followed by the topics of Aṣṭavidha nayika (which should come according to Contents under Bhava nirūpapa śkaṇḍha Adhy 3) and Daśavidha-cumbana (which does not occur in the Contents). Here folio 43b ends abruptly without a colophon.

It is to be noted that this portion of the text from folios 34b to 43b is written generally in the form of Anuṣṭubh Karika but there are occasional short comments in prose and occasional citations of authoritative works. There are references to or quotations from the following works: Saṁgīta ratnakara (folio 34b वाचस्पत्यविष्णवे इति भातोर्यदि स्पष्ट, folio 36a कालकल), Saṁgīta-ratna tālakāla vilāsa (folio 34b) Saṁgīta-ratna (folio 36a) Saṁgīta vidyāvinoda (folios 36b-37a) Saṁgīta-cudamāni (folio 37a) Tāla-kāla vilāsa (folio 37a) Saṁgīta-maṇi-darpana (folio 37a) Catura-sabha vilāsa (folio 37a) Sarasvatī-kāṇḍībhārana (folio 38a) and Kōhala-matā (43a). Of these works if the Saṁgīta ratnakara be the well-known work of the same name by Saṁgīta-deva its date would be between 1210 and 1247 A.D. while if the Saṁgīta-maṇi-darpana be the work of the same name by Catura-Damodara son of Lakṣmīdhara then it may be assigned to the second half of the 15th century. It seems therefore that this portion of the text in our MS cannot be assigned to a date earlier than the 16th century.

It will be seen from this brief description that although some of the topics dealt with would come partially under the Bhava nirūpapa śkaṇḍha (as detailed in the Contents) the portion of the MS from folio 34b to folio 43b which is marked by no distinguishing colophon is of a different

¹ Kōhala's lost work appears to have influenced the redactors of Bhāruya's Nāṭya Śāstra. See S. K. De Sanskrit Poetics 2 p. 23. T. V. Kane introduction to his new edition of Saṁgīta-darpana (p. 24).

character and can hardly be regarded as forming an organic part or a legitimate continuation of the so called *Adi Bharata* text preceding it. It is perhaps a fragment from some other work on *Nritya* or *Saṅgata* dealing generally with it does with the technicalities of *Tala*.

The same remark applies to the remainder of the text given in our MS from the unnumbered folio 44 up to the end on folio 61. This part of the text has a fresh beginning (folio 44a) with श्रीगणेशाय नमः followed by a *Maṅgala* verse to *Ganapati* namely विप्रश्वातनिकारणैरुत्तरशिखिर्निघाटकीहृन्ववाद which happens to be the fifth *Maṅgala* verse occurring at the commencement on folio 6 (see p 161 above) of the so called *Adi Bharata*. The text which follows is written in *Anuṣṭubh* *Karika* verse with hardly any commentary accompanying it. Starting with the topic of *Hasta lakṣaṇa* (folio 44a) it proceeds to deal briefly with *Ranga devata pujaṇa* (folios 44b-45b) *Nāṭya śāla lakṣaṇa* and *Sābhapaṭi namaskara* (folios 46a-46b) and closes up with *Hasta dvadśa prapa* (46b-47a) which last topic the Contents include under *Adhyāya 1* of the *Bhava nirupana śkaṇḍha*. Here the fragment ends and folio 47b is left blank.

After this from folio 48a to folio 51a we have a reproduction of the topic of *Citrabhinaya* of the present text of *Bharata's Nāṭya-śāstra* (ed. *Nirnay Sagar Press* ch 25 ed *Kaśhī Sanskrit Series* ch 26) but some of verses of the printed text in *Bharata* (e.g. verses 74 75a 85 131 of the NSP edition) are missing here. The colophon ends (folio 51a) significantly with इति भारतीयौक्तान्तिमिनः समाप्तः ॥

From folios 51a to 57b we have a description in *Anuṣṭubh* metre (without commentary) of *Hasta* mostly of *Asaṅghya* which follows but it is not identical with that of *Bharata*. The folio 57b three fourths of which is left blank closes with श्रीरामाय नमः सीतालक्ष्मणरत्नकुण्डलसुतयेतथैवराधाय नमः । After this folios 58 to 61 deal with the *Vinyoga* of *Asaṅghya Hasta* which follows *Bharata* generally but does

The author of the somewhat meagre commentary does not record his name but he mentions his preceptor Vaidya by name

- (6) An examination of the remaining folios 34 to 61 of our MS shows that they do not form a continuation of the work contained in folios 1-33. They present *diverse disjointed fragments of text, one of which* is a direct reproduction from Bharata, while the others, having some passages corresponding to those of Bharata are presumably derived from some unknown source. These, therefore, do not possess any value for our present enquiry.
- (7) The distinction between Bharata and Ādi Bharata as P V Kane rightly observes is made by comparatively late writers. It should be remembered that the word Bharata came to mean an actor or dancer, and in course of time Bharata or Bharataśāstra came to signify works on Nāṭya, Nṛtya and allied topics. It is possible, therefore, that to distinguish such late amorphous compilations from the older text of the sage Bharata, qualifying adjectives like Ādi or Vṛddha¹ came into existence, on the analogy of the epithet Vṛddha applied in Nīti śāstra to Vṛddha Caṇakya or as P V Kane points out on the analogy of the epithets Vṛddha or Brhat applied to Vṛddha Manu or Brhad Viṣṇu in Smṛiti literature. They might have derived material from different sources, but they were, as these compilations themselves show nothing more than mere manuals to which were given such titles of a vague but high sounding character.

Without further material this is all that can be concluded about Ādi Bharata and its relation to the text of Bharata.

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¹ Saradātanaya (1175-1250 A.D.) in his *Bhāṭya prakāśana* refers to Bharata Vṛddha as well as to Bharata.

THE THEORY OF *RASA* IN SANSKRIT POETICS

The theory of *Rasa* like the theory of *Dhvani* with which it is intimately connected forms one of the most important aesthetic foundations of Sanskrit Poetics. From its first appearance in the dramatic theory of Bharata down to its establishment as the soul of Poetry in the work of Viśvanatha there has been a steady working out of the idea into a fundamental aesthetic conception and it is worth while to study the gradual unfolding of the idea through its fairly long course of history.

(The dogma of *Rasa* apart from any theory thereon was naturally known to the old writers on Poetics but in the beginning it was taken into account only in connexion with the drama and its importance as one of the essential factors of poetic theory was not properly understood. This importance was probably for the first time ably set forth by the Kashmirian Anandavardhana in the ninth century and subsequently elaborated with such mastery by his commentator Abhinavagupta that it became thenceforth an accepted fact in Sanskrit Poetics never to be set aside by rival systems and improved only in detail by later speculations.)

But it can be easily shown that some theory of *Rasa* however undeveloped or even a *Rasa* School particularly in connexion with the drama was in existence long before the time of Anandavardhana although the bearings of this theory on poetry in contradistinction to drama were seldom discussed. The importance of this dramaturgic *Rasa* School must have been somewhat overshadowed by the dominance of the *Alamkara* and the *Riti* Schools in the sphere of poetic theory but its comparative antiquity going back to a period even anterior to Bharata is undoubted. Dramaturgy however appears at first to have formed a study by itself and even among later writers only Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha think it

ment of the Rasa theory which Bharata, if Rājasekhara is right, must have borrowed and worked up into his own system. That the Rasa theory was older than Bharata is apparent from the fact that Bharata himself cites in chs iii and vii several ślokas in the Ārya as well as in the Anuṣṭubh metres in support of his own statements, and in one place, he distinctly quotes two Ārya ślokas from a chapter of an unknown work relating to the discussion of Rasa.¹ It may be mentioned, however, that Keśava Miśra, a comparatively recent writer of the 16th century speaks of one *sutrakāra bhagavan* Śaundhodaya,² who according to him was one of the first to formulate the view that Rasa is the essence of poetry. Nothing is known of this mysterious Śaundhodaya apparently a Buddhist writer except that Keśava Miśra on his own acknowledgment, is following this old master, whose views, as recorded in the *Alamkāra śekhara*, do not seem however, to deviate in any material way from those of Mammata.

With Bharata on the other hand we arrive at a distinctly definite landmark. Long before the Dhvani School led by

Cat Cat i 276 ii 59 iii 206) on music histrionic art erotics grammar and Tantra. The writer on erotics is cited as Nandīśvara in *Pancasāyaka* (*Bik Cat* 333 Peterson ii 110) who is supposed by Aufrecht to be the same as Nandin quoted by Vātsyayana (i 18) but the name Nandikeśvara is given in *Ratn ratasya* (Oxf Cat 218a Schmidt *Ind Erotik* 1911 pp 46-59). See Schmidt's remarks *ibid* p 47. The work on histrionic art attributed to Nandikeśvara is called *Abhinaya darpana* (ed Manomohan Ghosh Calcutta Sansk Series 1934. English A. K. Coomaraswamy and Duggirala Gopal Krishnaiah with introd and illustrations New York 1936). A work on music called *Nandikeśvara mātā śāstrīyā* is Weber 1729. See also *Madras Cat* 23 i 15006-8 where mention is made of *Bharatārṇava* supposed to be a condensed version apparently after Bharata of the work of Nandikeśvara by Sumati treating of dramatic gestures and *śāstr*. See S. K. De *Sanskrit Poetics* i § 3 footnote.

1 *atīrāye rasa vīcāra mukhe* ed Kāvyamālā p 67.

2 *Ala ikāra-śekhara* pp 2, 20 etc.

Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, was dominant Bharata's views on Rasa seem to have been discussed in some detail with the result divergent theories came to prevail under the names of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa Śaṅkuka Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and others all of whom appear to have been commentators on Bharata's *Nāṭya śāstra*¹ and to have therefore taken Bharata as their starting point. As their discussion however, chiefly related as we have stated above to the dramatic art and as there existed side by side the rival theories of the more

1 The views of all these writers whose works are now lost are known from the exponent on of Abhinavagupta (followed by other writers e.g. Mammata Hemacandra Vidyādhara etc.) who also cites some less known commentators such as Rāhula or Rāhala and Bhaṭṭa Yāntra. This practically coincides with the enumeration of the different commentators on Bharata by Śārngadeva as the source of his work (13th century see intro. to Ānandasāma edition of the text) with the exception of the name of Udbhata mentioned by the latter (I. 1. 19). It is curious that Udbhata actually quotes (iv. 4) the first half of Bharata vi. 15 enumerating the eight Rasas only making enough verbal change in the latter portion of the verse to admit Śṛṅga as the ninth Rasa in the category Rāhula is cited by Śārngadeva as one of his authorities (I. 1. 17) while Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka belong in all probability to the 8th and the 9th centuries. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka does not appear to be very distant chronologically from Abhinava who is the oldest writer to quote him and probably belongs to the end of the 9th or the beginning of the 10th century a date which makes it likely that he is identical as Peterson suggested (intro. *Saṅkha* p. 50) with the Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who is mentioned by Kalhaṇa (v. 159) as having flourished in the reign of Saṅkara varman son of Avantivarman of Kashmir (see *JRAS* 1897 p. 296). Sundarām is in his *Nāṭya-pratīpa* (Ind. Off. Cat. iii. p. 347) as well as Rāghavabhaṭṭa speaks of a commentary on Bharata by Mātṛgupta who is also mentioned by Śārngadeva as one of his authorities (I. 1. 17). If this Mātṛgupta is the same person mentioned by Kalhaṇa (iii. 125-251) as living under Haṇa Vikramāditya and referred to by Vāsudeva on *Karpura-manjari* (Aufrecht Cat. Cat. i. 448) as a writer on Alakṣara then he must have been one of the earliest commentators on the present day text of Bharata. But this view about the date of Mātṛgupta is very doubtful. These points have been discussed in detail in *Sanskrit Poetics* (vol. i. p. 246) which see also on questions of chronology connected as a rule in this article.

influential Alankara and Riti Schools who never realized its aesthetic importance the Rasa theory and its exponents never seem to have come into prominence until the idea was taken up by the Dhvani School and worked into its system. In the meantime the dramaturgic Rasa School succeeded to a certain extent in reacting upon and influencing the rival schools who were apparently forced to acknowledge Rasa and accord it even a subsidiary place in their general theory of Alankara or Riti.

This will be evident from a reference to the standpoints of Bhamaha and Dandin the two earliest known writers on Poetics whose works have survived. Without going into details we may state that to Bhamaha the most important element in poetry is Vakrokti which is apparently identified with Atisayokti and which probably means a kind of heightened expression which is the underlying principle of all poetic figures or Alankaras. Bhamaha does not seem to possess a very clear notion of the function of Rasa in poetry the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure *rasavat* which in his opinion should manifest the Rasas clearly¹. Rasa is thus apparently included in the sphere of a particular Alankara and given a very subordinate place in his system. Commenting however on Bhamaha's central verse on *vakrokti* II 85

saṁsa sarvatra vakroktir anayartī vibhavyate

Abhinavagupta attempts to read into it his own idea of Rasa and interprets *vibhavyate* in the technical sense ■ *pramadodyūnad r vibhavalasṁ nuyate viśeṣena ca bhāvyaṭe rasamayikriyate* in². In other words he takes Bhamaha to mean that by Vakrokti the sense of poetry is rendered into a suitable factor of the Rasa so that by using the word *vibhavyate* with the meaning given to it by Abhinava Bhamaha apparently implies that

¹ *rasavat śarīrā te-ṣaṁsa i ga ād rasas* 6

² *Locana* ■ 208

Rasa as well as Alankara originates in Vakrokti. The scholastic speculation with regard to the origin and function of Rasa does not appear, however, to have started in Bhāmaha's time, and Bhāmaha, in common with Dandin, never uses the technical terms *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* etc., so familiar to later theorists. On the other hand, Bhāmaha's opinion seems to be that Rasa need not be invariably present in poetry, what must be present is Vakrokti¹). In v 3, no doubt, Bhāmaha speaks² of *kāvya-rasa* as mitigating the rigour of the Śāstra, a sentiment which is endorsed by Rudraṭa³ and which probably inspired the dictum of later writers that the Śāstra is *prabhū samūta*, while the Kāvya is *kantā samūta*⁴. It is probable that the phrase *kāvya-rasa* is used here in the general untechnical sense of 'the flavour of poetry,' but if we read, with Abhinavagupta,⁵ a technical meaning into it, it only shows that the earlier authors were satisfied with assigning only this pleasing and extraneous function to Rasa.

The same remarks with regard to the recognition of Rasa apply more or less to Dandin, but Dandin seems to be more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha Dandin allows Rasa to be included in the poetic figures and therefore assigns to it only a minor place in his system. It may be contended that Dandin gives greater prominence to Rasa by including it in one of the essential qualities (*guṇa*) of diction (*ras*), viz. in *madhurya*, which is defined as the

1 i 30 BB n 85-6, v. 23

2 *śūdrā kāvya-rasomūlīnāḥ śāstrīnāḥ apy apayuktā eḥ
prāṇamālā-dha-madhurāḥ pibantī kṣaṇa bhogajam*]]

3 xu 1, 2

4 Abhinava uses the terms *prabhū samūta* and *antā samūta* (Locana p 12) which is followed by Mammata (*Kāvya-pr* ed Bombay Sansk. Ser 1917 p 9). Later writers distinguish (*EL* vol II pp 13-5) between the Vedas which are *prabhū samūta* the Itihāsa etc. which are *mūla-samūta* and the Kāvya which is *kāntā samūta*.

5 Locana p 182

establishment of Rasa in the word and in the object¹. But from 11 292 it appears that Dandin means by *mādhurya guṇa* mere absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatā*) and does not contemplate the inclusion of Rasa as such. This is made clear by 1 64 where *agrāmya artha* is said to be *rasāvaha*, as well as by the *Hydangama* commentary on this point: *mādhurya guṇe pradarśitah śabdārthayor agrāmyatayā jāto rasavākyasya bhavati, alaiṅkāratayā nirdiṣṭam rasavattvam aṣṭa-rasāyattam* (p. 167), the last part of this passage calling attention to the fact that the only cases, where the eight Rasas are admitted by Dandin and which we shall discuss presently, occur in connection with his inclusion of this element in poetic figures like *rasavat*. The *mādhurya guṇa*, according to Dandin, may appear in two aspects, in so far as it creates *vāg-rasa* and *vastu-rasa* (1 51), the former consisting of alliteration of similar sounds (*śrutyānuprāsa*) and the latter denoting absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatā*)². Thus Hemacandra rightly explains Rasa in Dandin's *mādhurya* according as it resides in *vac* or *vastu*, in this way *śruti varnanuprāsābhyāṃ vāg-rasah, agrāmyābhidheyatā tu vastu-rasah* (p. 198). The Rasa in *mādhurya*, therefore, has a distinct technical connotation different from that imparted to it by the exponents of the Rasa School. A similar use of the term, which, however, Dandin does not explain, as he does in this particular case, is to be found in III 149 (or IV 26 in the Madras edition) where the phrase *gītam rasah* should be interpreted, as it is done by Tarunavacaspati, as *sūdhutvam*³.

1 *vāc vastutay ope paramathanā* : 51

2 See : 51 67. Also Manikyanandā p. 189

3 The modern commentators are sometimes misled by their own ideas of Rasa and interpret Dandin in that light. For instance Premacandra commenting on Dandin's exposition of the *lavya-tvīra* in 1 10, notes *lavjānam śrutarāṇaṃ ca śāmbhūtanāya rapidi ryaḥ gya sya deha bhūta āśrayat ca* although Dandin himself nowhere speaks of the suggestion of Rasa as the 'soul' of poetry. The same remark

At the same time it cannot be affirmed that Dandin was entirely ignorant of the idea of *Rasa* for he declares that poetic figures to which he attaches great importance as an element of poetry endow the sense with *Rasa* (1 62) although here as elsewhere the *artha-rasa* has a distinct reference to *agramyata* from the context. Again a *Mahakavya* in his opinion should invariably possess *rasa* and *bhava* (1 18). A clearer indication is given by his treatment of the figures *rasavat*, *preyas* and *urjasvin* (II 275-92) where he betrays an undoubted acquaintance with the existence of the eight recognised *Rasas* all of which he enumerates by their respective names and four of which (*viz śṛṅgāra raudra vira karuṇa*) he illustrates as elements of the poetic figures under discussion. If we are to accept Abhinavagupta's interpretation Dandin's conception of *Rasa* like that of Lollata is what may be described as objective or in other words Dandin believes in the causal development of *Rasa* through the Excitants (*vibhāvas*) and Ensouants (*anubhāvas*). Without making a definite statement on this point—for Dandin's somewhat meagre indication hardly justifies us in doing so—we may however affirm that Dandin apparently speaks of *Rasa* as being developed as an effect from a temporary (e.g. *ratī* or *krodha*) to a permanent mood (e.g. *śṛṅgāra* or *raudra*) and the way in which he deals with the question lends colour to Abhinavagupta's interpretation or at least indicates that Dandin was probably aware of some such theory. For speaking of the figure *rasavat* which according to him possesses the characteristic of manifesting the *Rasas* he gives an example of the manifestation of *śṛṅgāra* in such a figure with the remark *ratī śṛṅgaratām gaurī pa bahalya yogena* (1 281). Similarly with reference to the development of *raudra* from *krodha* he says *ity aruḥya* applies to the modern commentary in the ed. of Dandin in Bombay Sanskrit Series.

² The *Bhāṣa* etc. or (etc. of which follows below) repeated partially by Hemacandra p. 57 comm.

parāṁ loṣaṁ krodho raudrātmatāṁ gataḥ (ii 283). But the Rasa in these figures is, of course, subordinate to the expressed figure itself (*alanṁkāratayā anṛtam*, ii 287), of which it serves as a means of embellishment. It seems, therefore, that Dandin was to some extent cognisant of *rasa*, *bhāva* etc., but he could not give them a place in his system except as an embellishment of the language or of the sense, and this somewhat objective view of Rasa was apparently responsible for the subordinate position assigned to it in the *Alaṁkāra* and the *Riti* Schools.

Although *Vāmana* makes a great advance on Dandin's system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further than his predecessor in the treatment of Rasa. He emphasises, no doubt, the necessity of distinguishing between those characteristics (*guṇa*) which are essential (*nitya*) and those (*alanṁkāra*) which are secondary (*anitya*) in poetry, and marks an improvement on *Bhāmaha* and Dandin, who include Rasa only in the poetic figures, by including it in the essential characteristics, for he defines the *artha-guṇa kānti* as that essential excellence of sense "in which *rasa* = conspicuously present" (*dīpta rasatvam* iii. 2 15). In this respect *Vāmana* in a way anticipates the importance which Rasa assumed in later schools, but it must be admitted that although *Vāmana* includes Rasa in the essentials of poetry, he had no clear idea of its aesthetic significance except as an accessory element, just in the same way as he had no clear notion of the 'suggested sense' except as a similar accessory element in a particular figure (iv, 3 8).

Udbhaṣa, a follower of *Bhāmaha* and a contemporary of *Vāmana*, adheres in the main to the views of his predecessors and treats Rasa as a subsidiary element in poetry, including it like *Bhāmaha* in figures like *rasavat*, but in one passage, curiously enough he apparently designates Rasa as the 'soul' of poetry, without, however, setting up as

1 *rasadyadharthasāṁ kārjyam jīvaḥ rūpatayā gataḥ*
kāhyate tad rasatīnāṁ kavyatmavān vyavasthitaḥ //

aesthetic system on its basis. This verse occurs as vi 17 in the text of Udbhata's work published by Col. Jacob in *JRAS*, 1897, p. 847, but the verse appears to be a little out of place in the context in which it occurs, and in the text published by the Nirnay Sagar Press it is wanting, although given as a quotation with a *tad aha* in the accompanying commentary of Pratiharenduraja (p. 77). Hermann Jacobi's supposition¹ therefore, based on Jacob's text, that Udbhata was the first writer to consider the question as to what constitutes the 'soul' of poetry, and to regard *Rasa* as such does not appear to be at all plausible. Even if the verse in question be Udbhata's it should be taken as one of his *obiter dicta* which does not fit in well with his system as a whole although Pratiharenduraja would probably find a place for it by reading into Udbhata as he does, his own views about *Rasa*. It is true that Udbhata betrays a closer acquaintance with the *Rasa* theory in some form or other and its technicalities using terms like *vibhava sthayan sancarin* (iv 4) and *anubhava* (iv 2) and enumerating after Bharata vi 15 the eight orthodox *Rasas* with the addition of a ninth *santa* in the category, but all this is taken into account as an embellishment of the expressed figure or in other words *Rasa* is not considered for its own sake but because it helps to emphasise and constitute the charm of the particular figure. Hence Pratiharenduraja remarks that the question as to the nature of *rasa* and *bhasa* and how far they may stand as a mere *kavyulankara* or as the very 'soul' of poetry, is not discussed partly for fear of prolixity and partly because it is not relevant.²

¹ Ed. Kāvya-mālā, p. 50. Not much capital can be made out of this article, Prof. Jacobs admitted that his contention was no longer tenable.

² Ed. Kāvya-mālā, p. 50. Not much capital can be made out of the fact, referred to in p. 180 footnote above, that Śrīngadeva mentions Udbhata as one of the commentators on Bharata. If it were true it only shows that Udbhata was conversant with Bharata's

Rudraja on the other hand seems to be the earliest writer who explicitly includes a treatment of Rasa as a separate topic devoting four chapters to the discussion of Rasa and its adjunct subject of the hero and heroine (*nayaka nayikā*). It is not clear, however, what theoretical significance he attaches to Rasa, for although at the beginning of his work he praises poets who have won eternal fame by composing poetry enlivened by Rasa he devotes a comparatively small part of his work to its treatment and is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspect of the question. Out of the sixteen chapters into which his work is divided only two chapters deal directly with Rasa not theoretically but descriptively while the rest is taken up with the details of the poetic figures (*alamkaras*), on which apparently he puts greater emphasis. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem *śarasa* he says (xi 1) that to those who enjoy the Rasas but fight shy of the dry Śāstras instruction in the *caturvargas* is easier to impart through the medium of delectable writing, and this seems in his opinion, to be the chief motive for inspiring the sense of poetry with Rasa. Rudraja in his theoretical attitude has no affinity with the Rasa School but rather with the Alamkara School and we have the testimony of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha to this effect. Ruyyaka says¹ that Rudraja laid special stress on *alamkara* in which he comprised the three kinds of suggestion including the suggestion of Rasa (*rasa*

theory as his citation of a half line from Bharata and use of technical terms like *vibhava* etc. would indicate. It does not prove that he belonged to the school of Bharata. On the other hand evidence is not wanting that Udbhata belonged to the Alamkara School (Ruyyaka p. 7) and was a follower of Bhāmaha whose definitions of many poetic figures (e.g. *rasavat alayoktā sāsa delā sahoktī apalāti utprekṣā yathasā kīva aprastuta prastāva parayoktā ākṣepa vibhāvanā vrodhā and bhāṣikā*) he faithfully copies and on whose text he also appears to have written a *tiṛanna* (Pratibandha p. 13. Locana pp. 10, 40, 159. Hemacandra p. 17. Ruyyaka p. 183. Samudrabandha pp. 89, 90).

1. Ed. Kavyamālā p. 5. Samudrabandha agrees with this.

dhvani) and that in the figure *rasavat* and the like the *rasa* and *bhava* implied are taken as elements which only heighten the charm of the expressed idea. Namiśadhu Rūdrata's commentator however explaining Rūdrata xi 2 states in the usual metaphorical language that in the opinion of his author *śabda* and *artha* constitute the body of poetry the poetic figures take the place of artificial ornaments while *rasa* resembles natural qualities like beauty prowess etc (*rasas tu saundaryādaya eva sahaja-guṇaḥ*). This interpretation only shows that like Vāmana Rūdrata was a step in advance of Bhamaha and Dandin inasmuch as he would regard *Rasa* as a natural quality which is not extraneous but stands in intimate relation to poetry but there is nothing anywhere in Rūdrata which will support this elaborate description especially as Rūdrata can scarcely be supposed to look upon poetic figures which are of utmost importance in his view of poetry as mere artificial ornaments of expression.

The older writers on Poetics therefore before the advent of the *Dhvani* School contented themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression and hardly troubled themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle the soul (*ātman*) of poetry nor do they identify as some later writers do this soul with the subtle psychological factor known as *rasa*. Vāmana no doubt offers to solve the question by declaring (i 2 6) that the *Riti* which has been usually but inadequately translated as style or diction is this soul but in Vāmana's view the *Riti* is not the expression of poet's individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by the unification of certain more or less fixed excellences known as *guṇas* or by adjustment of word and sense. The older writers therefore lay the greatest emphasis on the poetic figures or *alankāras* as Ruyyaka (p 7) testifies or on *riti* or diction in the objective sense and although cognisant of that aesthetic delectableness which should be present in all poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of *Rasa* they could not yet har-

monise it well into their theory of externals, and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language by including it in certain poetic figures or by allowing it to form an element of the excellences of diction. The Rasa could come into their system only through this backdoor as it were. It is partly for this reason that the Dhvanikara (in 52) condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry and expounds his own aesthetic doctrine in which Dhvani especially Rasa dhvani plays such an important part.

The Dhvanikara however in his exposition of *rasa dhvani* seems to have been greatly influenced by the dramaturgic Rasa School (Bharata declared that the business of the drama was to evolve one or more of the eight Rasas and therefore a more or less elaborate psychology of human sentiments had been analysed in the service of the dramatic art. Bharata's ideas on these psychological processes and on Rasa which is the final internal experience consisting in the consciousness of a certain objective condition of the ego were elaborated by his commentators and followers till the Dhvanikara followed by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta came into the field.) From the extant drama and dramatic theory therefore the idea of Rasa was taken over in poetry and poetic theory and as the transition from the naive to the sentimental poetry was accomplished the theorists went a step further and erected Rasa into one of its essential aesthetic foundations. Anandavardhana is quite explicit on this point when he says *etac ca rasadīśī tasya kāvya sambandhanam bhāratadāvatī suprasiddham eva* (p. 181). In other words what was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others thus found its way into poetry profoundly modifying as it did, the entire conception of Kāvya. In the same way Abhinavagupta commenting on the concluding portion of the prose passage just before Bharata vi 33 says *nūjātī samudaya rūpād rasah nañya eva rasah kañye pī nūjā yamāna eva rasah kāvya arthah*. Similarly Rūdrabhaṣya states at

the beginning of his work (1.5) that Bharata and others have already discussed Rasa in connexion with the drama, while his own object is to apply it to the case of poetry.

It must be noted, however, that although all later theorists take Bharata as their starting point, and build up their own theories round his authoritative, if somewhat meagre, text, Bharata himself, like most old masters, is very simple in his statements, and the subject does not appear to have been yet brought into the realm of scholastic speculation. Bharata's work is encyclopaedic in scope but his primary theme is the drama and his conception of poetry dramatic, a view which perhaps inspired Vamana's partiality towards dramatic composition expressed in 3.30-32 and which is concisely put by Abhinavagupta by saying *lāvyaṇī śāvad dātāputra-kām eva*. In such a composition Rasa, according to Bharata, should be predominant, for he says that the drift of sense which arises from Rasa appeals to the heart and pervades the body, like fire lighting up dry pieces of wood.¹ Without Rasa there can be no sense of poetry.² Although Bharata does not go much into technicalities he seems to be of opinion that the *vibhavas* and *anubhavas* which, according to later theory, constitute the essential factors, call forth Rasa, but he is not clear as to what this process of evolution exactly is. He explains *bhāva* the basis of Rasa generally as that which brings into existence the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, viz. through words, gestures and internal feeling.³ This *bhāva* when permanent and not transitory, reaches the state of Rasa through the factors known as *vibhava* and *anubhava*.⁴ A *vibhava* is explained thus.

1 vi. 7

2 na hi rasad vie kalcid arthah pravarjate ed. Grosset p. 87
cd. Kavyamālā p. 62.

3 *īcān ga sūtravopadeśān lāvyaṇīkām bhāvayantīti bhāvaḥ* op. cit., p. 100 op. cit. p. 69.

4 *śābānta eva bhāvā rasāntam āpnuvanti* op. cit. || 102 op. cit. p. 70 *śābānta eva bhāvāntam āpnuvanti* op. cit. p. 70 *śābānta eva bhāvāntam āpnuvanti* op. cit. p. 87 op. cit. p. 62.

vibhāva itī kasmād ucyate, vibhāvo nāma vipñānārthah, vibhāvyanti¹ nena vāg anga-sattvābhīnaya ityato vibhāvah² The word *vibhāva* is used, therefore, to imply knowledge or understanding and may be explained generally as that which makes the three kinds of representation capable of being sensed. In the same way, the *anubhāva* is explained as that which follows upon and makes the three kinds of representation actually sensed.³ The third element of Rasa, the *vyabhicārī bhāva*, consists of accessory facts which help and strengthen it, and is etymologically described as *vi abhi ity etiā upasargau cara gatau dhātuh⁴*. As to what relation these factors bear to Rasa and how this state of relish is brought about, Bharata simply lays down: *vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicārī sañyogād rasa-nispattih*, a formula which, in spite of his own explanation, is so ambiguous with respect to the exact significance of the central terms *sañyoga* and *nispatti* that a great deal of controversy has gathered round its interpretation. As each commentator has tried to explain it in his own way, it has given rise, as we shall presently see, to a number of theories on Rasa. Bharata's own explanation, if it can be called an explanation, is that just as a beverage is accomplished through various seasoned articles and herbs, so the permanent mood, the *sthāyi-bhāva*, reinforced (*upagata*) by various *bhāvās*, attain the state of *rasa*⁵ and it is so called because its essence consists in its taste or relish (*rasa itī kah padārthah, ucyate*

¹ *op cit*, pp 100-1 *op cit* p 69

² *anubhāva itī kasmād ucyate yad aham anubhavasau punar itibhūtiḥ punar uḍ-angasattva kṛtam abhinayam itī op cit* p 101 *op cit* p 69

³ Bharata deals with *lakṣaṇa alankāra doṣa* and *gana* under *vācika abhinaya* treated in ch. XIX to XX and these are thus made subordinate to Rasa. All these elements are considered in so far as they form dramatic embellishments, but ultimately disappear in later works being included either under *alankāra* (Dandin n. 365 and *Dattarupaka* ed Hall iv 78) or under *gana* and *alankāra* (Vivaraṇṭha vi p 332, ed Durgaprasada)

⁴ Ed Croiset p 87 ed Kavyamālā p 62

asvadyatvat) He also explains that the *sthāyī bhāva* is the basis of Rasa because it attains as it were mastery or sovereignty among the forty nine different *bhāvas* (viz. eight *sthāyī bhāvas*, eight *sattvika bhāvas* and thirty three *vyabhicārī bhāvas* mentioned by him in vii ad 6 and vii 11 f) which naturally rest upon it as being presumably the principal theme of the composition in question¹ Nothing definite can be concluded from all this except that in Bharata's opinion the *sthāyī bhāva* is the basis of Rasa, while the *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhicārī* contribute to its final realisation² But this explanation by its very ambiguity or vagueness taxed the ingenuity of the commentators its general trend anticipating theories like the *utpatti vada* of Lollata and the *anumiti vada* of Saṅkuka while special technicalities (used probably in an untechnical sense by Bharata himself) like *vyanjita* and *samānya-guṇa-yoga* occurring in the text suggesting or lending support to specialised doctrines like the *vyakti vada* of Abhinavagupta or the *bhukti vada* of Bhaṭṭa Nayaka

The general foundations of the theory however, remain fixed by Bharata It is practically admitted on all hands that the Rasa is realised when a permanent mood or *sthāyī bhāva* is brought to a relishable condition through the three elements viz the *vibhava*, the *anubhava* and the *vyabhicārī bhāva* Of these the first two are the more important the *vyabhicārī* being only concomitant or accessory Bharata's explanations of these terms are rendered with greater precision by his followers By *sthāyī bhāva* in poetry and drama are meant certain more or less permanent conditions of the mind such as love grief anger or fear This permanent mood constituting the principal theme of composi-

1 *avāṇī* vad anyanyārtha-saṁskṛtaḥ vibhāva bhāva 12, 13, 14 to r
 elonapa cūṭarā bhāva āk ānāṇya-guṇa-yoga-nābhī n pādyaṇte ra āk
 tar koṭham dān m sīd) na eva bhāva rasatvam āpnu anṛ nṛjate
 bhāvaḥ cyatāḥ s 12, 13 to sīd) na bhāva āk ed Grosset pp 107
 ed Kīrtyamala, p 70

tion and running through all other moods like the thread of a garland cannot be overcome by those akin to it or those opposed to it but can only be reinforced. Those elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the *sthayi bhava* are in poetry and drama known as *vibhava*, *anubhava* and *vyabhicari bhava*¹ although in the ordinary world they may be known as mundane cause and effect (*laukika karana* and *karṇa*). Devoid of technicalities a *vibhava* may be taken as that which makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed an *anubhava* as that which makes it sensed while a *vyabhicari* (also called *sanicari*) *bhava* as that which acts as an auxiliary or gives an impetus to it. In the case of Love as a permanent mood the stock examples given of *vibhava* are women and the seasons of *anubhava* glance and embrace of *vyabhicarin* the transient subordinate feelings of joy and anxiety. Now Bharata says that the Rasa is realised through a certain correlation of these elements with the *sthayi bhava* or permanent mood. The question therefore arises to which Bharata himself gives no definite solution viz. what this process of realisation actually consists in and what relation do these elements bear to Rasa in this process the solution depending upon the explanation of the two much discussed terms *samyoga* and *mispatti* in Bharata's original dictum cited above.

✓ Bharata Lollata appears to be one of the earliest commentators of Bharata to offer an explanation. But excepting the brief review of his opinion in Abhinavagupta's commentary²

1 Ballantyne renders these to us conveniently, if not very adequately as the Excitant, the Evocant and the Accessory respectively a nomenclature which is accepted by Gangadhar Thakur in his translation of the *Kavya prakāśa*. H. Jacob however (ZDMG 1902 p. 394 f.) uses the terms Factor, Effect and Concurrent.

2 The extracts given below are taken from a transcript published herewith of the Tiruvandur Palace MS. received through the kind offices of Gangadhar Thakur. Lollata's views are reviewed after Abh.

on Bharata which is copied more or less by all subsequent writers from Mammata and reproduced almost literally but anonymously by Hemacandra. Lollata is unknown to us and his work is apparently lost. Very little can be gathered from this summary exposition by an adverse critic but it appears that Lollata took the *vibhāṭa* as the direct cause (*kāraṇa*) of Rasa which is therefore an effect (*anukārya* or *utpadya*) and the word *nīṣṭhā* of Bharata is explained as *utpatti* or *puṣṭi*.¹ The Rasa found in characters like Rāma is attributed to the actor who imitates the character in form, dress and action and thus charms the spectator.² Mammata and his followers agree with this interpretation of Lollata by Abhinava but they make it more clear by saying that the permanent mood or the *sthāyī* is directly connected with the hero (*mukhya* *vṛttī* = *saṁśat sambandhena*) but it is recognised as existing in the actor³ through a clever imitation of the original character, this imitation being apparently the source of the charm (*camatkara hetu*) to the spectator. The locus of the Rasa therefore is supposed to be in the hero but it is not clear how it is apparently transferred to the actor and how the spectator is charmed by a feeling which does not exist in him. Govinda therefore rightly comments on this view of

nava, in Mammata iv ed. Bom. Sansk. Ser., p. 87. Hemacandra p. 57. Mallinatha on Vidyādharma p. 85. Govinda ed. Kavyamala p. 63. Hemacandra practically reproduces Abhinavagupta's very words.

1 *utā bhāṭa lollata prābhūṭayam tadā eva n. vyacokhyat. Vihlā tad bhāṭa sanīyogo rti at sthāyīnaḥ tato rasa n. patti h. Tatra vibhāṭa c ita piteh sthāyīnam kāya utpattau lāṅghyam. anubhāṭa ca na rasa jāyāt ita v. vaktā. tadā rasa karanaṭi ca gāṇāṇāṁ evāt upi tu bhāṭa ānām eva etc. Abh. on Bh.*

2 *sthāyīeva vibhāṭam bhavad bh. r. upacita rasah sthāyī bhavaty-anupacitah. Sa cobhāyo py anukārye nukartary ap. [sic] carāṇasādhanaḥ bādh ita cīrāntanant. v. cāyāṁ pākṣah. Abh. on Bh.*

3 *ramadāvanukārye tad rūpāṇusārmillānam nartakē p. prai. yamāna rasah. Mammata loc. c. t.* where the term *prāyamaṇah* is interpreted by Govinda as *aropyamāṇah* (*ante tu vāg. r. pāṇasādhakāṁ vā vāṭāḥ aropyamāṇah ant. aḥ. kāmām camatkara hetuḥ* p. 63).

Lollaṭa *taḍ apēṣalam sāmāyikeṣu taḍ-abhave tatru camatkar-anubhava virodhat, na ca tagnānam eva camatkara hetuḥ laukika śrāguruḍi darśanenōpi camatkara prasāngat* (p. 63)

The rival school of Sāṅkya we are told by Abhinava gupta and following him by Hemacandra brings forward ingenious objections into the technicalities of which we need not enter here.¹ The later writers² however demur to this cause and effect theory on more philosophical grounds. An effect they argue may exist when its efficient cause is destroyed, but the life of Rasa is circumscribed by contact with the vibhavas (vibhavadī paramarśa jīvanavadhī) it disappears when the latter disappears a fact which goes to prove that the Rasa must not be taken as an ordinary mundane (laukika) effect.³ Again the cause and the effect cannot

1 Sāṅkya for instance maintains that Bharata apparently uses the terms *rasa* and *abhāsa* synonymously for the latter mentions the same vibhāva with respect to a particular abhāsa and its corresponding *rasa* and hence if they are identical there is no question of one being produced from the other. Nothing can be gained by replying that in its undeveloped state it is *abhāsa* but in the developed state it is *rasa* for such a supposition will involve an infinite multiplication (*ananyūpavāh*) of the stages of *abhāsa* and its corresponding *rasa*. If it is said that in its highest stage of development it is *rasa* then how can we imagine sixteen different varieties of *āhār-rasa* (Bharata xi 52) or the ten different stages of *śrāgāra* (Bharata xiii 154 (75)? Besides the priority of *āhāra* in relation to *rasa* is not always vouchsafed by experience a great sorrow felt in its intensity at the beginning is not seen to subside in time but grow stronger (see Hemacandra pp. 57-8).

2 Among the earlier authors Dandin as already noted appears to have been influenced by Lollaṭa's theory which is entirely discredited in later times. This does not argue the priority of Lollaṭa to Dandin for the theory in which the influence of Mīmāṃsaka is apparent, might have obtained in the schools before Lollaṭa first brought it into prominence.

33 *Māli nāṭha an Ekādaśī p. 87 kīrtyante ghaṭād vai vibhāḥ ad nāle pi roḍḍu tti prasāngah - na cāryāḥlaukikaṣya a-prakāśānandātmakāṣya laukika pramāṇa-ganyatvam* see also pp. 93-4 Govinda p. 69 *etāḥśūdrā parāmārśaṣya kīrtanātānāḥ yadi yāḥ tāḥ tāḥ nimitta-kīrtanātānāḥ etc.*

be contemporaneous if Rasa is supposed to be an effect its relish cannot be as it actually is contemporaneous with the appearance of the *vibhavas*. Hence Viśvanātha remarks that if Rasa is an effect having for its cause the perception of the *vibhavas* then at the time of the relish of Rasa the *vibhavas* would not be perceived for we do not find the simultaneous perception of a cause and its effect. The perception of the touch of the sandal wood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously however rapid the one may succeed the other.¹

Śaṅkuka therefore the next commentator on Bharata rejecting this theory contends that the Rasa is not produced as an effect but *inferred*. The permanent mood is inferred to exist in the actor—though not actually existing in him²—by means of the *vibhavas* etc. cleverly exhibited by him in his acting so as to produce an illusion of identity with the feelings of the hero³ and the mood thus inferred being sensed by the spectator through its exquisite beauty⁴ adds to itself a peculiar charm and thus develops into a relishable condition called Rasa. The realisation of Rasa therefore is simply a process of logical inference the *nyāyātī* of Bharata being explained as *anumati* and the *vibhava* stands to Rasa in the relation of *anumāpaka* or *gāṇaka* to *anumāpya* or *gāmya*. But the mood itself though inferred in this way from the relation of the major and middle terms (*liṅga-bāhāt*) is yet cognised as different from the objects of ordinary inference being inferred as it were by force of its exquisite charm as something to be relished on account of its connexion with the *vibhavas* etc. which though artificial are not recog-

1 Ch. 1, p. 86 of Durgaprasāda.

2 *naṣṭe tyaṁśa dya m'no pa* Hemacandra p. 58.

3 *ramadyabhedo-bhā eva naṣṭe ta p'akāśa r' e a bh' v d bh r*
anumitah Mallinātha p. 83.

4 *ast saṁśa ya bāhāt rasa ya vena s' hāy nam anjānamo ya*
n lakṣaṇa Govinda p. 65. Practically paraphrase of Mammata p. 20.

nised as such.¹ This cognition or knowledge is characterised² as based on what is called *citra-turaga-nyāya*, (viz the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse), and should be differentiated from the true ('he is Rāma'), the false ('he is Rāma' with a following negation 'he is not Rāma'), the doubtful ('he may or may not be Rāma') knowledge, as well as from the knowledge of similarity ('he is like Rāma').

This theory, however, has been discredited by later schools because, as Govinda concisely sums up the objections, it disregards the well recognised fact that the inference of a thing can never produce the same charm as its direct cognition.³ It has been pointed out that the Rasa is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of Rāma, the hero represented on the stage, being past, cannot be cognised by the organs of sense belonging to the present time and the present place.⁴ The *anumāna* theory is discussed elaborately in connexion with the theory of 'suggestion', coming topically within the province of the suggestion of Rasa (*rasa dhvani*), by later adherents of the Dhvani School⁵ and the general argument

1 *kāraṇa-kārya sambandābhāvāt kṛtrimaḥ api tātha nobhūtaḥ samānāḥ*. Mammata iv, also Hemacandra p 58

2 Mammata ibid Hemacandra expanding Abhinava's exposition on this point puts it in this way *na caitra nartaka eva sukṛtā prāṭi pātāḥ nāpyayanti eva rama it na cāpyanti sukṛtā nāpi rājanā yad ita ita vāyam it na cāpi tai sadṛśāṁ it kṛtāḥ samāyāṁ tathā yā samāyāṁ tādṛśa prastūbhya vāhājanāt citra-turagād nyāyena yā sukṛtā samāh āśāyāṁ it prastū asti (p 59)*

3 *etaḥ api śrīdayagrūha yataḥ pratyakṣam eva manasā sa-camat karam nanumityadit it loka prastūbhina avadhūyānyatha kalpane mana bhavāt*, p 63

4 *yad api rasatyānāpāyavibhīdhāgāt tad api samāyāṁ rater āsta itat ānūhita-leḥa varitamāna kalendriya sāmnikarpatānāpāyavibhī pruyena Vidyādhara p 94*

5 The *anumāna* theory never appears to have received liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists. Mahimabhatta author of the *Pyākṛa-vyākṛa* was the only known writer who put forward a similar theory, for trying to prove in opposition to the accepted Dhvani theory that the so called *dhvani* including *rasa-dhvani* can be arrived at by the ordinary process of logical inference he preferred him self to be an *anumanī-vadin* in his idea of Rasa. We do not possess enough data to decide what relation if any Mahima bore to his predecessor Śaṅkha. We have the testimony indeed of a very late (A D

by which it is sought to be discarded is that the *vibhāṣas* cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the *sthāyin*, because the *vibhāṣas* do not stand in the same relation to the

1700) and not usually careful writer, Rāmānujān who commented on the *Sūtrīya-darpaṇa* that Mahima was in reality a follower of Śaṅkuka (*śaṅkuka-matānūjyāmāṇī vyākṛti-vivēkaśūdrāśīdīnī matanī dāṇayati*, ed. Durgaprasāda p. 248 ed. Roer, p. 121 note), but Mahima himself who throughout takes pride in his originality omits all reference direct or indirect to his predecessor. It is probable however that the theory developed by Mahima was not originated by him. Ānandavardhana himself refers at some length (pp. 201 f.) a similar theory which tried to establish that the cognition of the unexpressed is nothing more than the cognition of the object of a logical conclusion so that the relation of the suggestor and the suggested is that of the syllogistic middle and major terms. Mahimabhaṭṭa's theory bears a close resemblance to that of Śaṅkuka for the former proceeds on a quite different line. Although accepting the new concept of *dhvani* he differs from Ānanda in holding that \equiv can be revealed by *anumāna* and that therefore there is no need to establish a separate function of *vyākhyāna* and by a process of elaborate destructive criticism he attempts to make the definition of *dhvani* conform to what he calls *dhvani-mūlaka* as the process by which another sense \equiv revealed by the expressed sense (*vyākṛtā*) or by a sense inferred sometimes connectedly from it (p. 22). He argues that the existence of a *dhvani* or sequence however imperceptible (*asatīkṛtā*) cannot be denoted between the suggested elements (*vyākṛtā vattu alamīdṛa* or *śara*) and the expressed (*vyākṛtā*) sense (*vibhāṣa* in case of *śara*) and this only shows that the two senses expressed and unexpressed *vyākṛtā* and *vyākṛtā* are sequential and being such bear the relation of premise and conclusion (pp. 11 f.). Hence *artha* is merely a ground of inference which is very wide in its scope (*mahādhvani*) and not a *vyākhyāna*. Again as *śabḍa* exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense even the secondary sense (*lakṣaṇa artha*) has admittedly to be inferred not from itself but from the latter how can it be supposed to be a *vibhāṣa* and convey a deeper sense? But such words through their expressed sense can well become a source of inference (*anumāṇapūṣa*) pp. 27 f. There is no room here to consider this theory in detail nor take into account the different objections urged against its over-subtlety (see *Maṇḍana* v. *Rūpyaka* ed. Kāvyamāla pp. 123. *Vidyadhara* pp. 32 ff. *Viśvanātha*, v.) Mahima had no followers in later literature.

sthāyin as the middle term (*sādhana*) does to the major term (*sādhya*), but are simply its suggestor (*vyaññaka*)

The *vibhāvas*, therefore, are neither the efficient cause (*kāraka hetu*) nor the logical cause (*prāpaka-hetu*) of Rasa, as held respectively by Lollata and Śaṅkuka. In both these theories the difficulty remains, namely, that if Rasa is an objective entity, produced or inferred, how can it bring about a subjective feeling of relish in the audience in whom these factors are presumably absent? If, on the other hand, it is supposed that it exists in the audience also, the question still remains as to how the particular feelings of a particular hero, like Rāma who is different or superior to the spectator himself, can be relished or realised as his own by the spectator. These objections are ably set forth by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as interpreted by Abhinava in his *Locana* (pp. 67-8), *raso yadi para-gatitayā prasthite, tarhi tāsasthityam eva syāt*. Na ca svagatatvena rāmadā caritamayāi kāvyād asau prasthite. Sva-gatatvena ca prasthite svātman rasayotpattir evābhivyupagatā syāt, sā cayukta sāmānyānāṁ praty avibhāvavat Kantāvanā sādharāṇāṁ vāsanā vikaśa hetur vibhāvanayāṁ prayojakaṁ itī cet, devatā-varṇanādau tad api katham? Na ca sva kanta-smaranam madhye sañvedyate. Aloka sāmānyānāṁ ca rāmādīnāṁ ye samudra setu bandhūdayo vibhāvās te katham sādharāṇāṁ bhajeyuh?

Hence Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka attempts to refute these earlier theories (as well as those of the new Dhvani School who later on found a champion in Abhinavagupta), and sets up a peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*). He argues that (1) Rasa cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes, namely, the *vibhāvas*, being non-realities, cannot bring about real effects, (2) it cannot be inferred, because the character, Rāma, not really being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (*na ca tatvato ramarāya smrtir, anupalabdhanat*). Besides, how is it possible for the ordinary reader or spectator to identify himself with the extraordinary virtues of a hero

Saṃkhya philosophers which is borrowed by these theorists, from the prominence of the attribute of goodness *satya*) in a man and differing from what is known as worldly happiness¹. It is distinguished from the two kinds of knowledge *anubhava* and *smarana*, and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation². According to Bhaṭṭa Nayaka, therefore, the Rasa consists in the *sthayi bhava* or the permanent mood experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of *abhidha* and *bhūvalaya* and enjoyed by a blissful process known as *bhoga* till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not worldly (*alaukika*) and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

It will be noticed that all these different theories about Rasa though applied to drama and poetry, are at the same time tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian Philosophy. Lollata appears to be a Mīmāṃsaka, Saṅkuka a Nāyayika, while Bhaṭṭa Nayaka seems to follow the Saṃkhya doctrine. But what is more noticeable is that in Bhaṭṭa Nayaka we mark a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of Rasa and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of inward experience. If we may judge from the somewhat elaborate criticism levelled against this theory it seems to have produced a greater impression and undoubtedly paved the way for the later theory of Abhinavagupta to whom really belongs the credit of elaborating the new aesthetic system of

1 *ratnavodreka prakāśamandamaya samitā vīratā satattvina bhogena bhujyate* Mīmāṃsā explained by Govinda as *bhogat ca satya guṇo dret it prakāśate ya anandar tat svarūpananyalauk bhavā ya svit tat svarūpa laukika sukā anubhava-lakṣanah* etc. *sāṃkhya siddhāntānu sārāṇa* viijñ ite, p. 66.

2 *ratā nūbīaya-anvītyānī vilakṣaṇena drutī vīratā vīkṣatmanā para brāhmānāda savādīnena bhogema* Abh. on Bh. bhā ite ca rose *tasya bhogāt ya nūbīaya smarana pratipattiḥ vilakṣaṇa e a drutī vīratā-vīkṣa nūṇa* para brāhmānāda-savādīh Locana p. 68.

which Vamana had already amply recognised and on which the Alankāra and the Riti Schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric however veiled it may be is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such but the suggestive (*vyangya*) is always unexpressed and is therefore a source of greater charm through its capacity of concealment, for this concealment in which consists the essence of art is in reality no concealment at all. The new aesthetic school claims a particular function of suggestion appertaining to words and their senses whereby the unexpressed or the inexpressible is called into being or to speak with *haṁs* whereby poetry becomes an expression of the aesthetic idea.

Now the unexpressed through the suggestive power of word or idea may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*) or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alamkāra*) but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani School therefore took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of Rasa with the theory of Dhvani. It was realised that poetry was not as Dandin thought the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods in themselves are inexpressible. We can give a name to them but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best therefore we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *vibhavas* etc. but with the help of these expressed element which must be generalised and conceived not as they appear in the mundane world but as they may be imagined in a poetic world the poet can awaken in us through the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas a particular *alaukika* condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as the person (e.g. Rama) whom he describes felt in times past but he can call up a reflection of

the Dhvanikāra and Anandavardhana¹ From his extensive literary and philosophical studies as well as from his interest in the works of Bharata and his followers, Abhinava seems to have realised that no system of Poetics, like no system of Dramaturgy, can ever completely ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments and must find an important place for Rasa the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of the drama The insufficiencies of the earlier theories on Rasa are obvious but it was a happy idea to elaborate the theory in such a way as not only to supply these deficiencies but also to fit it well into the *dhvani* theory formulated by the new school

It is not necessary for us to enter into the details of the *dhvani* theory, it will suffice here to indicate generally how the idea of Rasa was worked up into it The Dhvani School in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts The one is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words, the other content is not expressed but must be added to it by the imagination of reader or the listener The unexpressed or the suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (*vyanjana*) is taken to be the 'soul' or essence of poetry To the grammarians and learned writers it seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of a poem is that which is not even expressed On the other hand some form of symbolical speech in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegories But the suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical

¹ There is some difference in the general theoretical positions of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta which will be noticed in its proper place later

which Vamana had already amply recognised and on which the Alamkara and the Rasi Schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric however veiled it may be is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such but the suggestive (*vyañgya*) is always unexpressed and is therefore a source of greater charm through its capacity of concealment for this concealment in which consists the essence of art is in reality no concealment at all. The new aesthetic school claims a particular function of suggestion appertaining to words and their senses whereby the unexpressed or the inexpressible is called into being or to speak with Kant whereby poetry becomes an expression of the aesthetic idea.

Now the unexpressed through the suggestive power of word or idea may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*) or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alamkara*) but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani School therefore took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of Rasa with the theory of Dhvani. It was realized that poetry was not as Dandin thought the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods in themselves are inexpressible. We can give a name to them but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best therefore we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *vibhavas* etc. but with the help of these expressed element which must be generalised and conceived not as they appear in the mundane world but as they may be imagined in a poetic world the poet can awaken in us through the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas a particular *alamkara* condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as the person (e.g. Rama) whom he describes felt in times past but he can call up a reflection of

of the power of *bhāvakaśa*, Abhinava turns to the other power assumed as *bhoga* or *bhogikarāṇa* by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka. He remarks that beyond the *prasthā* or perception of *rasa*, he is not aware of any other process called *bhoga*. If it is relish or enjoyment, it is already admitted; and nothing is gained by giving it a new name, just as nothing is gained by arriving at the same idea by the use of different terms like *darśana*, *anumiti*, *śruti*, *upamā* or *pratibhāna* according only to the distinction of the means employed¹. Hence *bhoga* is nothing more than the perception of *Rasa*, consisting of its essence of relish based on permanent moods like *rati* etc. But it must not be supposed to rest there, for although it is admitted that wherever there is *Rasa* there is no doubt its perception, consisting in its enjoyment, yet since the nature of *sattva* and other *gunas*, involved in such enjoyment is diversified, according as they are principal or subordinate and is therefore in itself infinite and incomprehensible, the relish of *Rasa* is not to be measured by the mere supposition of three functions². The *bhoga* supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nayaka therefore consists essentially in the *anvaya* of *Rasa* possible by the suggestive power of poetry, and falling naturally within its domain it need not be taken as a separate function³.

*asmābhir vācya vākyaśc Na ca kavye śabdānam leśāṇam
bhāvakaśam na leśāṇam arthanām dravyas tu bhāvakaśam
asmābhir ūktam sasmad vyanjakaśāṅghyaś vyāpureṇa guṇaṇam
kāraucityadikaroyas kartavyataya kavyaśc bhāvakaśam rasas bhāvayati
Locana ¶ 76*

1 *prasthīyati, vyatiriktat ca samāse ko bhoga ity na vidmah rasas
eti cet sūpti pratipattir eva leśāṇam upaya vailakyaśāṅgyam nāmanāntam
pratipadyatārś darśanamunam śruty-upamāś protibhā śāndi nāmanāntaravat
(Hemacandra p 61)*

2 *attho'cyate prasthāś aśya bhogikarāṇam tac ca tatsādīś varuparś
tad aśtu Tathāpi na tavaś mātram Yāvanāś hi tatātś saratyaś eva
rasāśmanāś prasthāśyāś bhogikarāṇaś vābhāś aś samāśāś gunanām caś
guṇaś vācīśryam anantam akāśpyam itīś laś tritveśyātāś (ibid loc cit)*

3 *bhogikarāṇaś vyāpureś ca kavyatmakāś-rasāś viśayāś dhvananot
maiva śāśāśāś śrutyāś vācāś vāśāśatmakāś bhogeś kartavyāś lokottarāś
dhvananaś vyāpuraś cīś mardhāśbhāśktāś Locana p 70*

This *prattī* of Rasa, Abhinava maintains, is nothing more than its *abhīyāsi* or manifestation by the power of suggestion resulting in an extraordinary state of relish, known as *rasanā ānāda* or *cariṇā*. What is manifested is not the Rasa itself, but its relish, not the mood itself but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader. This taste or relish partakes no doubt, of the nature of cognition, it is nevertheless different from the ordinary or *laukika* forms of the process, because its means, the *vibhāvas* are not to be taken as ordinary or *laukika* causes¹. Although Rasa requires these factors for

1 *rasanā ca bodha rāgava kīṃ tu bodhātarekhyā lauikikēhya vācāraṇa apyānā vibhāvādīnā lauikā-vācāraṇāḥ* (op. cit. p. 66). This will make it clear why Rasas like *karuṇā* *bībhatsa* or *bhayanaka* which cause pity, disgust or horror be termed Rasa in which enjoyment is essential. The relish of Rasa is supposed to be an extraordinary bliss not to be likened to ordinary pain or pleasure and the mind is so entirely lost in it that even when the sentiment of grief or horror is relished in such a state pain is never felt and even when it is felt it is a pleasurable pain. The fact is borne out by the common experience that when grief is represented the spectator or the reader says 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence Viśvanātha remarks (it. 6-7 and viii) ed Durgaprasāda (p. 73) that those very things which are called causes of pain in the world (like banishment of Śiśu in the forest) when consigned to poetry and dramatic representation possess the right to be called in consequence of their assuming such a function *alaukika vibhāvas* etc., and from them only pleasure comes, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance. It is also maintained (ibid. 11) that tears constitute no proof that anything but pleasure is felt in poetry for the tears which are shed by the reader are not those of pain but those of sentiment. Jagannātha's remarks in the connexion are interesting. He says (p. 26) that the shedding of tears and the like are due to the nature of the experience of the particular pleasure and not to pain. Hence in a devotee tears arise on listening to a description of the deity in this case there is not the slightest feeling of pain. Such is the power of the extraordinary function of poetry that even unpleasant things like sorrow generate *alaukika* pleasure and this pleasant aesthetic relish should be distinguished from the experience realised by other ordinary means.

its manifestation and cannot exist without them, it cannot yet be regarded as an ordinary effect, and the cause and effect theory is inapplicable; for in the transcendental sphere of poetry, it is said, the connexion between cause and effect gives place to a imaginative system of relations, which has the power of stirring the reader's soul into Rasa. The resulting Rasa cannot be identified with its constituent *vibhavas*, for the latter are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as Rasa, which is thus simple and indivisible, and at the time of relish nothing else but Rasa is raised to our consciousness. The writers on poetics are fond of explaining this phenomenon under the analogy of a beverage, which, though made up of black pepper, candied sugar, camphor and other ingredients gives us a different taste from that of its constituents. The result, therefore, is an indissoluble unity of taste from which every trace of the constituent elements is obliterated.

Abhinavagupta goes a step further also in maintaining that the *sthāyī* or the permanent mood, inferred from its *laukika* causes (e.g. woman, garden, etc.) remains in the hearts of the appreciating audience in the subtle form of latent impressions.¹ On reading a poem or witnessing a drama this permanent mood, remaining in the form of latent impressions (*vāsana*), is suggested by the depicted *vibhavas* etc., which cease to be called *laukika* causes but go by the name of *vibhavas* etc., in poetry and drama,² and which are taken in their general form without specific connexions.³

1 explained by Mammata as *samāṣaṇam vāsanātmakāḥ sth itah* on which Govinda comments *samāṣaṇam sūksmatayantah sth itah* and Mallinātha adds *samāṣaṇam svanubhava janta vāsanātmakāḥ sth itah* explaining *vāsana* as *sādhakā*.

2 *laukika karanatvādī bhāṣyam atīkrāntau evālaukika vibhavadī vyapadeśa bhāṣyāt* Abh. on Bh. *karanatvādī parihārena vibhavanatī vyaparavattivadī alaukika vibhavadī kṛtā vyavahara* i. Mammata explained by Vidyābhāṣa as *loke tu karana karyā sambhavanī evābhīdhitvānte, na vibhavanubhava vybhacarimahi* p. 92.

3 *sādhāranyena grahita* i., Mammata.

To state it briefly and without any technicality, there is in the mind a latent impression of feelings which we once went through and this is roused when we read a poem which describes similar things. By universal sympathy we become part and parcel of the same feeling and imagine ourselves in that condition. Thus the feeling is raised to a state of relish, called Rasa in which lies the essence of poetic enjoyment. It will be noticed that these theorists presuppose latent impression of experience (*vasanā*) and universal sympathy (*sādhāranya* or *sādhāranīkaraṇa*). Those who have never experienced the feeling of love for instance, and have therefore no impression of experience left in them as well as those who have no sense of community of human feelings can never relish Rasa in poetry. The *vasanā* we are told is natural (*svābhavikī* or *naisargikī*) but it may be acquired by study and experience. The writers on Poetics, therefore, are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and old Mimamsakas to whom such relish of Rasa is denied and they declare unanimously that *rasika eva rasīsvade योग्याः*. As Rasa is not an objective entity which can reside in the hero or the actor it is realised, as Dhanañjaya puts it (iv 36) by the reader's own capacity of enjoyment. Thus a degree of culture and aesthetic instinct is demanded in the critic, the *rasika* or *sahṛdaya*, who is the *adhikarī* dignified with the appellation of *pramāṇī* compatible with this subtle and extraordinary conception of poetry. As Abhinavagupta puts it *adhikarī catra vimala pratyubhaṇasali hrdayah*, and elsewhere (*Locana* p 11) he describes such a *sahṛdaya* as *yeshāṃ kavyānuśīlanabhyaṃsa vaśād vīśadībhūte manomukute varṇanīya tannayībhavāna योग्याः ते ह्रदया समवादा-भक्ष्याः सहृदयाः*

✧ It may also be pointed out that this subtle conception of Rasa makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms 'flavour' 'relish' 'gustation' 'taste' 'Geschmack' or 'savour', but none of these renderings seems to be adequate. The simpler word 'mood' or the term 'Stim

ming' used by Jacobi, may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories. Most of the terms employed have ideational associations of their own, and are therefore not strictly applicable. For instance, the word 'taste' or 'relish,' though literally correct, must not be understood to imply aesthetic or moral judgment, 'good or bad taste,' but must be taken to indicate an idea similar to what we mean when we speak of tasting food. At the same time, this realistic description must not lead us to drag it down to the level of a bodily pleasure; for this artistic pleasure is given as almost equivalent to the philosophic bliss, known as *ānanda* being lifted above worldly joy.

This peculiar condition of the ego, the *Rasa*, is realised through the characteristic function of *vyañjanā* or suggestion in poetry. The idea is elaborated by later theorists, who take pains to show that it does not come under the province of *abhidhā* (denotation), nor of *tāparya* (import), nor of *lakṣanā* (indication), nor of *pratyakṣa* (perception), nor of *anumāna* (inference), nor of *smarana* (reminiscence), admitted by philosophers and grammarians. Into these technicalities which properly come under the discussion of the *vyañjanā-vṛtti*, we need not enter; but it may be noted that *Abhinava* describes this *abhinivyakti*, which is taken as synonymous with *caryanā*,¹ as *vīta-vighna-prāpti* or cognition rendered free from obstacles. Following him, *Jagannātha* notes in this connexion: *vyaktiś ca bhagnāvaraṇā cit, yathā hi tarāvādinā plūto dīpas tan-nivṛttau sannihitān padārthān prakāśayati, svayam ca prakāśate, evam ātma-caitanyas vibhāvādi-saṁvalitān ratyūdin*. Similarly *caryanā* is described by the author of the *Prabhā* as *vibhāvādi-samūhālambanena ratyavacchinna caitanyābhinivyaktiś caryanā, jā ca bhagnāvaraṇā cit*. The cognition of *Rasa*, therefore, is a distinct realisation freed from all doubts and obstacles by means of the *vibhāva*s etc., which are accordingly designated

¹ *vyaktiś caryanant paryāyah*, Govinda, p. 62.

as *vighnāpasūra*¹. It is variously described as *camatkāra-nirveśa* (awakening of poetic charm), *rasanā* (relish) *āsvāda* (taste), *bhoga* (fruition) *saṃāpatti* (accomplishment), *laya* (fusion) and *viśrānti* (repose)².

The essence of Rasa, therefore, consists in its *āsvāda* or *carvanā* (*carvya*, *amanāka prāna*) which is *alaukika*, being incompassable by the ordinary processes of knowledge. It is a relish in which the Rasa alone apart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness, and it is therefore, described as a relish in which the contemplation of any other thing but Rasa itself is lost (*vigalita vedyāntara*) or which is free from the contact of aught else perceived (*vedyāntara-sparśa tūnya*), like the state of mind lost in the philosophic contemplation of Brahma. It is not capable of proof or designation and cannot be made known, because its perception is inseparable from its existence, or in other words, it is identical with the knowledge of itself³. The only proof of the existence of Rasa is its relish itself by the *sahridaya*⁴. It is therefore *sakala sahrdaya hrdaya samvedana sakjika* or in the words of Mammata *sakla sahrdaya saṃvādabhāṣa pramātra gocarikataḥ*. Although it is a very intimate relish *camatkāra* is supposed to constitute its life breath. This *camatkāra*, which has been compared to the 'wonder spirit' of modern critics is described by Viśvanātha as a kind of expanding of the mind of which another name is 'wonder' (*camatkāraś citta vistara rūpo viśmayāpara paryayah*) implying that the marvellous always underlies the Rasa (*tac camatkāra sūratye sarvatrāpy adbhūta rasah* under III 3) Jagannātha, however,

1 See Hemacandra p. 63 *sarvatha ratanātma veta v ghna prānti grahyo bhava eva rasah tatra vighnāpasūraḥ vibhava prabīṭayah* where the *vighnas* are enumerated as seven in number and discussed in detail.

2 *loke sakala vighna v nirmulā sahrvatur eva camatkāra n rveśa-rasanāsvadana bhoga-samāpatti laya viśrāntyādi śabda r abhikāṭyate* Hemacandra loc cit. following Abhinava.

3 Viśvanātha p. 20.

4 *Ibid* p. 26.

completes the idea by correlating this *camatkāra* with the *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti* of the Alankāra School who mean by it a special charm due to an act of imagination on the part of the poet (*kavi karma* or *kavi pratibhā*) underlying and constituting the essence of all poetic figures¹. The *camatkāra* therefore which is the essence of all poetic figures is also the essence of *Rasa* and has been defined² as a fact of our consciousness (*anubhava sākṣa*) consisting of extraordinary pleasure (*ānandāhlāda*) which depends on a concept formed by continued contemplation of itself.

The last step in this idea was taken by the attempt of bringing Poetry to the level of Religion by likening this aesthetic enjoyment to the ecstatic bliss of divine contemplation (*brahmānanda*). Viśvanātha sums up the idea briefly thus: 'The *Rasa* arising from the exaltation of *saṁā* (purity) indivisible self manifested made up of joy and thought in their identity free from the contact of aught else perceived akin to the realisation of *Brahma* the life whereof is super-mundane wonder is enjoyed by those competent in inseparableness (of the object from the realisation thereof) and as it were in its own shape'. It follows from this that the *pramāṇ* to whom alone this bliss is vouchsafed is like a *yogi* or devotee who deserves this preference through his accumulated merits (*puṇyānandā pramāṇanti yogivad rasa samitām*).

This in its general outlines is the *Rasa* theory as finally fixed by the *Dhvani* School and all later writers from Dhananjaya to Jagannātha accept this new interpretation and attempt to work it out in detail. Thus an endeavour was made not only to explain the concept of *Rasa* in terms of inward experience but also to absorb this idea of aesthetic delectation into the new theory of *Dhvani* and make it appli-

1 See Jacob: *Leber Begriff und Wesen der poetischen Figuren* in *GN* 1908 where this conception of an *alankāra* is explained. See also *Intro* to the *Vakroktī*, *ibid* S III De.

2 *Rasagangādhara* II 4 ed Bombay 1916.

3 *Saṁśodharan* I 23 ed Durgaprasāda II 27 f.

cable to poetry and the Rasa School properly so called began to merge from this time onwards into the dominant Dhvani School. Even Maṇimabhaṭṭa who attempted to demolish the Dhvani theory was forced to acknowledge Rasa and declare that on this point there is no difference of opinion between himself and the Dhvanikara¹, the only difference existing with regard to the function *par excellence* which should be operative in poetry. But the Dhvani School and its followers consider Rasa as an element of the unexpressed only, and though their theory which puts a great emphasis on *rasa-dhvani* practically leads to such a conclusion, both the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana are yet careful not to erect it into the very soul of poetry. From the theoretical standpoint at least they could not give exclusive preference to *rasa dhvani* however important it may be, for in their complete scheme of Poetics the unexpressed may also take the form of *vastu dhvani* and *alamkāra dhvani* and the centre of gravity in a poem may lie in its matter or in its poetic figure as well as in its Rasa. Abhinavagupta however appears to have attached little weight to these theoretical considerations, and brushing them aside he boldly brings forward the essentiality of Rasa declaring that there can be no poetry without Rasa (*na hi tacchūnyam kavyam kincid asti*²) because all poetry lives through *rasa* (*rasenaiva sarvam jivati kavyam*). He attempts however to reconcile the theoretical discrepancy by saying that although admittedly the unexpressed may also take the form of a *vastu* or an *alamkāra* these two kinds of suggestion resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of Rasa which is in fact the essence of poetry³. This opinion apparently led Viśvanātha to push the theory to its logical limit and formulate his somewhat extreme view that the Rasa alone constitutes the essence of poetry (13). But the

1 *kāvyaśāstram* rasād rupe na kanyasul mat h p 22

2 *Lacana* ■ 65

3 *rasa eva vastula śmā vastulamāśra-dhvan in sarvāṅha rasam*
prati paryavartate p 23

considerations which led the founders of the Dhvani theory to leave this view wisely unstated, could not be easily put out of the way. and Jagannatha objects on this very ground. The definition of poetry given by Viśvanatha he says, cannot be accepted, because thereby poetry in which the central charm lies in the matter or in the poetic figure (e.g. in professedly descriptive and ornamental poetry) would be entirely excluded and such an exclusion is not warranted either by theory or by the practice of great poets. Viśvanātha anticipates this objection by saying that in these cases there is a semblance of Rasa (*rasabhāsa*) and the verse given in *Dhvanyaloka* p. 20 as an instance of *varuṇa dhvani* is in his opinion, admissible because there is a touch of Rasa (*rasa sparsa*) and not because mere *vyāṅgya varuṇa* can constitute the essence of poetry. Jagannatha replies that nothing is gained by this clumsy subterfuge of an indirect reference to Rasa because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like 'the cow moves' or 'the deer leaps'. This cannot be taken as a criterion because thereby any and every content of poetry would be reduced to the position of a *vibhāva anubhāva* or *vyabhicāra bhāva* of the Rasa.¹ Jagannatha himself one of the latest writers on the subject, therefore tries to solve the difficulty by studiously avoiding all mention of Rasa in his definition of poetry, although in theory he, like Viśvanatha adheres in the main to the views of the Dhvani School. Jagannatha mentions as many as eight different theories about Rasa (p. 28), but the existence of so many conflicting views as well as the fact that Rasa cannot be taken as the essence of all poetry, makes him define poetry as *ramanyartha pratipadakah śabdah* inasmuch as all theorists agree that Rasa, which cannot be manifested without an accompanying state of joy conveys a peculiar *ramanyata* essential to poetry.² It will be noticed there-

1 See on this point *Saṁkhyādarpaṇa* pp. 16 f and *Rasa gaṅgā dīpa* pp. 1-3. Cf. also Govinda *Pradīpa* ed. Kāvya-māla 1912, p. 11.

2 *Itiha* h. *nānā pārijātibh* *śemūtibh* *nānā rūpatyā* *ś* *asito p*.

fore, that recognition was refused to any attempt, like that of Viśvanātha, to develop the theory further out of itself; and the views of the Dhvani School, as represented later by Maṇi-maṭa, became in spite of many attempts at improvement in detail, a kind of canonical code for all future time.

In spite of this unquestioned dominance of the Dhvani School, which amply recognised Rasa but regarded it as one of the phases of the unexpressed in poetry, one class of writers still adhered to Rasa as the only element worth considering in poetry, although they never theoretically discussed the position like Viśvanātha, and built up a system on its basis. Of all the Rasas, however, as *śṛṅgāra* or love forms the absorbing theme of Sanskrit poetry and drama in general, and as this particular poetic mood possesses an almost universal appeal, these writers naturally work out the *śṛṅgāra* in all its detail, and we have in consequence a body of erotico-rhetorical treatises, of which the earliest and the most remarkable is Rudrabhaṭṭa's *Śṛṅgāra nīlaka*, one of whose avowed objects (15) is to apply the idea of Rasa, already discussed in connexion with the drama by Bharata and others, to the case of poetry. Following upon this we have Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, cited by Vidyādhara (p. 98) and Kumārasvāmin (p. 221),¹ which deals with the subject in the usual elaborate cyclopaedic manner of its author, with profuse illustrations of every phase of the sentiment, in no less than twenty chapters. After this come innumerable works of a similar nature, which take Rasa, especially *śṛṅgāra*, as their principal theme, and which were composed with the apparent object of guiding the poet in the composition of erotic pieces so popular and profuse in Sanskrit poetry. Of these the *Bhāva prakāśa* of Śāradātanaya, which produces the substance of most of the chapters of

*manuśibhūṭa paramahīdaiṇabhaṭṭaṭīyā pratyamaṇaḥ prapocce'amin
raso ramanīyaidm avahatīlī nirvradam*, p. 29

1 A MS of this work has been acquired by the Madras Govt Oriental MSS Library, and V Raghavan has given an extensive account, based on this MS, of this work in his *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* vol. 1 (in 2 pts.), Bombay 1940.

formalism there is an unmistakable attempt to do justice to facts not only as they appear to experience but to the observation of general poetic usage. In the elaborate working out of the general thesis that the Rasa is evolved on the basis on one or other of what they call the permanent mental moods with the help of various emotional adjuncts, the writers on Poetics have proceeded a long way in the careful analysis of poetic emotions, the psychology of which bears an intimate relation to their theory and in itself deserves separate study.

A new turn was given to the theory by Rūpa Gosvamin's *Ujvala nīlāmam* which brings erotic religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of Rasa. It attempts to deal with Rasa in terms of the Vaiṣṇava idea of *ujjala* or *madhura rasa* by which is meant the *sringara rasa* the term *ujjala* being apparently suggested by Bharata's description of that Rasa¹. The *madhura rasa*, however is represented not in its secular aspect but primarily as a phase of *bhakti rasa* (*madhurākhyo bhakti rasah* 1 3), for the Vaiṣṇava theology admits five Rasas as forming roughly the five degrees or aspects of the realisation of Bhakti or faith, viz. *śānta* (tranquillity), *dasya* (also called *prīti* servitude or humility), *sakhya* (also called *preyas* friendship or equality), *vatsalya* (parental affection) and *madhurya* (sweetness). The last also called the *ujjala rasa* being the principal is termed *bhakti rasa raj** and constitutes as such, the subject matter of the present treatise. The *kṛpā rati* or the love of Kṛpā forms the *sthayi bhava* of this Rasa and the recipient here is not the literary *sahridaya* but the *bhakti*

1 *yat kūrṇat lake śānta madhyam ujjaśaśi dardantyaṁ va sa: chakragatopamīyate* ed. Gresset pp. 89-90

2 1 2 explained by Rūpa Gosvamin as *śānta prīti preya vātsalya ujjala namoṣṭi mukhyeṣu sa evajjalāpara paryāyo bhakti rasānām rajā madhurākhyo rasah* ed. Kāvyaśilā p. 3

the faithful.¹ This *sthāyī bhāva* known as *madhura ratī* which is the source of this particular Rasa is defined in terms of love of Kṛṣṇa², and the nature of the Nayaka and Nayikā is defined in the same manner and their feelings and emotions illustrated by examples adduced from poems dealing with the love stories of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. The work is therefore essentially a Vaiṣṇava religious treatise presented in a literary garb taking Kṛṣṇa as the ideal hero with the caution however that what is true of Kṛṣṇa as the hero does not apply to the ordinary secular hero (i 18 20)

APPENDIX

[We give in the following pages the relevant text of Abhinavagupta's commentary on Bharata ch vi with reference to his famous Sūtra on Rasa referred to in this monograph. The passage gives a learned summary of the various theories on Rasa obtaining in Abhinava's time. Most of it has been as we have noticed appropriated by Hemacandra in his commentary on his own *Āḍyānuśaṅga* (p 57f). Manuscripts of Abhinava's commentary are by no means plentiful and so far two copies are known to be in existence one of which is now in the Trivandrum Palace Library and the other in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras. Our text is based on a Devanāgarī transcript procured for us by Mr Gaṅganāth Jha presumably from the Trivandrum MS. The text offered here being based on such imperfect material is indeed deficient and unsatisfactory in many places but it is

1 s ādyā ā īdā bhaktānām ānī ā sra anām bhil |
 eṣā kṛṣṇa ratī ī sthāyī bhāva bhakti rasa bhāva cīti

c text by J va Gosvām n p 4

2 *madhuraśhāyā ratī lakṣaṇam cōktam—*

m āha cī mṛgāśhāyā cī āsī bhāgavādī āśraṇam |

madhura ā pāpāya prīyatākī yodī rā ratī h |

śbid loc c 1

published in this tentative form out of a consideration of its importance. We have noted some readings from the Madras MS also '}

एतन्नेति शीतल्लुक् । विभावाद्ययोरे स्थायिनो लिङ्गत्वादेनाजगत्समुपपत्तेः , भावाना पूर्वमगिषेवताप्रसङ्गात् , स्थितदशायां सत्तुष्टान्तरवैकल्यात् भन्दतर-समपाप्यस्थायान्त्वापत्तेः , हासरत्वे⁶ योढात्वाभावप्राप्तेः , कामापस्थानु-दशस्तसहस्रसभावादिप्रसङ्गात् , शोकस्य प्रथमतीव्रत्व-कालात्तु मान्यदर्शनम् , शोभोत्साहरतीनाममयैस्त्वैयमेवाविपर्यये हासदर्शयमिति विपर्ययस्य हस्यमानत्वाच्च । रास्त्राच्चेतुभिर्विभावाहये कार्येऽनुभावात्मनि संहचारिरूपैश्च स्वभित्तिरिभि-प्रयोजार्जिततया कृत्तिरैरपि तथानिमित्तमन्यमानैरनुकृत्यस्थत्वेन लिङ्गयत्तत् प्रतीय-मानं स्थायी भावो मुख्यरागादिगतस्याप्यनुकरणरूपत्वादेव च नामान्तरेण व्यपदिष्टो रत्त । विभावा हि काव्यबलादनुसंधेयाः , अनुभावा विज्ञात , स्वभित्तिरिण कृत्तिमन्निजानुमायार्जनवत्त्वात् । स्थायी तु काव्यपलादपि नानुसंधेयः । रति शोक इत्यादयो हि शब्दा रत्तादिभ्यश्चैवोक्तुर्वन्त्यमि-यातयेन , न तु वाचिकमिगपक्षयत्तत्वात्प्रममन्ति । न हि वागेष वाचिभ्यम् , अपि तु तया निर्दृष्टम् , शत्रौरिपतिरम् । केन—‘शत्रवेनैव जज्ञपि शोक शोभेन धीयते’ इति । तथा—‘शत्रवेन कृतसम्भस्रया स्थितो यो-ऽनवस्त्रिताभे’⁷ इत्येवमादौ न शोकोऽभिनेयोऽपि त्वमिभेयः । ‘भाति पतितो तिलगन्ता’⁸ इत्यनेन तु वाक्येन स्वार्थमभिदधता उदयनश्च सुतसना रति-स्यामिभावोऽभिनीयते , न रूप्यते⁹ । अयमयमनराक्षिर्भाभितयन वाचकत्वा-दन्त्या । अतएव स्थायिवद् सूत्रे भिन्नविमङ्गिभ्यश्च नोपात्तम् । केन रति-विश्विमाया रटज्ज्वर इति तदारम्भक्य तदप्रभवत्वं च युक्तम् । अर्थद्विधापि भिन्नाङ्गानादृष्टाः । न चात नर्तक एव सुलोकि प्रतिपत्तिः , नाप्ययमेव राम

6 भाष्यपाठ्ये ४।११

7 ‘विश्रान्ताजगत्त्रायेऽपि दुःखोऽपि नशानरि’ इत्ययं पूर्वाभेदः ।

8 यत्तं पूर्वाभेदतद् अयमन्ते तद्विज्ञेयं प्रतीयते , तथापि तु तत्र “वद-सुदृढनयनार्वादिदुःखमभ्यर्थात् कश्चिन्” इत्युपपत्त्यर्थः ।

9 ‘भाति पतितो तिलगन्तास्तथा रात्र्यामनुशोकरकचोव ।

स्वेदोऽयं ह्य करतलसंस्पर्शादिषु नैव गतिः ॥’

इति अयमन्तः पूर्विपत्तिवोऽप्युक्तः ।

10 न रूप्यते इति यदायादयश्चक्षते ।

इति । न चाप्ययं न सुखीति, न चापि तत्सदृश इति । किंतु यं सुखी
रामोऽमायश्मिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति । तदाह—

प्रतिभाति न संदेहो न तत्र न विपर्ययः ।

धीरसावयमिलस्त्रि नासावेवायमप्यपि ॥

विरुद्धवृद्धिरभेदाद्विवेचिततद्भवः ।

पुरुषा पयमुपुज्येत स्फुरन्नुजय कथा ॥ इति ।

तदिदमप्यन्तर्गतवस्तुस्य विमर्शममिदमुपाध्याय ११ ।

तथा हि—अनुसूक्तस्यो रस इति श्रुत्यते तद् किं सामान्यिकप्रतीतिभिः
प्राप्येतेषां नटाभिप्रायेण ? किं वा वस्तुप्रतिषेधकस्यास्त्यक्तुद्विषयमवशम्यनेन ?
यदाहुर्व्याख्यातारः स्वयमेव विवेचयन्तीति । अथ मरतमुनिवचनानुसारेण तत्रास्य
पक्षोऽसंगतः । किमिदं प्रमाणेनोपलब्धं तदनुकरणमिति शक्यं वक्तुम् । यथा
—एवमस्मीं श्रुतं विवर्तते श्रुतापानानुकरणत्वेन यथापानं प्रत्यक्षावलोकिता प्रति-
भाति । इह च नटगतं किं तदुपलम्ब्य तदनुकरणतया भातीति चिन्त्यम् । तच्छ-
रीरं तन्निष्ठं प्रतिस्तीर्यकमिदं शोभाभग्नदिकादि मुद्राक्षेपसंनयप्रभृति घट्टक्षेप
कटाक्षादिकं च न रतेधितप्रतिरूपतवानुकारत्वेन कस्यचित् प्रतिभाति । अस्त्येन
निम्नैर्द्विषयमाश्रित्येन भिन्नाधिकरणत्वेन च ततोऽतिवैलक्षण्यत्वात् । मुद्रानामुभ्यां
बलोक्त्यै च तदनुकरणप्रतिभातो न च रामगता रतिमुपलम्ब्यपूर्विष्ठं केचित् ।
एतेन रामानुकारी नट इत्यपि निरस्तं प्रवादः ।

अथ नटगता वितरतिरेव प्रतिपन्ना तटी रत्ननुकार रत्नद्वार इत्युभयो
तत्रापि किमात्मकत्वेन सा प्रतीयत इति चिन्त्यम् । ननु प्रमदादिभिः कारणैः
कटाक्षादिभिः कार्यैर्घट्टादिभिश्च सद्धारिभिर्निप्रभूतैर्वा लौकिको कार्यरूपो कारण
रूपो सद्धारिरूपा च चित्तमिति प्रतीतियोग्या, तदस्त्यत्वेन सा नटचित्तराति
प्रतिभाति । इदं तर्हि रत्नाकारेणैव सा प्रतिपन्नेति दूरे रत्ननुकरणतावाचो-
युक्तिः ।

कृत, स उत्तरतु स्थावरो चर्चयिष्यते । तस्मात्तामानिच्छतीत्यनुसारेण
स्याप्यनुकरणं रस इत्यसत् । न चापि नटयेत्य प्रतिपत्तिराम तस्मिन् प्रति-
बानुबरोमीति । तदनुकरणं हि तावदनुकरणमुपलब्धप्रवृत्तीनां^{१४} न शक्यं
कर्तुम् ।

अथ पञ्चाक्षरानुकरणं तन्मोकेऽप्यनुहरणात्मिकेति प्रसङ्गाः । अथ न
नियतस्य कस्यचिदनुसारेऽपि कृतमप्रकृते शोच्यनुकरोति, तर्हि केनेति विन्त्यम् ।
न तावच्छोचनेन, तस्य तदभावात् । न चाधुपातादिना शोरम्यानुहार,
तद्वैलक्षण्यादित्युक्तम् । इयत्तु स्यादुत्तमप्रकृतेयं शोचानुभावस्याननुकरोमीति ।
तस्यापि कस्योत्तमप्रकृते ? यस्य कस्यचिदि चेत्, सोऽपि विशिष्टतां विना कथं
बुद्धावरोपयितुं शक्यः । य एवं रोदसीति चेत्, सात्मापि मध्ये नटस्यानु-
प्रविष्ट इति गतितोऽनुकार्यानुकर्मभेदः । ॥ ३ ॥ अ, नट शिष्टावशात्तदभावा-
त्स्मरणाक्षितवृत्तिमाधारस्वीभावेन हृदयसत्त्वादात्तं वैयल्यनुभावात् प्रदर्शयन्
काम्यगमुचितकापुत्रमृत्पुष्पलोकारेण नटयेत्येतत् इत्येतावन्मात्रेऽस्य प्रतीतिर्न
स्तनुकारं वेदयते । अन्तर्देशानुधारवदि न राम^{१५}चेदितस्यानुकारः । एतस्य
प्रपमाप्यायेऽपि दक्षितमभ्यासि । नापि वस्तुवृत्तानुसारेण वदनुकारत्वम्,
अनुसंश्लेषमानस्य वस्तुवृत्तानुपपत्तेः । अथ वस्तुवृत्तं तद्दर्शयिष्याम । न च
मुनिवचननेवमिषमस्ति कश्चिद् स्वाग्यनुकरणं रस इति । नापि तिर्यग्मन्त्रा^{१६}
मुनेरुपलभ्यते । प्रयुक्तं प्रवचनतात्पर्यमिष्यन्तासाहचर्यवीक्षणं निष्पत्त्यादिविपर्यये
तिष्ठति । तस्यैवाप्यावाप्ते विततिष्यामः । अस्तद्धीपानुकरणमित्याद्यन्यथापि
शक्यमननिकमिति तदनुसारेऽपि अ, अ^{१७}नामांतरं अन्तर्देशयत्यनुहरणादौ ।
यस्योच्यते—वर्णनैर्हरितास्तादिभिर्भयुज्यमान एव गौरित्तादि, तत्र यथमिष्यग-
मान इत्यर्थोऽभिप्रेतस्तदसम् । न हि मित्रादिभिर्पारमार्थिको गौरिति

व्यस्यते प्रदीपादिभिरिव¹⁸ । किं तु तत्परास्तु समूहविशेषो निवर्त्यते । उप-
दि हि हिन्दुरादयो गनावयवसन्निवेशसदृशेन सन्निवेशविशेषेणावस्थिता भोक्तृगति-
प्रतिभासस्य विषय, नैवं विभाव्यादिसमूहो रविवरसताप्रविभाज्य । नन्माद्वावा-
वरणं रश्मि इत्यसत् ।

येन एवमप्यपि—मुनदु सजननशङ्खिमुक्ता विदयतामग्नी बाणैव मोहयन्त्या
मुनदु सत्यमायो रत, तस्यो च ताम्बग्यां दत्तस्थानीया विभावा भस्करा,
अनुभासम्यमिवारिण श्वायिनस्तु तन्नामघीजन्या आन्तरा मुनदु सत्यगावा
इति, तेन स्वाविभावानुरगतमिषादाद्युपचार¹⁹ गन्धोर्द्धवा ग्रन्थविरोध स्वयमेव
बुध्यमानेन ह्युपस्थाविष्मरणमोर्ध्वार्ध प्राभाशिमे जन परिरक्षित इति चिन्तस्यते ।
यत्तत्स्य न प्रतीतिवैषम्यप्रसङ्गादि तत्किं वदस्येति चेत् ।

भट्टनाथचरित्राह—रमो न प्रदीप्यते, नोत्पद्यते, नानिम्यग्यते । स्वगतत्वेन
हि प्रदीप्यते कथं नु क्षित्वा स्यात् । न च वा प्रतीतिर्युक्ता सीतादेरविभान-
त्वात्, अस्मन्तास्मत्त्वस्येदनात्, देवतादौ न साधारणीकरणदीर्घत्वात्,
तत्प्रसङ्गनादेरुपाधारत्वात् । न च तत्त्वतो रागस्य स्पृधि, अनुपलब्धत्वात् ।
न च शाब्दानुमानादिभ्यस्तत्प्रतीतो लोकेन सरसता प्रयुक्ता प्रसङ्गाविष ।
नाप्यनुगतजनकभावे हि प्रयुक्त तन्मात्रगुणास्पृहादिसोचितचित्ताद्य-तरोदवम-
प्यप्रतयामाह²⁰ त्वमथापि स्यात् तत्र । प्रतीतिरनुभवस्मृतादिरपि रमस्य
मुक्ता । उत्पत्तायपि तुल्यमेतदुच्यते । शक्तिरूपत्वेन पूर्वं स्थितस्य पश्चादभिम्यक्तौ
विद्यमानादारम्भपरिणतिः । स्वगतत्वपरगतत्वादिति च पूर्वद्विचिन्त्यम् । अस्मा-
त्काम्ये दोषाभावमुपलक्ष्यकारकत्वत्तत्त्वज्ञेय, भाव्ये चतुर्विधभिनयहर्षेण, निबिड-
निजमोहसक्तमिवारक्तकारिणा विभाव्यादिसाधारणीकरणतामनाविधातौ द्वितीये
भावेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसोऽनुभवास्पृहादिविलक्षण, रसस्यो-

18 प्रतिपादिभि इति नुच्यते ।

19 'स्वाविभावान् रसलक्षणव्याध द्वादाद्युपचार' इति शेषपदस्य
पठः ।

20 'नवरात्राकारप्रसन्नमयाभि' इति चिन्तित्वातो मूलपदस्येति ।

अनुपेयवैचित्र्यरसादुपिविहसवित्सारलक्षणेन, सत्कोदेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिज-
सविद्विधान्तिष्ठलक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादमभिधेन भोगेन पर भुज्यते इति ।²¹

तल्ल पूर्वोच्योऽयं महोच्छ्रयदानभङ्गपद्मादेन नाभ्युपगत इति तदुपगमनु-
स्थानोपगमेव । प्रतीत्यादिव्यतिरिक्त्य एवारे को भोग इति न विद्य । रसेनेति
चेत्, साप्यत प्रतिवर्तितेव । रेषमभ्युपगमैलक्षणाप्रामाण्यं प्रतिपद्यता
दर्शनाभ्युपगमिभ्युपगमितिप्रतिमानादिनाप्रामाण्यवत् । निष्ठादनाभिव्यक्तिद्वया-
नभ्युपगमे च निष्ठा वास्तव्या इति न तुल्योपा- इति स्यात् । न चाप्रतीति-
वस्तवसि ध्यवहारे योग्यम् । अथोच्यते प्रतीतिरिति रसस्य भोगीकरणम्, तत्र
रसादित्वरूपम्, उच्यते । तथापि न ताव मातृम् । भावन्तो हि रसास्वादनन्त
एव रमन्तात्मन प्रतीतयो भोगीकरणलभावा । गुणानां आभासिनैविम्य-
मननमसकल्पमिति का निरपेक्षेयता ।

भावनाभाव्य एषोऽपि श्रुतादिगणो मतः²² ।

इति । अस्माभ्येन भाव्यन्ते रसा इत्युच्यते तत्र विभावादिजनितवर्णना-
त्मकास्वादरूपप्रत्ययोचरतापादनमेव यदि भावनं तदभ्युपगम्यत एव । यत्तुम् —

सत्वेदनाख्यव्यङ्ग्य[सु] परतवित्तोचर* ।

आलादनात्मातुभावो रसः काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥

इति, तल्ल ध्यजमानतया व्यङ्ग्यो लक्ष्यते । अनुनदेन च एक्षिपम इति
मन्तव्यम् । नन्वेव कथं रसतत्त्वम् ? आलां रि कुर्म ।

आलायमिदे किमपूर्वमेतत्

सविद्विक्तासेऽधिगताममित्यम् ।

21 काट्यासीकलीली (पृ ६०-६८) एवमन्तव्यमाख्यानं दृश्यते ।

22 अविभा नावना भाव्या तल्लोकोक्तमेव य ।

अविभावायतां याते अन्तर्भावतल्लोकोक्तं तल्ल ॥

भावनाभाव्य एषोऽपि श्रुतादिगणो मतः ।

तल्लोकोक्ततत्त्वमेव व्याख्येयं विद्विषातः ॥

इति शेषवन्तस्तु अन्तर्भावतल्लोकोक्तमेव ।

इत्थं स्वप्नाग्रमहाहंते
 इन्तेन किं कृत्यता न शोकः ॥
 कृष्णार्धमाद्यं यदर्थतः
 धीं परयति धान्तिर्मयंदयन्ता ।
 अतः तदायं परिचलितानां
 विषयगोचनरंघराणाम् ॥
 चित्रं निरासम्बन्धमेव मन्ये
 प्रमेयचिदां प्रथमावतारम् ।
 तन्मात्रानामिह स्मृतिः सैमुबन्ध-
 भुरप्रतिष्ठादि न विसर्वाय ॥
 तन्मात्रमात्रं न इतिष्ठानि
 मतामिह तन्मात्रं नु सोचिष्ठानि ।
 पूर्वप्रतिष्ठापितयोऽत्रमात्रं
 मूलप्रतिष्ठापितमात्रमिति ॥

तर्कव्युत्पत्तिम्—परिगृह्यतस्वप्नमेव मुनिना, न त्वत्वं चिन्तिन् । तथा ह्यह—
 काम्यार्थो भावयन्तीति तत् काम्यार्थो रतः । तथा हि—“उक्तीरासते तानमी
 प्रादात्” (तै भा) इत्यादी अर्थितादिकविवक्षाधिकारिण प्रतिपत्तिर्मात्रादिति-
 त्वस्योचितम्²³ प्रथमप्रकृत-द्वन्द्वमधिकैवोपात्तप्रकृतिरुत्कारेणैव भास्ते ।
 प्रवृत्तीत्यादिरुपा तन्मात्रादिसमावा । तथा इत्थं प्रति भाव्यादिविषयुद्देशादि-
 भावनिर्णयवृत्ता प्रतिपत्तिरप्येव काम्यप्रकृतादि शब्दादधिकारिणोऽधिकारिणि
 प्रतिपत्तिः । अधिकारी चात्र विमलप्रतिमानरातिहृदयः । तस्य च ‘श्रीवा-
 म्हाविष्णुम्’²⁴ इति, ‘तमापि नोत्तातम्’²⁵ इति, ‘हरत्तु चिन्तिन्’²⁶ इत्यादि
 वाक्येष्वेव वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिरनन्तरं मानमी साक्षात्कारात्मिका अपहृतितत-
 त्वनिर्माणकालादिविभागा लालयतीतिरुपायवत् । तस्यायं यो मृग्योतसादि-

23 प्रतिपत्तिमात्रादितोत्र इत्यादि भटाचार्यभट्टकभेदस्थाने ।

24 अग्निप्रवृत्तकृत्यते ॥१०

25 सुमरयन्मे ॥११

26 तत्रैव ॥१३

भति तस्य विशेषस्त्वभावाद्भीतिः" इति माहक्यापारमार्थिकत्वाद्भयमेव पर
देशकालादनास्तित्तितम् । ततएव भीतोऽहं भीतोऽयं शत्रुर्वयस्यो मध्यम्यो
प्रेसादिप्रत्ययेभ्यो दुःखसुखादिकृतहानादिषु द्रव्यन्तरोदयनियमवतया विप्रबहुलोभ्यो
विलक्षण निविग्रप्रतीतिप्रकाशा साक्षादिव हृदये निधीयमानं वस्तुपौरिव विपरिवर्त
मानं भयानको रसः । तथाविधे हि भवे नमसा तित्स्फुरतो निविरोपत उज्जितित ।
एव परोऽपि । ततएव न परिमितमेव साधारण्यमपि तु विततम् । अस्मिन्मह
इह धूमाभ्योर्मयधूमपौरिव वा । तदस्य साक्षात्काराभ्यामत्यपोषिका नृणादि
सामग्री । यस्या वस्तुसत्ता काव्यापिताना च देशकालप्रमाणादीनां नियमहेतू
नामन्योन्यसम्बन्धवत्त्वादित्यन्तमपसरणे स एव च साधारणीयमानं सुतरां दुष्यति ।
अतएव स्वसामाजिककामाभेक्यवर्णेन प्रतिपत्ते सुतय रसपरिपोषाय सर्वेषामनादि
वासनाविशोक्तवनेतसा वासनसमादात् ।

सा धावित्रा समिक्कम्कारः । तस्योऽपि कम्पपुङ्खकोलस्रगदिनिकार
धमत्कारः । यथा

अनं बिहरी क्कम्पइ चहक्क वि ए मवरेण कतिमाद ।

यदकलाचदसस्रधमाह लच्छीइ मगाइ ॥

तथा हि—स आतुस्मिन्तिरेकेणाच्छिन्नो भीमावेश इत्युच्यते । भुजानस्याद्भुत
भोगस्पर्शानिद्रस्य च मन करणं बलत्कार इति । स च साक्षात्काररूपावो
मानसाप्यवसायो वा सप्रसवो वा स्फुटित्वां स्यात्वेन स्फुरन्नस्तु । यदाह

रम्याणि वीक्ष्य सधुरांधं दिशम्य शब्दान्

पशुं त्युक्ते भवति यस्तुतिर्योऽपि ननु ।

तन्मे तदा स्मरति नूनमनोधपूर्वं

भावस्थितानि जननामंतरसौहृदानि ॥²⁷

इत्यादि सर्वथा सानदेवा प्रतीतिरास्तादात्मा, यस्यां रतिरेव भाति । अतएव
विरोधान्तरानुपहितत्वात् सा रसनीया सती न लीविकीति, न मिथ्या, नाति-

27 'विशेषककथाभाद' इति पठ्यादादंजायके पाठः ।

28 'अभिज्ञानककुल्ले' १३१+४ । 'आरक्षितारवि' इति प्रक्षिप्तं पाठः ।

मोच्या, न संविस्तुन्वा, न तदारोपादिस्था । उयैव घोषचयावस्थागु देराप-
नियन्त्रणात्, अतुकारोऽप्यनुभावात्तुगमितवा करणात्, विषयसामग्र्यमपि
भगदु विज्ञानवादावसम्भनात् ।

सर्वथा रसनात्मकव्योतविप्रायतीतिप्राप्ती भाव एव रसः । सत विप्राप-
सारका विभाषप्रवृत्तयः । तथा हि लीके गत्सविप्रविनिर्मुक्ता संवित्तिरेव
व्यमत्कारनिर्देशरसनात्वादनमौचस्तमापतित्वविधाम्नादिस्थाप्यैरभिधीयते । विद्या-
स्थासो प्रतिपत्तावयोग्यता मंभावनाविरहो मम्म, क्षमतात्त्वपरगतत्वनिवर्त्तनेन पैरा-
कालविरोपावेशः, निजगुणादिविषयीभावः, प्रतीत्युपायैर्यस्यम्, स्फुटावामाषः,
अप्रधानता, संरुच्योग्य । तथाहि—सर्वियमसंभावयमानः संवेदे संविदे निदेश-
यितुं न शक्नोति । अस्त विधाम्तिरिति प्रपमो विप्रः । तदप्यारो
हृदपसंवादोऽशोभ्यमान्यस्तुविषयः । अज्ञोपसामान्येषु चेटितेषु अस्मिन्नि-
प्रसिद्धिनिजगतादहृदप्रत्ययप्रसरकारिप्रवृत्ताद्युत्तमादिनामधेयपरिग्रहः । अतएव
नि सामान्योक्त्यैऽपि दैतद्युत्पत्तिप्रबोजने नाटकादी प्रख्यातवस्तुविषयत्वादि-
नियमेन निरूपयिष्यते । न तु ग्रहस्तनादायेत्येव क्षावसर एव वचयाम इत्यास्तां
हापत् ।

स्वैरुपगतानो च सुखदुःखसंविदास्मात्वादे कथासंभव' तत्पणमनीरुतया वा
तत्परिप्लव्यमवतया वा तत्सदृशोमिजीपया वा तस्मिन्नातया वा तत्प्रविष्ट्या-
पयिपया वा तद्गोपनेच्छया वा प्रवृत्तान्तरेण वा संवेदवान्तरसमुद्भूत एव एरमो
विप्रः । 'परगतत्वनिष्कमताज्जासपि सुखदुःखानां संवेदने निष्पन्नेन स्थान्यनि
सुखदुःखमोहमाभ्युत्थादिसंविदन्तरोद्गमनसंभावनादवश्यभावी विप्रः । तदपा-
कारो "कार्ये नातिप्रसंगोऽज्ञे"त्यादिना पूर्वज्ञानिगूढनेन प्रज्ञावनालोचनेन च यो
नटहृदपायिगमन्तसुर'सरः प्रतिशीर्षकजिना तत्पच्छादनप्राप्तोऽभ्युपायः, अली-
विप्रभाषादिमेदलास्यात्तस्मिन्नीठमएवप्रयत्नकृत्वादिपरिमहनाव्यर्थसंदिह्यतः । तस्मिन्
हि तस्यैवास्तेन एवस्यैव च सुखदुःखं चेति न भवति, प्रतीक्सिरूपस्य निरुबाद्-
पान्तरस्य नातोपितस्य प्रतिमार्गविद्विधान्तिवैकल्पेन सारूपे विधान्ताभावात् ।
मज्जम्, तदीयगतिद्वयमात्र एव पर्यवगातात् । तथाहि—आसीनराज्यपुष्प-

यदिहनादि²⁹ लोके न दृश्यम् । न च तत्र किञ्चिद्व्यतिरेकस्याव्यवस्थित्यादिति न एव
रागं मुनिना साधारणीभावसिद्धरसत्वं लोभयोगित्वेन परित्यज्यन्त समाधित
इति तत्रैव स्पृष्टीभविविषयीति तदिह तावज्जोष्यमनीयम् । तत स एष
स्वरनियततया विभाषसंरक्षणप्रसङ्गे न्याय्यात् ।

निजमुखादिविदशभासुष कथं वस्तुनन्तरे सविद् विधाययेदिति तत्तत्पुद्-
व्यपोदनाय प्रतिपदार्थनिष्ठै साधारण्यमहिम्ना सञ्जलभोग्यत्वसङ्गिणुभि
राब्दादिविषयमयीभिरातोद्यमानविच्छिन्नमण्डपपदविदग्धश्लिष्टादिभिरुपरजन समा-
धितम् । यैनाह्वयोऽपि हृदयवैमल्यप्राप्त्या सङ्गवशीक्रियते । जह्म हि—दृश्य
श्रव्य चेति । किं च—प्रतीत्युपायानाम्भावे कथं प्रतीति स्फुटयतीति
तत्कारिणोऽस्तिप्रसङ्गमेव न प्रतीतिर्विश्राम्यति, स्फुटप्रतीतिरूपप्रसङ्गोचित
प्रत्ययसाक्षाद्भूत्वात् । यथाहुः—‘सर्वा यथ प्रमिति प्रत्यक्षपरा’ इति ।
समाप्तादकृते आध्यानुमानशतैरपि अन्येन्यथाभावस्य स्वसंकेतात् । अस्मात्
बलादौ माह्वात्कारान्तरेणैव वस्तवता तद्वधारणादिति लौकिकत्वादयः कम ।
तस्मात्तदुभयविप्रविषाद्येऽभिन्नमवोभक्तवर्मिगतिप्रवृत्त्युपसृष्टता सममिपिप्यन्ते ।
अभिनयन हि सारसद्विद्वन्वापारविस्तृतमेव प्रत्यक्षवापारक्षणमिति विधेयम् ।

अप्राधाने च वस्तुनि कथं सविद्भिधायि तस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रधानान्तर
प्रत्ययुपायत सात्मनि अविधायित्वात् । अतोऽप्रधानत्वं यदे विभावानु-
भाववर्गे व्यभिचारिनिषये च सविदात्मकेऽपि नियमेन नान्यमुत्तरेदिशि³⁰
सम्भवतीति सदतिरिक्तं त्वाभ्येव । तथा न सर्वथाप्राप्तं तस्य पुष्ट्यर्थनिष्ठा
काचित् नमिद इति प्रधानम् । तद्वत्—एति कामतदनुपपत्तिप्रमाणनिष्ठा,
श्लोभस्तरग्रधानैष्वर्गनिष्ठ कामवर्गैष्वर्गवसितोऽप्युत्साहः, समस्तधर्मादिपद-
वहितसत्त्वज्ञाननितनिर्बेदप्राग्विभावो योद्योपाय इति तावदेव प्रधानम् ।
यद्यपि चैवासम्पन्नोऽप्य गुणभावोऽस्ति तथापि तत्तत्प्रधाने रूपके तत्प्रधान
सम्भवतीति हृदयमेदपर्यायेण सर्वेषां प्रधानान्वयेषा लक्ष्यते । अदूरमाणादिनिविष्ट-

29 भरतनाट्यशास्त्रे १८।१७० दशरूपके १।४७-४८ साहित्यदर्पणे १।११५

30 भाष्यसुखप्रवेशि इति पाठो मूलप्रसङ्गे ।

रसा स्वेरन्मिदमपि रूपके दृष्टम् प्राधान्यम् । सत सर्वेऽपि गुणप्रधानाः,
स्वमिदमर्थरूपस्यैक्यनस्य प्रथमास्थानन्दसारवादात् ।

तथा हि—एवमनयोवमविधरेणोऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोचन्य इदमविधान्तिरन्त-
रायस्यविधान्तिरारोस्तादविधान्तिरूपवैव दुःखम् । सत एव काचित्तरं रास्य
चायवपयेय प्राणत्वेनोक्तं रजोहृतितां वदन्तिस्त्वनन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् । किं
तुपरकपरिपयपतातेपामपि कटुं किं भाति स्वसौ बीरस्य । स हि हेरा-
सहिष्णुतादिप्राण एव । एव' रसादीनां प्राधान्यम् । हासदीनां तु
सातितनं सपततोवमुक्तभविमावतयेपरजवत्वमिति प्राधान्यम् । अतएवा-
मुक्तमप्रकृतिषु हासादयो बाहुल्येन भवन्ति । पामर्याय सर्वेऽपि हसति
शोचति परनिन्दाभाद्रियते, स्वल्पमुमायितयेन च सर्वत विस्वयते । रसापन्न-
तया तु पुमर्थोऽयोगितमपि ह्यारेपाम् । गुणदृष्टप्रपात्रभावकृत एव च दरास्प-
कादिभेद इति वक्ष्याम । इत्यादि' चैतावतामेव । आत एव हि जन्तुरिय-
तामि सविद्धि परीतो भवति । तथा हि—“दुःखसंज्ञेपनिद्वेधी सुधा-
सादनतादर” इति न्यायेन सर्वो रिरसया न्यासः । स्वात्मनुकर्ममानितया
परमुपहृतममीदृशविभोगसत्ताल्लहेतुषु कीपपरकरोऽसाह[सया] च ततो भीरुः,
विचित्रिगीपुरपि जितवस्तुमिपमनैरुत्साहमकृतयाद्यान्तः, विविधमभीष्टतयामि-
मन्यमानस्तत्त्वमर्थमवर्तनसमुदितविस्रम विविध जिहासुरेव जायते³¹ । न
छेवविताहृतिपासनाशून्य प्राणी भवति । चेयत कस्यचित्काधिदधिका चित्त-
वृत्ति कापिदृता, पक्षधितुचितविषयनिवन्निता क्यत्तिरन्यथा । स्वस्वान्निदेन
पुमर्थोपयोगिनीरुपदेरवा । तद्विनामकृतधोतमप्रकृतादिम्यवहारः ।

ये पुनरमी ग्लान्तिरुद्वाप्नुतयधितवृत्तिविरीपास्ते समुचितविभाषामावा-
सगन्मयेऽपि न भवन्त्येव । तथा हि—रसामनमुपपुष्टवतो सुमेर्त्तान्यातस्-

31 “स्वात्मनुकर्ममानितया चसुपहृयति । चकृत्वापावकृता शोचति ।
चपारं प्रति श्रुयति । अपामचित्तपरिहारी सकलकृते । विनिपातादिभेति ।
विचिदुक्ततयाविमन्यमानो जगुद्वहते । ततश्च परकृतदयवैविध्यार्थान्तरविकारे ।
विचिद्विहासुखव वैराग्याहमर्षमयवते” इत्येव शेषचन्द्रमोपखण्डम् (पृ ८२) ।

भ्रमप्रभृतयो नोत्तिष्ठन्ति । यस्यापि वा भवन्ति विभावकलातस्यापि हेतुप्रभृत्ये
 क्षीयभाषाः सत्कारोपतां तावन्नामरसमनुयप्रन्ति । उत्साहादयस्तु सपादित
 स्वमृत्युतया प्रलीनकल्पा अपि सत्कारोपतां नास्तिवर्तन्ते, वर्तव्यान्तरविप-
 लोत्साहादेरसहृदनात् । यथा पतञ्जलि — “न हि चेत् एकस्या भिन्नां रस-
 इत्यन्यासु विरक्ताः” इत्यादि । तस्याप्यव्यभिचारिण्युत्पत्तिस्तु तस्यैव एवामी
 व्यभिचारिणः । सात्त्विकानुबन्धस्यैवैविविधतत्त्वज्ञानधर्माणां प्रतिष्ठमानानां
 रसनीलादिसूक्ष्मविरसभाषो-^[पलम्भन]मभावितलज्ञीसहृदगर्भस्वदिकवाचात्र-
 पप्रारगमरसतमज्ञानोत्सादिमन्त्रोलकादिवत्तस्मिन् सूत्रे सत्कारवैचित्र्यमभिनिकेश-
 यन्तोऽपि तत्सूत्रकृतमुपकारसदृशं विभ्रतः स्वयं च विचित्रार्थस्थापितुं विहित-
 यन्तोऽन्तरान्तरा शुद्धमपि स्वाविसूत्र प्रतिभासावकाशमुपनयन्तोऽपि पूर्वा-
 परव्यभिचारिरसच्छायाशक्तिसिमानमवश्यमानवन्तः प्रतिभासन्त इति व्यभि-
 चारिण इष्यन्ते । तथा हि—यत्तानोऽयमित्युक्ते कुत इति हेतुप्रभृते स्वामि-
 तास्य सृज्यते, न तु राम उत्साहसहिम्नादित्वत् हेतुमभ्रमातु । अतएव
 विभावकालोद्बोधका सन्त सत्कारोपरप्रकृत्य विदधाना रस्युत्साहादेरुपपाद-
 यितस्त्वमाहमावहन्ति । न तु उदभावे सर्ववैयं ते निरुपाख्या, वासनात्मना
 सर्वजन्तूना तन्मयत्वेनोद्बोधनात् । व्यभिचारिणां तु स्वविभावाभावे नामापि
 नास्तीति दितनिष्यते यैतदभाषोऽप्यव्याख्याकरे । एवमप्रधानतनिरास
 स्वाभिनिवृत्त्याय स्वाभिभावाद्रसत्वमित्यदवा नामान्यतद्वशरोपभूतया विरोध
 सङ्गतिनिष्ठया च कृतः ।

तत्तादृगभावानां विभावानां व्यभिचारिणां च पुनरुक्त्वा स्थानियस्यो नास्ति,
 बाष्पादेरानन्दार्क्षीरोमादिजलदर्शनात्, व्याघ्रादेव क्रोधभयादिहेतुत्वात्, भ्रम
 चिन्तादेरुत्साहमयावनेकसहचरत्वावलोचनात् । सामग्री वा तु न व्यभि-
 चारिणी । तथा हि—बन्धुविनाशो यत्त विभाव परिदेविताभ्युपातादित्वनु-
 भावचिन्तादैन्यादिष्व व्यभिचारी, सोऽदृश्य शोक एतेष्वेव सशब्दोदये सङ्गात्प-
 विप्रशमनाय समीगोपपात्तः । तत्र चोक्तव्यवहारे कार्यकारणसहकारारमकलिङ्ग-
 दर्शने स्वाव्यात्मपरचित्ततत्त्वानुमानाभ्यासपाटवादधुना तैरौघानकटाक्षइत्यादिभि-

लौकिकी कारणत्वादिभुवमतिक्रान्तविभावानुभावनामनुपपन्नव्यप्राणैरत एवा-
लौकिकविभावादित्यपदेशमायमि प्राच्यस्वरणादिस्वरसङ्घातोपजावनारत्यापनाय
विभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेशैर्गोषाप्यायेऽपि वक्ष्यमाणसम्पन्नेर्गुणप्रधानतापर्य-
येण सामाजिकविधि सम्मय्योग संवर्धमैक्याम् वासादित्ववद्विरलौकिकितिविद-
नवेदनारमकपर्ययाभ्येतरा नीतोऽर्थवर्धमायेनसारो न तु निवृत्तभावतात्कालिक
एव, न तु स्वैरातिरिक्तकालावस्थायी स्वायित्वित्युच्य एव रम ।

ननु शङ्कुकादिभिरभ्यधीयत—स्वाध्वो विभावनादिप्रत्ययारभ्यमाण वादत
उच्यत इति । एव हि लौकिकेऽपि वि न रस । अततोऽपि हि यत् रयनायता
स्मात्तत् वस्तुसत् वय न भविष्यति । तेन स्वाधिव्यतिरुद्धितिरूपप्राप्ता न
रत । अतएव ह्ये स्वाधिव्यदृष्ट न कृतम् । वप्रयुक्त शक्त्यभूत स्मात् ।
वेनसमीचिस्त्रादेवमुच्यते—स्वाधी रसोभूत इति । यौचित्य तु कस्यामिगच्छते
कारणादित्या प्रसिद्धानामधुना चवत्योपयोगितया विभावत्वादित्यभ्यनारत् ।
तथा हि—लौकिकवित्ताख्यनुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकमत्कारारमा
रसासाध स्तृप्तनुमानलौकिकस्यवेदनवित्तुच्य एव । तथा हि लौकिकनातु
मानेन सङ्गृह्य प्रमदादिर्न तादस्येन प्रतिपद्यते, अपि तु हृदयसावादात्मकमहदय-
रवतातूष्णीमविष्यद्रसप्रादाहुरीभावेनानुमानस्यत्यादिषोषानयाद्येव तमयो
भावीचित्तवर्त्तमानाश्रयता । न च सा चवत्या प्राच्यान्वतरात्, येनाधुना
रसति स्यात् । न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाख्युपायार । किं चालौकिक-
विभावादिसंशोधनलीप्यनर्हयेव चरणा । या च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादि-
लौकिकप्रमाभ्यनितरत्वाद्यन्योपपत्तया यौगिकप्रत्यक्षनमित्यपरमितिज्ञानात् सकल
नैपथिकोपरमाशू नशुभपक्षोऽपिगच्छतामदैरसनानुभवाय विशिष्यते । एतासा
मयायोगमर्नादिविम्रा ततोदयात्तादस्यास्तुत्य विषयावेतवैवरय च सौन्दर्य-
विहात् । अतः तु स्वात्मैक्यतत्त्वनिगमात्मगवात्त्वानुश्लेषात्तरयत्तरनियमा-
भावात्तद्विभावादिवाधारस्यसम्बुद्धोचितनिजरत्नादिवाक्यावेगवत्ताय न विम्रा-
न्तरादीनां सम्य ह्यव्येयताय बहुश । अतएव विभावादयो न विषयिहेतवो
रसस्य, तद्व्योषावयवेऽपि रससंभवत् । नापि चमिहेतवो येन प्रमाख्यमये पतेयु ।

सिद्धस्य कल्पविग्रमेकभूतस्य रसस्वाभावात् । किं तर्ह्येतद्विभावादय इति, अलौकिक
एवाय चवैशेष्ययोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः । कान्यतैश्च दृष्टमिति चेद्रूपणमेतदस्मा
कमलौकिकत्वमिति । पानकरसास्वादोऽपि ॥ गुडमरिचादिषु दृष्ट इति समानमेतत् ।

मन्वेद्य रसोऽप्यमेय स्यात्, एव युक्तमिति उच्यते । रसतैश्चाणो ह्यसौ न
प्रमेयादित्वभावः । तर्हि सूत्रे निष्पत्तिरिति कथम् ? नैव रसस्य, अपि तु
तद्विषयरमनायाः । तन्निष्पत्त्या तु यदि तदेकावचनमीदृक्स्य रसस्य निष्पत्ति-
रुच्यते तेन न कश्चित् दोषः । सा च रसना न प्रमाणव्यापारो न वारक
व्यापारः । सत्यं तु भाषाभाषिणी स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात् । रसना बोधहरैव
किं तु बोधान्तरेभ्यो विलक्षणीय, उपायानां विभावादीनां लौकिकवैलक्षण्यत्वात् ।
तेन विभावादिमयोगादस्मान्न यतो निष्पद्यते तत्तत्तद्विषयरसनामोचरो लौकिको-
त्तरोऽर्था रस इति तात्पर्यं सूच्यते । अन्यत्र स चैव — सुकृष्टप्रतिगीर्षकादिना
तानन्दबुद्धिराध्यायते । बाह्यप्राकृत्यस्य वित्तव्यवहाराय काव्यवत्तात्परादीयमानानि
न तत्र रामपीरिभ्राम्यन्ति । अतएवोभयवैशेष्यमन्यथा । रोमाञ्चादयश्च भूयसां
रतिप्रदीपिकादितया दृष्टान्तानि शोचिना देसाकान्ताविषयेन रतिं तमयन्ति ।
यस्या स्वात्मापि तद्भासनावत्त्वादनुश्रविष्टः । अतएव न तदव्यतया रसव्यगमः ।
न च निवृत्तकारणतया, वैबाज्याभिपन्नादिसंभावना । न च नियतपराङ्मू-
लतया, येन तु सङ्केपायुदयः । तेन मय्यारणोभूता यतानहृतेरेकस्या एव वा
सविदो गोचरोभूता रतिः शृङ्गारः । साधारणोभावना च विभावादिभिरिति ।³²

तत्तत् विभावमाधान्य [यथा]—

वैखीनन्दसितस्य विग्रममपोदुर्वं ययुस्ते एवो

भङ्गीमङ्गुरकामवासुर्वमिदं भ्रूमर्मक्रीकम् ।

आपातेऽपि विकारकारणमहो वक्राम्बुज-मालम्

सस्य सुन्दरि वैखसतिजगतीसाम् त्वमेका कृतिः ॥³³

32 इति श्रीभानुभक्तप्रसादाचार्य यत्तच्छतवैशाखाभिधपकीरित वैदित्यगम
इति निश्चयान्तरमतेन चैवमन्त्रं टीकायामुद्धतिः (प ६६) यथाशा ।

33 वैदित्यनन्दकाव्यानुपासने (प ६६) ।

इति । तदुपसम्पन्नाय तु प्रवर्धे भाषावेषप्रवृत्तिचिन्तादिकल्पनात् । तदुप
जीवनेन मुहुरे । तथा च तत्र सहृदया पूर्वोपरमुचित परिरुन्म्य ईदृश
वहास्मिन्नवसर इत्यादि बहुतर पोठव-ग्रहणं विदधते । तेन च कायान्वास
प्राक्तनपुण्यादिहेतुवत्तादिति सहृदया, तेषां परिमितविभावाद्युन्मीलनऽपि
परिस्तुत एव साक्षात्काररूपतः काव्यार्थं स्फुरति । अतएव तेषां काव्यमेव
प्रतीत्युत्पत्तिरुक्तं अनपेक्षितनाट्यमपि । तेन तु नाट्यं 'निर्घतिता स्फुरिता
शशिशरमय' इति न्यायेन सुतरां निर्मलीकरणम् । सहृदयानां च तदेव
नैर्मल्यथापि अतः प्रतीता सीतवाद्यवयविकादयो न व्यसन्निवार्ये पर्यवस्यति
नाट्योपलक्षणात् । तत्र च नटो ध्यायिनामिव इदं ध्यानपदम् न हि तस्मात्
मेव सिद्ध्यमानो वासुदेव स्मरणीयप्रतिपत्तिः अपि तु तदुपायद्वारेणातिस्फुट्य
भूतलकल्पगोचरो देवताविशेषो ध्यायिनां फलरूपः । तद्व्यवहृत्य नाट्योपलक्ष
त्तितातिस्फुटाध्यवसायविपर्ययो निश्चयदेशनात्तात्पर्यमूतव इदं वक्तव्यमिति
विधिस्थानीयोऽर्था व्युत्पत्तिं वितरति ।

THE TEXT OF KAVYALOKA LOCANA IV

The notice in the recent *Descriptive Catalogue*¹ of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library Madras of two manuscripts (A and B) in Devanāgarī character of Abhinavagupta's commentary² on the fourth Uddyota of the *Dhvanyaloka* or *Kavyaloka* first drew attention to this missing chapter³ of the well known work the existence of which was brilliantly conjectured long ago by Prof. Jacobi.⁴ An application was made for a loan of these MSS through the India Office in 1920, but as the rules of the Library did not allow

1 Madras 1918 vol. xxii pp. 8666-7, nos. 12893-4

2 The full title of this work (commonly known as *Locana*) is given in the different MSS as *Kāyaloka locana* or *Dhvanyaloka locana*. Abhinava himself in the present text calls the original *Kavyaloka*. The *Anandavardhana Kavyalamkāra kāmadhenu śika* entered by Aufrecht (i. 49) as Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Dhvanyaloka* involves a twofold error due perhaps to Oppert's inaccurate entry. In the first place the term *Anandavardhana* is an incorrect designation; in the second place by *kavyalamkāra kāmadhenu śika* is probably meant the commentary of the same name (ed. Benares Sansk. Series 1908 Śrīnivāṣa Press 1909) on Viṃśa's *Kāvyaśikha* by Gopendra Tipṭha Bhūpāla mixed up through a confusion with the *Locana* commentary of Abhinava.

3 The *Kāvyamālā* (ed. Nir. Sag. Press Bombay 1911) prints only the first three *uddhyotas* of the *Locana* which were the only ones known in Buhler (*Asiatic Report* iii. 66 and xvii). Other MSS. Burnell, *Tanjore Cat.* 55a. Keith's *Central Prov. Rep.* 100 also *List of MSS purchased in 1869-78* 20. Oppert 2692.3. 2996. 5513. Bhandarkar, *Rep.* 1887-91. 593. *India Office Cat.* 1088. Stein *Jammu Cat.* 62, Kāśnāth Kunte *Lahore Rep.* 8. Most of these MSS are described as complete but it cannot be determined whether they include the fourth *uddhyota*.

4 ZDMG 1902 p. 404 footnote 1. In addition the arguments adduced therein it may be pointed out that Abhinava at p. 12.11. 19-20 (ed. *Kāvyamālā*) promises to dilate upon a certain point at the end of his work (*granthate vakyaśmaḥ*) a promise which he bears out towards the end of the present text.

such a loan and as a rotograph transcript was impossible the present writer had to be content with certified copies forwarded by the Curator of the Library through the kindness and courtesy of F. W. Thomas of the India Office Library. On return to India another attempt was made to obtain a loan of the MSS through the Calcutta University but as there was no chance of success in this direction Sir Asutosh Mookerjee to whom the difficulties were submitted very kindly directed Pandit Ananta Kṛṣṇa Śāstri to make fresh copies personally. His efforts happily resulted in the discovery of a fresh manuscript in the possession of his friend Pandit S. K. Ramanāth Śāstri of the Madras Oriental MSS Library with which also (C) the present text is collated. Although still deficient in many places on which probably a sight of the original MSS might have thrown some light the present writer ventures to publish the text in its present form not only out of consideration of its importance but also with the hope of drawing to it the attention of interested scholars who may have access to other MSS and can thereby help to determine some of the difficultes left unsolved here.

Apart from the inherent interest of the present text as supplying the missing part of the learned commentary of this champion of the Dhvaṇī School there are several points in which attention may be drawn here. As in the other parts of his commentary¹ Abhinava appears to distinguish here between the Karikakara and the Vṛttikara of the original text by directly opposing them a fact which further supports Jacobi's contention² that the author of the Karika the so-called Dhvaṇīkara was different from Anandavardhana the author of the prose Vṛtti. Abhinava uses the term *vṛtti-grantha* in contradistinction to the *Karika* and in one place

1 Pp. I III 59-60 71 78 104 123 130-1 etc.

2 First suggested by Bühler *Kaśīn r Rep.* p. 66. See ZDAIG loc. cit. p. 405 ff. and S. K. De on the Dhvaṇīkāra and Anandavardhana in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies* vol. I 1936 pp. 19.

especially, points out that the question as to the source of the endless variety of Artha imparted in poetry is mentioned by the Vṛtikāra although not touched upon by the Karikākara.¹ Towards the end of the present text, Abhinava gives his own reading of some of the Kārikas, and his remarks apparently show that the Vṛtikāra in several places reads the Karikās by splitting them up (*khandikṛtā paśudā*)—a procedure which is not likely if we suppose a common authorship of the Karikā and the Vṛti.

There are two *guthā* verses in the present text (*Dhaavahala*^{*} and *Cāyana*^{*}) one of which is ascribed to Abhinava himself in one of the MSS,² the sense and construction of which do not seem very clear from the obviously corrupt text. The first verse is baffling and obscure as to sense and metre in all the MSS. The next verse is clearer and its *chayā* may be put tentatively thus

*Thyagi jana-kara paramparā samcarana lṣaya tuhsaha śarirāḥ.
Arthāḥ krpana-grhasṭhah sarthad vjastāḥ sravanāḥ*

"Riches, enfeebled of body through decay caused by passing to and fro through a succession of hands of bountiful folk melt away, as it were separated from their company and lodging in poor men's houses." This reading, which was first suggested through a discussion of this point with Dr. Barnett, may not be faultless and is perhaps capable of being improved upon, but in the main it may be accepted in the absence of anything better, and there is nothing in it incompatible with the context. The difficulty lies in the two words *sarvanā* and *sarthavasthā*. The emendation *vasantā* is very natural and tempting, but it is supported by none of the MSS while *svasthavasthah*, instead of *sarthad vjastah* is attractive although *svasthasasthah* > *sarthavasthā*.

In this connexion attention may be drawn to two Deśi verses in the original text at || 240 ii 6-7 and p 243 ii

1 उक्तयोरनन्तर्येनैवैतत्तु निश्चयिनीकृत्यापि कारिकावदिव नोक्तम् ।

2 Two other verses are cited as Abhinava's own in the present text.

21 2 which are unintelligible as they stand but which may now be reconstructed in the light of the interesting *chāyas* given by Abhinava Pischel¹ gives the latter śloka somewhat differently thus

*Mahu mahu tri bhanantaaho vijai kulu janassu
To vi na deu Janaddanau goarhoi manassu*

It is interesting to note that Abhinava in his gloss on this verse calls Apabhraṃśa Saśadhava bhāṣa thus confirming the modern tradition that Apabhraṃśa originated in Sindhu deśa.²

Another point of interest is the mention by Abhinava of a work called *Tattvaloka* by Apandavardhana in which the latter is said to have discussed in detail the relation between *śāstra naya* and *kāvya naya*. This work yet remains to be recovered.

In one of the concluding verses as in the invocatory śloka at the beginning of the first Uddyota Abhinava mentions the name of his *upadhyaya* Bhaṭṭendurāja but here he couples this name with that of another teacher of his called Śrī Siddhiceta who is not mentioned elsewhere in any of his known works. From Siddhiceta he probably learnt philosophy. The reference to *asmad upadhyaya* Bhaṭṭendurāja occurs also at pp. 25 43 116 207 223 of the printed text of the *Dhvanyaloka* and in one place (p. 160) he is adorned with the grandiloquent epithet *vidvat kavi suhrdaya cakravartin* which together with the fact that in the present text Abhinava apparently indicates that he learnt Kāvya from this teacher will go to support the conjecture that this Bhaṭṭendurāja was probably a poet and critic held in high esteem by his great pupil. Although chronology does not stand in the way there is hardly any definite means to decide whether Abhinava's teacher Bhaṭṭendurāja was identical with Pratibarendurāja the commentator

1 *Ma et alen zur Kenntnis d. Apabhraṃśa* p. 45 also cited in Jacobi *Jana L. naya* p. xx.

2 See Jacob *loc. cit.*

of Udbhata.¹ From Abhinava's commentary on the *Bhaga-
vadgita*² we learn that Bhaṭṭendri was the son of Śrībhūti-
rāja and grandson of Saucuka of the Katayana gotra, but Prati-
harendurāja's genealogy is unknown. The only facts known
about the latter is that he was a native of Koṅkana and a
pupil of Mukula,³ probably the same Mukula who was the
son of Bhaṭṭa Kallaja and author of *Abhidhā vṛtti-matrka*⁴
and who is placed by Bühler⁵ on the authority of *Raja-
tarangini* v. 66 in the reign of Avantivarman. Two plausible
reasons, however, will lead one to the opinion that the two
Indurājas were probably different persons. To begin with
Bhaṭṭendurāja appears essentially as a poet who wrote as
Abhinava's own quotations show, in Sanskrit as well as in
Prakrit and whose verses supplied a ready source of poetic
illustrations in his pupil's work probably inspired by himself.
Had he been like Pratisharendurāja, a writer on Poetics as
well as a poet his views would very likely have been cited
and discussed in the usual course by Abhinava. It is also
remarkable that Abhinava cites his teacher always as Bhaṭṭ-
endurāja and never as Pratisharendurāja although Bhatta and
Pratihara being mere titles need not make any difference.
The conjecture is not unlikely that Abhinava's teacher may
have been the poet Bhaṭṭendurāja who is quoted under the
same designation in Kṣemendra's two works *Ancitya-vicara*⁶
and *Suśrīra-tīlaka*⁷ as well as in the poetical anthologies⁸ of

1 As Peterson (*Subhāṣit* p. 11) seems to suggest.

2 Bühler *op cit* pp. 65, 80 and *et passim*.

3 *Kāvya-lāhara-sara-laghu-vṛtti* (ed. Kāvya-mālā) pp. 1, 86.

4 Ed. Kāvya-mālā p. 22. It is curious that this treatise which deals
with the grammatico-rhetorical question of the functions of word and
its sense is not cited at all by Abhinava.

5 *Op cit* pp. 66, 78. see Pischel *Spr. gōrūtīlaka* p. 12.

6 Under II. 20, 31.

7 Under II. 2, 24, 29, 30.

8 The verse *parāṅmukha-jāṇa-pīṇam āsra bedo Indurāja* in the *Paṇḍit-
an* of Śrīnagadhara (no. 1052) is quoted anonymously to be by Ānanda-
vardhana (pp. III, 118) a fact which, however, is not decisive because

Sarāghadhara Vallabhadeva and Jalhana. The commentator Pratiharenduraja on the other hand was never known for his poetical pretensions and was chiefly a writer on Poetics who obviously belonged to the older Alamkāra School and did not as Abhinava did believe in the newly established doctrine of *dhvani* with which however he appears to be fully conversant. Referring to this new theory Pratiharendu following the views of the ancient writers of the Alamkāra and the Riti Schools states in one place that what is known as *Dhvani* and taken to be the soul of Poetry by some thinkers included by his author Udbhata in the treatment of some of the Alamkāras under discussion and therefore need not be separately considered.¹ The standpoints of Pratiharenduraja and Abhinava in the realm of Poetics are so divergent—in fact they belong to totally different schools of opinion—that it is difficult to admit any spiritual relationship between the two for the former was in no way a subscriber to the teachings of the *Dhvani* School of which Abhinava was a recognised advocate.

Jacobi has already negatived² Pischel's contention³ that in three passages (pp. 37, 183, 214) Abhinava speaks of Anandavardhana himself as one of his *gurus* or *upadhyāyas*. It is more likely that the reference is to one or other of Abhinava's many preceptors mentioned in his *Locana* as well.

Abhinava's commentary is ascribed to the authorship of this verse and the same verse occurs in *Bhallaṅga Saṅkha* 56 and is ascribed to another poet Yajña in the *Subhāṣitavalī* no. 947. The verse is attributed to Vāṭpati in *Saduktī Karmamṛta*. It is cited anonymously in Hemacandra's *Comma* p. 257. Jayaratha p. 108.

१ ननु यत्र काव्ये वचनवद्वयान्तादिन अथानभूतस्य स्वयन्द्वयपारादृष्टेः न प्रतीयमानेकवचनस्य यत्रवक्ष्यत तत्राविषादीभिरप्यजिह्व काव्यजोवितभूय मेविवचनैर्द्वैर्वा निर्णीय यत्तत्कलनेदाया काव्यवर्गोपनिहितं यं कथादिह नोपदिष्टं २ अथयते एव काव्यवर्गोपनिहितं । (Op cit II 79)

॥ WZKM iv pp. 237-8 and ZDMG loc cit p. 314 footnote 2

३ Śrngara ilaka p. 22

as in his numerous treatises on Kashmir Śaivism. One of these is Bhaṭṭa Tauta cited at p. 178 on whose work called *Kāvya-kautuka* Abhinava had, as he himself tells us, written a *Vivaraṇa* before he wrote his *Locana*. Nothing is known of this Bhaṭṭa Tauta (also Bhaṭṭa Tota), but it appears that Abhinava's commentary on *Bharata* was written in the instance of this teacher who is reverently cited therein just as his *Locana* was probably inspired by Bhāttendurāja. The *Kāvya-kautuka* is also referred to in the *Vyaktiviveka-vyakhyana* (p. 13), and Hemacandra¹ quotes three verses from Bhaṭṭa Tauta while in his own commentary on the same work² he reproduces after Abhinava's commentary on *Bharata* Tota's opinion in connexion with the theory of *Rasa*. Other reference to *asmad upadhyaya* Bhaṭṭa Tauta in *Locana* occurs at p. 29. Kṛṣṇendra in his *Aucitya-vivaraṇa* attributes to him a verse (*prajña nava nava**) which is given anonymously in Hemacandra p. 3. Tauta is also cited by Candīdasa in his *Dīpika* commentary on Mammata.

Sometimes Abhinava refers to his numerous preceptors generally as *asmad guruvaḥ*. In his *Locana* (p. 30) however as well as in his *Pratyabhijñā vimarśini* Laghuvṛtti³ Abhinava refers to Utpalā as his *parama guru* the teacher of his teacher. This Utpalā son of Udayakara is well known in the history of Kashmir Śaivism as the author of the *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā* on which Abhinava wrote, besides the *Laghuvṛtti* referred to above a *Bhāṭī Vṛtti* and is assigned by Bühler⁴ to the first half of the 10th century. It is interesting to note that while commenting on the word *pratyabhijñā* occurring in *Dhyanaloka* i. 8 Abhinava discusses this term and refers to what is said on this point by Utpalā (*śad uktam*

1 *Kavyanūśāsana* § 316.

2 *Alaṅkāra-candā-mamā* p. 59.

3 Bühler *op. cit.* p. clxx.

4 *Op. cit.*, pp. 79-80. Also Bhandarkar *Rep.* 1883-4 pp. 76 ff. *Essays Ind. & Off. Car.* iv p. 235. Chatterji *Kashm. Śaivism* pp. 19-40.

asmatparama gurubhūh śrīmad utpala-padañi ■ 30) From what Abhinava himself says in his numerous works on Kashmir Śaivism we can indicate the line of spiritual succession (*guru parampara*) thus Somananda → Utpala → Lakṣmana gupta → Abhinavagupta Somananda being probably a pupil of Vasugupta the earliest founder of the Pratyabhijña śāstra

In the concluding portion of his *Paratrinidhīa vivaraṇa* Abhinava gives us an interesting personal and genealogical account in which he tells us that he was the son of Kāśmiraka Cukhala¹ and grandson of Varahagupta and had a brother named Manorathagupta That Abhinava was Śaiva is abundantly shown here as elsewhere in the invocatory and concluding verses of the present text It may be noted in this connexion that at the end of each Uddyota Abhinava invokes the different manifestations (*vivarta*) of Vac In the first it is *pratibha* in the second *paśyanti* ■ the third *madhyama* and in the fourth Uddyota he simply speaks of the fourth manifestation (*turya śakti*) implying thereby presumably *vaikhari* These manifestations however, are usually enumerated as three and not four although different writers differ as to the particular name attached to individual manifestations in succession Thus Ruṣṣaka speaks of Vac as *trividha vigraha* (p 1) which both Jayaratha and Saṃudra bandha explain ■ constituting in succession *paśyanti* (*para* or *vimarsa rūpa*) *madhyama* and *vaikhari* This agrees substantially with Abhinava's enumeration with the exception of *pratibha* which is probably Vac itself and not one of its *vivartas*

The date of Abhinavagupta which forms a central landmark in Alamkāra literature is easily settled from his relation to Utpala and Anandavardhana as well as from the indications given by himself in some of his works His *Krama*

¹ Buhler's MS has *kāśmīra rāṭhī v. cūkhala* (p. clv) as well as *cūkhala* (p. cliv)

stotra was written in A D 991 ¹ His *Bhairava stotra* is dated A D 993 ² and his *Bṛhasī Vṛtti* on Utpala's *Pratyabliṣṭa* bears the date of A D 1015 ³ We may, therefore place Abhinavagupta with great certainty towards the last quarter of the 10th century, and he certainly lived into the first quarter of the 11th

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1 *Intro to Dh anyāloka* ed Kāvyaśālā p 2 footnote

2 Buhler *op cit* p clxi

3 Buhler *ibid* p clx also p 80

श्रीमद्भिनवगुप्तोन्मीलित

काव्यालोकलोचनम्

चतुर्थ उद्गोत

हृत्पञ्चकनिर्वाहयोगेऽपि परमेश्वर ।

नान्योपकरणापेक्षो यदा ता नौमि शाङ्करीम् ॥¹

उद्गोतसमिति निवस्तुर्हृत्तिहार² आह—पयमिति । प्रयो
जानान्तरमिति यद्यपि 'सहृदयमन प्रीतये' (I : p 3 l 3)
इत्यनेन प्रयोजन प्रागेवोक्तम्, तृतीयोद्गोतावधौ च सत्काव्य कर्तुं
ज्ञातु वा³ (III 46 p 231 l 6) इति तदेवैव⁴ स्फुटीकृतम्
तथापि स्फुटतरोर्ध्वमिदानीं यत्न । यत्तु सुस्पष्टरूपेण विहायै

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N II —The references are to pages and lines of the
text in the Karyamala edition Nr Sag Press 1911
(no 25)

1 II reads two verses before this which really belong
to the end of Chap III (see p 233 ll 32 25) श्री
काव्यालोके प्रथमोक्तम् अविभेदात् परावधम् । इदानीं चोप
योक्ते द्वितीयोक्तम् अविभाज्यम् ॥ अन्वयितानां भेदानां स्फुटतावधि
दायिनीम् । त्रिषोपपत्तिर्वाच्यं यथाप्यपरिपरीम् ।

2 उद्गोताम्बरं प्रदत्तवित् इतिहार—A उद्गोतसमिति
विरचितम् इतिहार—C.

3 यतदेवैव—A omitt B इति

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अतोऽस्मिन्निर्दिष्टात्^१ स्पष्टनिष्पन्नमयैव प्रतिपादयति प्रयो-
जनान्तरमित्युक्तम् । अथवा पूर्वोक्तयो प्रयोजनयोरन्तर विरो-
धोऽभिधीयते । केन^२ विशेषेण सत्कान्यकरणमस्य प्रयोजनं केन
॥ सत्कान्यकारणोप^३ इति विशेषो निरूप्यते । तस्य सत्कान्यकरणे
रूपमस्य व्यापार इति पूर्वं वक्तव्यम् । निष्पादितस्य श्रेयत्वादिति ।
कृत्यते—एतन्नेर्य^४ इति । ननु^५ धनिमेदात्मविमानामात्मन्यमिति
व्यभिचरन्ते^६ तद्विषयिभ्यामेकप्रामाण्ये—कथमिति^७ ।

Kārikā 1

Kārikā 2

अतोऽतस्मिन्—अतो हीति । आसत्तया वाक्यद्वय^८ प्रकारा ,
एतेनाप्येव नवतीत्यपि-तत्पदार्थः । एतदुक्तं भवति—वर्णनीयवस्तु
निष्ठ प्रज्ञाविशेष प्रतिमानं तस्य वर्णनीयस्य पारिमित्यादाय कविर्नैव
स्पृष्टत्वप्रगर्भस्य तद्विषय प्रतिमानं^९ सत्कान्यमेव स्पष्टम् । तस्यैव काव्य-
मपि सत्कान्यमिति^{१०} ब्रह्म इत्यादी कविप्रवाह^{११} । उक्तिवैचित्र्येण
तु स पदार्था निरूपकस्य नव-तीति तद्विषयत्वात् प्रतिमानाभावात्-त्य
सुस्पष्टमिति । ननु प्रतिमानमस्य किं फलमिति निर्णेतुं याणी
नवत्यमायातीत्युक्तम् । तेन वाच्यतां काव्यवाक्यानां^{१२} तानत्र-
फलमानादि, तस्य प्रतिमानमस्य सत्त्वव्यपदेशे, तत्त्वार्थान्तरे^{१३}, तस्य
धनिप्रमाणादादिवि । तस्य प्रथममस्य तिरस्कृतवाक्यान्तरमाह—

१ अतोऽस्मिन्निर्दिष्टात्—B

२ Omitted in A

३ Omitted in A and B

४ सत्कान्यकारणोप—B

५ Omitted in A and B

६ व्यभिचरन्ते—A, व्यभिचरन्ते—B

७ तद्विषय—A

८ आसत्तया वाक्यद्वय—B

९ तद्विषयस्य प्रतिमानम्—B

१० सत्कान्यमेव इति—B

११ कविप्रवाह—A

१२ वाक्यावाक्यानां—B

१३ तत्त्वार्थान्तरे—C, तत्त्वार्थ—A

स्मितमिति । मुख-मधुर-विभव-सरस-विसलयित-परिमल-
स्पर्शनान्मलन्ततिरस्कृतानि तैरबाहृतसौन्दर्यसर्वजनवाह्यभ्रातृश-
प्रसरत्नसतापप्रशमनतर्पणत्वयैक्यमायैकात्मिकत्वसुस्कारादुत्तिष्ठ-
ममाभिलषणीयैश्वर्यत्वानि स्वयम्भूतानि यानि तैः सितादे
प्रतिद्वस्वार्यस्य स्वविरकविवेयो¹ विहितधर्मव्यतिरेकेण धर्मान्तर-
पाक्षता² यावत् द्विगते³ तावत्पूर्वमेव सपद्यत इति सर्वत्र
तन्मन्तव्यम् । अस्म्येति "अपूर्वत्वमेव [प्रति]भासत" इति
दूरेण सवन्ध, सर्वज्ञेयास नवत्वमिति सवन्ति⁴ । द्वितीय प्रथम-
शब्दोऽर्थान्तरेऽन्या⁵ करणीयत्वप्रधानत्वसाधारणत्वाविम्वद्वयधर्मा-
न्तरे सकान्त स्तार्थं भवन्ति । एव त्रिह-शब्दोऽपि धीरत्वान-
पेक्षत्वापत्तिवनीकवादी षड्वयधर्मान्तरे सकान्त स्तार्थं भवति ।
एवं प्रथमस्य द्वौ भेदाद्युदाहरण द्वितीयस्याप्युदाहर्तुमाशङ्कति—
वियसितेति⁶ । निद्राया कौतुकी कृतकमुक्त इत्यर्थः । वदने
विम्वस्य वक्तूमिति वदनस्पर्शमेव⁷ तावद्विभ्य मुखस्यक्तु न
पारयतीति अतएव प्रियस्येति । वधूर्नवीर्यः । बोधतायेन
प्रियतमप्रबोधनेन⁸ निरुद्धो हठात्⁹ प्रवर्तमान प्रवर्तमानोऽपि
अवधिद् वृक्षमास वृत्तयम्यनामितापो वना¹⁰ । अतएवाभोगेन¹¹

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1 The text reads परिकर

2 अक्षय्योय—B

3 विकविरवयो ?—A, स्वविरवयो—B

4 अविरवपाक्षता—B

5 अर्थ—B

6 Omitted in A, B C, but in the text

7 वराकरवयो—A and B

8 Abhinava apparently accepts here the reading of A
in the text

9 वदनस्पर्शमेव—A

10 प्रियतमप्रबोधने—B

11 वरात्—A ■ वयो—B

12 अतएव बोधिव—B

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तु पुनर्निर्द्वाविचारनिर्वर्णनयावि¹ लोल² कृत्वा स्थिता । न
तु सर्वथैव शुभ्यनान्³ निवर्तितुं शक्नोतीत्यर्थः । एवमूता एषा
यदि मया परिचुम्ब्यते तद्विस्तृता विस्तृता भवेदिति तस्यापि प्रियस्य
परिचुम्बनविषये⁴ निरारम्भस्य हृदय साक्षाद्दक्षप्रतिपत्ति
कामेति । साक्षाद्दृष्टा साभिलाषा प्रतिपत्ति स्मितिर्वैल्यं तादरा
रुदरुदिकाकुर्यात् न तु मनोरम्यप्रति⁵वरित्वार्थं यद्यपि हृदयम्,
वितु रते परस्परजोनितशब्दसाभिमानरूपाया परिनिर्भूते⁶
केनचिदप्यनुभाषेनालम्बापमाहवाया पार यतमिति⁷ परिपूर्णभूत
एव शृङ्गार इत्यर्थः । द्वितीयश्लोकेन तु परिचुम्बनं सप्तमम् ।
तमास्यराग्नेजोक्ता सेनापि च सा परिचुम्ब्यतेति यद्यपि योषित एव
शृङ्गार, तथापि प्रथमश्लोके परस्परानिलयप्रसरनितोपपरपरा
पर्यवसानात्मकेन वा रतिरुक्ता⁸ सोमबोरपि⁹ एकस्वरूपचित्तव्यपनु
प्रवेष्टामाषद्यासा रति¹⁰ सुतयं योषयति ।

Kārikā 3

एव गौल मेदधनुस्सुदाहलालक्ष्यकममेदेध्वति¹¹ देरामुलेन
क्षयापमेदधियसमतिदेरा पतेति युक्तशान्तेति¹² । अनुसर्तध्व
इति उदाहर्तव्य इत्यर्थः । यथोक्तमिति

तस्याज्ज्ञानं प्रमेदा ये प्रमेदा क्षयताम ये ।

तेषामानन्त्यमन्बोन्त्यसव¹³ पपरिषत्पनम्¹⁴ । (M 13 p 83)

1 निर्द्वापि चाक्षरपर्यवसायि—A

2 च लोल—A निरर्जनवा विस्तृत—B 3 शुभ्यन—A

4 सप्तमे—A and B 5 शृङ्गारपि—B

6 परिनिर्भूतो—B ; रपदिष्ट ते—C

7 पार पार यतमिति—B ; परां गच्छिमिति—A

8 स्मिति—B 9 शोभयते—B 10 रति—D

11 मेदधियसमिति—A and B 12 The text reads दिग्गजना-

13 The text reads अपरिषत्पनम्

इत्यतः प्रतिपादितम् । चैतदिति न-शब्दोऽपि-शब्दसाम्ये^१
 निप्रकटम् । एतदपि प्रतिपादितम् “भाषानचेतनानपि चेता
 एच्यतनानचेतनवत्” (p 122, l 9) इत्यतः । अतथा
 स्थितानपि तथासंस्थितानिवेति^२ इव-शब्देन एकरविश्रान्ति
 गोभाभापादेव सुतरां विविक्तरूपागिलय^३ । हृदय इति प्रधानतमे
 समस्तभावजनकनिष्पन्नस्थान इत्यर्थः । निवेशयति यस्य यस्य
 हृदयमस्ति तस्य तस्याचलतया तस्य तत्र स्थापयतोत्यर्थः । अतएव
 ते प्रतिक्षाप्येभ्योऽप्य एवेत्यपेक्षितोपा तपयते । हृदयनिविष्टा
 एव य तया भवन्ति नान्वयेत्यर्थः । सा जयति परिच्छिन्न
 शक्तिभ्यः प्रजापतिभ्योऽप्युत्कर्षेण वर्तते । तदयमस्यैव कवि
 गोवरो वर्णनीयाथो^४ विद्मो नि धीमा मपयते ।

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प्रतिभाया वाचीनां धामन्यं प्वमिच्छामिति^५ यदनुमिप्रसक्त
 तदेव कारिकाया अद्भुता निरुन्मत्त इत्याह—उपपादयितुमिति ।
 उपपत्त्या निरुपयितुमिच्छार्थः । यद्यप्यर्थान्तरमात्रे हेतुति-
 कारेणोक्तत्वापि कारिकायास्त नोक्त इति भावः । यत्र वा
 उच्यते समस्तोक्तोऽयमिति भावः, अतएवास्त ओक्तस्य इतिप्रत्ये
 व्याख्यानं न कृतम् । दृष्टपूर्णा इति । यद्दि^६ प्रललादिभि
 प्रमाथैः प्राकृतैश्च कविभिरित्युभयथा नेयम् । काव्यं यशुमास
 स्थानीयम् । स्पृष्ट्वां सत्त्वामिति रत्नमयत्तामुत्कलिका इति
 य शम्भुस्तुष्टेऽभ^७ का हृषता । एतानि बोधाद्वरुणानि चित्तल

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Karika 4

१ ०शब्दोऽपि—A

२ यदि पितृपितामहिवेति—A, नद्विषयः—B

३ वर्णनीयो—A

४ यान्त्रध्वजिक इति—B 5 The text reads यपि

६ रामरतामुत्कलिकाविति य इत्य स्पष्टेऽर्थे—B, रामरतामुत्

कलिकायम् इति य स्पष्टेऽर्थे—A

पूर्वमेव व्याख्यातावीति (pp 102, 106) किं पुनरुक्तम् ।
सत्यपि प्राक्तनकविस्मृतये नूतनत्व भवत्येवैकद्व्यकारानुप्रहादित्ये-
तावति तावत्यर्थं हि वृत्तिमन्वशाधिकं नान्यम् ।

किंरक्षीवैषम्यकरो मम पुत्र एतेन कालेन विनिपातनसमर्थः ।

P 237 इत्युत्पत्त्या तया कृतो वधा काण्डकरहृदकं वहति ॥

इत्युत्तान¹ एवावमर्षं । मायार्थस्यानालीटतैवेति² सधन्ध ।

Karika 5 अत्यन्तं ग्रहणेन निरपेक्षमावतया विप्रलम्भासाक्षां परिहरति ।

इत्युक्ता परस्परस्य, पाण्डवानामपि महापञ्चशेनाश्रुयिता
विपत्तिः, कृष्णस्यापि व्याघ्राद्विपत्तिः इति सर्वस्यापि³ विरसा

P 238 धस्तानमिति । मुख्यतयेति यद्यपि 'धर्मे चाथ च काने
च मोक्षे च'⁴ इत्युक्तं⁵ तथापि कलारथकारा एवमाहुः — यद्यपि
धर्मार्थकामाना सर्वेषां तादृक् नास्ति⁶ यदत्र न विद्यते तथापि
पर्यन्तविरसत्त्वमैवावलोक्यताम् । मोक्षे तु वदूप तस्य सारता
सैव निवार्यतामिति । यथा यथेति लौकिकान्तरमात्रं यनेन
संभावमानं धर्मार्थ⁷कामतत्ताधनतत्त्वञ्च यस्तु भूतजगन्निमित्तमपि
येन केनार्जनरक्षणव्यादिना प्रसारेणा⁸धारवस्तुस्थे प्रजातादि-
वद्विपत्तेरिति श्रुतं विपरीतं मप्यते । आत्मा तस्य स्वरूप
चित्तेत्यर्थः⁹ । तेन तेन प्रकारेणात्र शोचन्त्यै विरामो प्राप्य
इत्यनेन तत्त्वज्ञानोपशान्तिं निवेदं शान्तराम्भ्यानि सूचयता तत्सर्वं

1 इत्युक्ता म—A and B

2 यथासंख्यं आलीटतैवेति—B 3 B omits यपि

4 धर्मे चाथ च काने च मोक्षे च भरवदन ।

अद्विष्टास्ति तद्वन्तं यद्विष्टास्ति न तत् कश्चित् ॥

5 धर्मकामा दुःखनास्ति—B

6 यथासंख्यं यथा—A

7 A omits प्रकारेण

8 कस्यचित् —A सूक्ष्माग्ने—B 9 तत्त्वज्ञानार्थ—A

सर्वेतराभारतप्रतिपादनेन प्राधान्यसुहम् । ननु शृङ्गारवीरादि-
धमन्कारोऽपि तत्र भावोद्व्यापदृष्टाद्—पारमार्थिकेति । भोग्यामि
निवेशिना लोभवासनाविष्टानामङ्गभूतेऽपि रणे तथागमिनां यथा
शरीरे प्रभातृत्वान्निभान प्रमत्तुर्गोणावतनमाप्तेऽपि । केयले
ष्विति परमेश्वरभक्त्युपकरणेषु तु न दोष इत्यर्थः । विभूतिषु
रागिणो गुणेषु^१ च निधिष्वधिषो मा भूतेति सङ्गच्छ । अप्र
इत्यनुक्रमण्यनन्तरं चो भारते प्रत्यस्तत्वेत्यर्थः । ननु बहुदेवाय-
वासुदेव इत्युच्यते, न परमेश्वर परमात्मा महादेश इत्याशङ्क्याद्
—वासुदेवसंज्ञाभिधेयत्वेनेति ।

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बहुना ज-मनामन्ते ज्ञाननाम्नां प्रपद्यते ।

वासुदेव सर्वम्^२ (Bhagavadgītā vii 19)

इत्यादौ अस्मिन्संज्ञाभिधेयमिति निर्णीतं^३ सात्पर्यम् ।
निर्णीतञ्चेति शब्दा^४ हि नित्या एव सन्त्योऽनन्तरं शक्यतालोच
यस्याद् रुपा सकेतित्वा इत्युक्तं श्रुत्यन्धकारुण्डिपुत्रभ्यर्थेयञ्च
(Panini iv 1 114) । शास्त्रमय इति तत्तात्प्रादयोभा
भावे पुरोधार्थं इत्ययमेव^५ व्यपदेश सोऽर, व्यस्तकारणोऽपि तु रव
व्यपदेश इति भावः । एतच्च धर्म्यकारेण तत्त्वास्तोके विवक्ष्योक्तम् ।
इह त्वस्य न मुख्योऽनन्तर इति भास्वान्वित्प्रसिद्धम् । सुतरामे
वेति यदुक्तं तत्त हेतुमाह—प्रसिद्धिश्चेति । य शब्दो वस्त्रादर्थं,
यत् इय लीङिषी प्रसिद्धिः । अनादितो भवव्याप्तादीनामयमेवा^६

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१ शीकवाङ्मिका विष्टानामङ्ग—B A reads चात्र instead of चात्र

२ गुणेषु—A

३ वासुदेव सर्वम् न सर्वम्—B

४ च ति—B and C

५ निर्णीत—A

६ शब्दो—A which reads एव after this

७ इत्ययमेव इत्येवमयम्—A इत्ययमेवमयम् इत्ययमेव—B

८ भवव्याप्तादीनामयमेवास्तव्यव्याप्ति—B and C

स्वच्छन्दाभिधाने आशयः । अथवा हि किञ्चाकारकसम्बन्धादी
 नारायण भगवत्स्वयेत्यादि शब्दार्थनिरूपणे च^१ तथापि एव तस्य
 भगवन्त आशय इत्यतः किं प्रमाणमिति मायः । विश्वभविद्व-
 ब्रह्मेण कालवदवै शास्त्रनय इति वानुसृतम्^२ । “रसादिभ्य
 एतस्मिन् कवि स्यादवधानवान्” (iv 5, p 237 1 14)
 इति यदुक्तं तदेव प्रसङ्गादागतभारतसर्वधनिरूपणान्तरमुपसहरति
 —तस्मात् स्थितमिति । अतः इति वच एव स्थितमत एवैदमपि
 ग्राह्ये^३ हरयते तदुपपन्नम्, अन्वया तदनुपपत्तमेव^४ । न च
 तदनुपपन्नं चास्त्वेन^५ प्रतीयते, तस्मात्तदेव कारणं रसानुगुणार्थ
 स्थितेवेत्याशयः । अलंकारान्तरेति अन्तर-शब्दो विशेष्यवाची ।
 यदि वा दितिते सदाहरणे^६ रसप्रवक्तव्यस्य विद्यमानत्वात् तद
 ऐक्यालंकारांतरशब्दः । अतः यत्सकच्छब्ददर्शनाद्यतीतमानं यदेक
 सुतके जलनिधिसन्निधानं ततो मुनेर्माहात्म्यप्रतिपत्तिरिति न
 रसानुगुणेनार्थेन ह्यावा बोधितेत्याशङ्क्याह—अस्य हीति । मन्वेव
 प्रतीयमानं जलनिधिदर्शनमेवाद्भुतानुगुणं भवदिति रसानुगुणोऽस्य^७
 वाच्योऽर्थ इत्यस्मिन् शे स्थितिरनुदाहरणमत्राह—क्षुभा इति ।
 पुनः पुनश्चर्चननिरूपणादिना यत् पिष्टपिष्टत्वादति^८ निर्भिन्नरस-
 मित्यर्थः । बहुतरतश्चम्पापकं चैतदिति दर्शयति^९—न चेत्या
 दिना । रस्यार्थं तुल्यार्थेन वाक्यान्तीयेन^{१०} प्रतिपन्नं साम्प्रत्येन

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1 Omitted in B

2 वाच्यतम्—A

3 यत्तद्वर्तते—A and B

4 तदनुपपत्तमेव—A

5 तदनुपपत्तावास्त्वेन—B

6 सदाहरणे—A and B

7 तदुपो च—B

8 पिष्टत्वादति—A

9 Omitted in B—A

10 एवमन्वाक्यान्तीयेन Hemacandra *Deśa* & v 15

स पार्श्वोऽद्यापि सुमय तस्या येनास्त्विकान्तः^१ । रसप्रतीतिरिव
 परस्परहेतुकश्चकारप्रतीतिः । अस्यार्थस्य रसानुगुणत्वव्यतिरेक
 द्वारेण दृढवति—सा त्वामित्यादिना । “धनेर्यं सगुणीभूत
 ज्येष्ठपस्याश्वा प्रदर्शितः” इत्युद्योतारम्भे य^२ श्लो^३ (10 : p
 234 : 5) उक्तं धनेरप्यनाश्वोना प्रतिमागुणोऽनयो^४ भव
 तीत्येव भागो व्याख्यात इत्युपसङ्हरवि—तदेयमित्यादिना ।
 सगुणीभूतज्येष्ठपस्येत्यमुं भागं व्याकटे—गुणीभूतेत्यादिना ।
 निप्रमेदो^५ वस्त्वन्नकाररसात्मना यो व्यक्तास्तस्य यापेक्षा वाच्यी
 गुणीभावस्त्येव । उक्तं सर्वे ये धनिभेदास्तेषां गुणोभावा
 दानन्वयमिति तदाह—अतिविस्तरेति^६ । स्वयमिति क्व वस्तुना
 व्यङ्ग्येन गुणीभूतेन भवावम्, सख्यपि पुराणार्थस्पर्शे । यथा^७ सर्वे^८

भगवद्भिरुत्तरद्वये वक्त्रमक्षररागागवाण्यु चत्पाण ।

तत्त्वमेतत्तु विद्यादियथा विस्वामध्वो नि नुत्तमिच्छम् ॥^९(2)

रमननरतमर्थांश्च खनसीति^१ श्रीशार्ङ्गलक्षणं वस्तु ध्वन्यमान
 वाच्योपस्कारकं भवत्वं ददामि खयपि पुराणवद्विस्तृष्टेऽर्थे ।
 तथा हि पुराणो^२ भाषा

१ येनास्त्विकान्तः—A 2 Omitted in A

३ न पर्याप्तो—C

४ Abhinava apparently accepts the reading of न an
 य in the text 5 The text reads अतिविस्तरे

६ Omitted in A.

७ B reads, भगवद्भिरुत्तरद्वये वक्त्रमक्षररागागवाण्यु चत्पाण ।
 तत्त्वमेतत्तु विद्यादियथा विस्वामध्वो नि नुत्तमिच्छम् । C reads
 भगवद्भिरुत्तरद्वये वक्त्रमक्षररागागवाण्यु चत्पाण । Both correct

८ सख्यपि—B

९ श्रीशार्ङ्ग—B

पाइअणकरपरपरसआरणसअसोसहसरीर ।

अस्या भिन्नरूपरत्ना सत्यावस्था मन्तव्य ॥¹ (2)

P 240 अलकारेण व्यक्तेन वाच्योपकारेण^१ वचत्वम् । तथा ममैव

यसं तमत्तालिपयपरोपमा

कथासुखस्य विषयस्य च

रसखानंभूभागपरायमासुरा ५

कृणु तदेते न मनो^१विरहये ॥

अज्ञातेष्वेकं विभावयत्या वा' गन्धमानाभ्या वाच्यमुपपत्तुत
मिति न कश्चम्. गत्वपि पुराणार्थयोगित्ते । तथा' पुराणं श्री

शतपथब्राह्मणम् ॥

पञ्चैतानि दिग्दर्शने दार्ढ्ये विदुषामपि ।

इति । व्यक्तेष्वन^{११} रक्षेन^{१२} शुशीगृहेन नाच्योपस्कारेण नवत्नम्,^{१३}
यथा मतेष

महा नैय मूर्ध्नि च दशपत्नी कालभुजः

कृष्यान्ध^{१३} कृत्तारै स्फुटकरल^{१४}पेनै प्रशिरति ।

१. चारुचरपरपरमवारचलययीमद्वरीरा । अर्था किं
चतुर्वा मथामता सन्धी—A इत्यचरपरपरमवारचलययी
मद्वरीरा । अर्था किंचररणी मथोपनी सन्धीर—B C
reads किं वक्तुं पथा in the second line

२ वाच्योपकारि—४ ३ अक्षयि—५ ४ अक्षयि—४

5. मन्त्र—A, मन्त्र—B 6. चतुष्टयमेव—B and C

7 Omitted in B 8 -सुपस्कन्धमिति—B

9 This sentence and the following verse omitted in A

20 ॥ अथ १-८

११ एच-८

xx. This line is omitted in A. 13 वाच्य A; ४ वाच्य—B.

14. **अन्य-१३**

उदेन¹ उपस्यत्यथ च मुक्तिर्मन्वद्दय

शिवोपाय नेच्छन् यत नत सुधीर क्षन्तु जन ॥

अगाम्यतेन मन्त्रेण वाच्यमुपपद्यत शान्तैरुपप्रतिपत्त्यज्ञात्वा²

आहभयतीति जवायम्, सत्वमसिन् पुराणश्रीरे

जराजीर्णशरीरेऽग्निम् वैराग्य बल जायते ।

तन्मूषन³ हृदये मृत्युर्दृढ नास्तीति निश्चय ॥

सत्वपीत्यादि कारिकाया उपस्कार⁴ । मीन् पादन्⁵
स्पष्टान् मत्वा ह्यर्थं पाद व्याख्यातुं पठति—यदीति⁶ । विद्यमानो
ह्यसौ प्रतिभाशुण्ड उक्तलोका भूयान्भवति, न च तस्मात्तत्र वेदार्थः ।
तस्मिन्निति जनन्तीमूले प्रतिभाशुणे । न किञ्चिदेवेति ह्यर्थं
हि पुराणवर्णनेन स्पष्टमिति किमिदानीं वर्यं यत् स्वेवैर्गुणा
व्यापार स्यात् । अतः अपि सर्वमपूर्व⁷ नास्ति तद्यथाप्युक्ति
परिपाकमुक्त्वा⁸ नारायणपरमार्थवन्मच्छाया नरा न्ना भविष्यति यदि
वेदने चम्यन्तराणां सरम्भ इत्याशङ्क्याह—अन्धच्छायाश्रीतिः ।
अर्धद्वयं⁹ शुद्धोन्मूलकस्य प्रभावभूतत्वात्¹⁰ च । वेदीय इति
निकटतरम्, इदंशानुप्रवेशो न¹¹ भवतीत्यर्थः । अत्र हेतुमाह—
एव सतीति । अतुरत्य समाप्तमप्यत्र । मधुरत्वमपाह्न्यम् ।
तथाविधानमिति अपूर्वबन्ध¹² व्यायायुक्तानामपि । एतेषां
निबन्धा¹³ निबन्धने परकृतकाम्यव्यवहार एव स्यादित्यस्यान¹⁴

॥ 240

Kāṇḍa 6

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| 1 तदेतान्—B | 2 उपपद्यतयासौ—A |
| 3 उपस्यत्यथ—A | 4 उपेन—A and B |
| 5 उपकार—B | C is not available after this |
| 6 त्रिपादाय—A | 7 यदीति—B यदि—A |
| 8 अपरं पुन—A | 9 शुद्ध—A and B |
| 10 अपहृता—A | 11 Omitted in B |
| 12 अपेक्षेन—B | 13 अपेक्षेन—B |
| 13 अपेक्षेन—A | 14 एतेषां निबन्धानाम्—B A simply reads एतेषां निबन्धने |
| | 15 आदिप्रकाराणि—B |

पूर्वतमाश्रयस्वीयम् । ववनीयं काव्यं तस्य मात्रं काव्यत्वम् ।
न तस्य¹ मावप्रत्ययान्ताद्भावनप्रत्यय इति शङ्कितव्यम् ।

Kārika 2

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प्रतिपादयितुमिति प्रसङ्गादिति शेषः² । यदि वा
वाच्यं तावद्विधिष्वन्वयोपपद्ये, तदेव चेदनन्तम्, तद्वलादेव
व्यङ्ग्यत्वान्न³ भवतीत्यनेनान्निप्रत्ययेवं प्रकृतमेवोच्यते—शुद्ध-
स्येति । व्यङ्ग्यनिर्णयो नो व्यापारस्तत्सर्त⁴ विनाध्यानन्य
स्वरूपभावेत्येव । यथास्तु तथा स्वरूपेणान्त⁵ सत्वात् व्यङ्ग्यतोति
भावः । ननु सर्वथा तत्त व्यङ्ग्यं वासीति मन्तव्यम्, धातु-
मूलकद्रव्यभावे वाच्यव्यवहारहाने⁶ । तथा⁷ चोदाहरणेषु
रसकने चक्रानो⁸ प्रत्येव । आदि-प्रहणं व्याचष्टे—स्वालक्षण्य⁹-
रूपेति स्वाभावेत्यर्थः, यथा रूपस्यस्योत्तीर्णकालस्यबोरेष्टद्वय-
निष्ठबोरेकद्रव्यस्येव ।

न च तेषां घटत्वेऽपि¹⁰ यत्तै रसवन्त्वे कथमपि पुनरुक्ताः ।

ये विज्ञप्ताः प्रियाणामर्थो वा मुकविवाणोचाम् ॥

पकाराभ्यामतिविलम्बं सृज्यते । कथमपीति प्रत्येन विचार्य
मात्रं पौनरुक्त्यं न लभ्यमिति यावत्¹¹ । प्रियाणामिति
बहुवचनो हि सुमगो राधावल्लभप्रयत्नात्माः क्वमिती परिभोग-
सुमग्युपभुजानोऽपि न विभ्रमपौनरुक्त्यं¹² पश्यति । तदा एतदेव
प्रियप्रवमुच्यते यदाह¹³

1 अथा—B

2 तत्र स्वचंन—B

3 मूलकद्रव्यवन्तर—B

4 तदा—B

5 यथावो—B

6 व्याचक्षिपत्—A and B

7 विधि—B

8 'पौनरुक्त्यं' कश्चित् तदा घटदेव प्रियाणामुच्यते यदा न च यथा
मिति यावत्—B, a confusion with the locs which
follow9 B omits due to the above confusion, the sentence
from तदा to यदाह

चक्षे चक्षे यमवतामुपैति

तदेव रूपं रमणीयताया । (Magha iv 17)

इति । प्रियाणामिति वाचसागरः प्रवहदूतोऽयं^१ कान्तानां
विधर्मविशेषः यः^२ नवनव एव रस्यते । न ह्ययं श्रुतिवचनादि-
वदन्यत् सिद्धिः, केन सत्सादरयास्तुनरकृतां गच्छेत् । यत्
तु निखर्गोद्भूयमानमदनादुरविकासमात्रं उदिति नवनवम् ।
तद्वत्पर्यायशिक्षान्वयेन निरुपदिष्टागुणनिबन्धमूढं काव्यार्थं इति
भावः । तत्र यदिति अत्रात्रात्र व्यङ्ग्यस्पर्शनेन विचित्रतां परां
ममतां नाम तावदिति^३ तु समावेनैव सा विचित्रतेति तावद्वन्द्व-
स्माभिप्रायः । तन्निमित्तानां चेति श्रुत्यादिनां छात्रभूत
परानुभूतानां यत्तमान्यं तदेव विशेषान्तररहितं तन्मात्रं तस्या-
भ्येष्टः । न^४ हि तैरिति कविभिः । एतच्छास्त्रासमावधार्यं
सुहृत् । प्रत्यक्षदर्शनेऽपि हि

शब्द^५ सकेतितं प्राहुर्व्यवहाराय स स्मृतं^६ ।

तदा सत्तत्त्वञ्च शक्तिं सकेतस्तेन तत्तं^७ यः

इत्यादियुक्तिभिः सामान्यमेव स्पष्टयते । किमिदमविधमानार्थं
पीनरूप^८ कर्म^९ प्रामाणिके^{१०} शब्दोक्तमिति भावः । तमेव
प्रकलयति—न चेदिति । उक्तिर्हीति^{११} सर्वव्याप्तत्वेन यत्किं^{१२}
विशेषस्तत्पर्यायान्तरैरविकलतत्त्वोपनिबधे^{१३} पीनरूपकव्यामिमांशे व

१ प्रवाहदूतो कीदृशं—A

२ निबध—A ३ Omitted in A ४ तावति—A

५ Omitted in A ॥ शब्द—A and B

७ व्यवहारासमस्तत्त्व—A ८ शब्दोक्तम्—A

९ सर्वव्याप्तत्वेन यत्किं—A १० Omitted in A

११ प्रामाणिके—A १२ उक्तिर्हीति—A १३ अव्ययुक्ति—A

१४ निबन्धोपनिबधे—A

भवति तस्माद्विशिष्टान्वयप्रतिपादकतैवोक्तेश्चोप इति भावः ।
 ग्राह्यविशेषेति¹ ग्राह्यं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैर्यो विशेषस्तस्य यो भेदः ।
 तेनायमर्थः—यदास्मात् वाक्यं सामान्यं वा² तद्वि वाचोदे³ वा
 यत् कृत्वापि वस्तुनि सत्यं⁴ । किमनेन वादात्तरेण ।
 वाक्यान्विशेषः⁵ प्रतीयत इति कस्यास वादिनो विमर्शः⁶ ।
 अन्विताभिधानतद्विषयवत्तत्त्वमेवप्रतिपादि⁷ वाक्यार्थपक्षेण सर्वत्र
 विशेषस्याप्रत्याहयेयत्वादुक्तिर्नैचिष्य च न पर्यायत्वमात्रं⁸ इव
 मित्युक्तम् । अन्यत् यत्तत्प्रत्युतास्मात् पक्षसायकमित्याह—किं
 चेति । पुनरिति भूय इत्यर्थः । उपमानं हि विम⁹प्रतिम
 च्छत्तप्रतिविम्बप्रतिष्ठायाद्युक्त्यन¹⁰राभासादिभिर्विविक्तानिर्दिष्टानि¹¹
 विचित्राभिव्यक्त्येव । वस्तुत एतासांशुक्रानाम¹² यैचिष्यस्य
 विद्यमानत्वाभिप्रेतेन भाग¹³—योगादि निध-शब्दस्यदुकातरया
 प्रतिमं शब्द इत्येव सर्वत्र वाच्यम्¹⁴ । केवल¹⁵ यैविक¹⁶ (1) काव्य
 टोका¹⁷ परिवर्तीतनदीराभ्यादेभ्यः पर्यायवचन इति भावः । एवमर्थो
 नन्य¹⁸ मर्तव्यरात्रन्त्य च गणितिविवचिष्याङ्गवति¹⁹ । अत्रवापि
 च तस्योक्तं मन्तीति दर्शयति—भणितिश्रमेति । प्रतिनिधत्वाया
 भाषाया पोषरो वाच्यो बोध्य²⁰ लाङ्कृत यैविष्य तद्विवचन²¹

1 The text reads वाङ्मयिषः ।

2 च—A

3 वाचोदेव—A

4 वस्तुवचन—B

5 वाक्यान्विशेषः तस्य यो भेदः—B ॥ वादिनोद्विषति—B

7 अन्विता—B 8 वाच्य—B 9 निरुक्त—A

10 विचित्राभि विविचिष्य—A 11 एतासां श्रुतौ—B

12 यैविष्यवचन—B 13 वाच्य—B

14 केवल वा—B केवल—A 15 यैविक—A

16 वाच्यविषय—B 17 एवमर्थवचन—A

॥ योवरैरवाच्यो—A, B and C यो affect वाच्यो and reads
 वाच्योद्वेग 19 विचित्राभि विचिष्य—A and B

निमित्तं सत्य । अलङ्काराणां काव्यार्थानां चानन्त्य¹ । तत्त्वमभूत्²
मलितिवैचित्र्ये कर्तृभूतमापादयतीति संबन्धः । कर्मणो विरोधस्य
पक्षेन³ हेतुर्दर्शितः ।

मम मम इति मण्यतो मज्जति कालो जनस्य ।

तथापि न देवो जनार्दनो गोनरो मज्जति ममनो मधुमयन ॥
इति । ओजस्वरत मज्जति सत्यं न देवो मनोगोचरो भवतीति
विरोधात्कारण्यत्वात् संबन्धसाधनाय नहं नहं इत्यनया मणित्वा
समुन्नेषिता ।

अथत्वादिविभिन्नानां वाच्यानां विनिवन्धकम्⁴ ।

P 243-44

भूमेव त्वयते सद्ये⁵ तत्तु भाति⁶ रसाभ्यात् ॥

Kārika 8

इति कारिका⁷ । अन्यस्तु अन्यो मण्योपस्कारः । अथ च
पादत्रयस्त्वायंमनूय चतुर्वेदाद्यर्थोऽपूर्वतवामिधौवते—तस्वित्यादि ।
शान्तीनामित्यन्तत कारिकयोर्मण्योपस्कारः⁸ ।

द्वितीयकारिकायास्तुरीया वाच्ये व्याचष्टे—यथा हीति । P 244

सयादास्त्विति⁹ कारिकाया अर्थम्, नैकरूपतेति द्वितीयम् । Kārika 10-11
विभिन्नं राजाशेखनिग्रामेणाराधयते—कथमिति चेदिति ।

सयादो¹⁰ ह्यन्यसाद्वर्त्यं तत्तुनं प्रतिविम्बवत् ।

आशेखयाकारवत्तुल्यदेहिबन्ध शरीरिणाम् ॥

Kārika 12

1 वाच्यवन्ध—B 2 तत्त्वम्—B 3 संबन्ध—B

4 विनिवन्धक—B 5 सद्येत—B 6 भासते—A

7 Omitted by B The Kārika reads differently in the text.

8 Abhinava's reading of the text here is interesting

9 B is corrupt here and reads वापादस्त्विति कारिकाया वि
प्रतिबिम्बवत्तुल्यदेहिबन्ध शरीरिणाम् इति चेदिति ।

10 सयादो—B

इत्यन्या कारिका । एषा अष्टादीकृत्य वृत्ते पठिता ।
शरीरिणामित्वं¹ च शब्दः प्रतिवाक्यं द्रष्टव्य इति दर्शितम् ।
शरीरिण इति पूर्वमेव प्रतितन्व्यस्वरूपतया प्रधानभूतस्येत्यर्थः ।

Kārikā 13

तत्र पूर्वमनन्यात्म तुच्छात्म तद्वन्तरम् ।

तृतीयं² तु प्रसिद्धात्म नान्यत्वात्³ रणजेन्द्रविः ॥

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इति कारिका । अत्रान्यं पुर्वमनिबद्धवाच्यादात्मा स्वभावो यस्य
तदनन्यात्म⁴ । तेन रूपेण याति तत्राक् विस्मृष्टमेव⁵ । यथा
स्वेन रूपेण प्रतिधिम्बं याति तेन रूपेण विम्बमेव । तत्स्वत्वं तु
शरीरिणमित्याह—शरीरिणशरीरस्यमिति । न हि तेन
निबिडपूर्णमुत्प्रेक्षितम्, प्रतिविम्बमप्येवमेव । एवं प्रथमं प्रकारं
भ्याम्बत्वं द्वितीयं भ्याचष्टे—तद्वन्तरं त्विति । द्वितीयमिदमर्थः ।
अन्तेन तान्त्र्यं यस्य उपमा । तुच्छमस्मेति अनुकारे अनुकार्यं⁶—
बुद्धिरेव चित्तपुस्तकादाविव न तु सिन्दूरादिवुद्धिः स्फुरति । सापि
न पातकायेति भावः । यतदेवेति तृतीयस्य रूपस्य न स्वात्मत्वम् ।

Kārikā 14

आत्मनोऽन्यस्य⁷ वद्भावे पूर्वमित्यनुयाय्यवि ।

मस्तु भावितव्यं तस्याः⁸ राशिच्छावमिश्रावचम् ॥

इति कारिका वृत्ते अष्टादीकृत्य पठिता । वेदुचित्तुस्तकेषु कारिका
अस्तिदृष्टा एव दृश्यन्ते । आत्मन इत्यस्य शब्दस्य पूर्वपठिता-
भ्यामेव तत्त्वस्य सारभूतस्यैवि पदाम्बायर्थो निरूपितः ।

1 शरीरिणमिति अन्य—B, शरीरिणमित्वं च—A

2 तृतीयं—B

3 प्रसिद्धात्मना अन्यत्वात्—A ; प्रसिद्धात्मना नाम्ना—B

4 तदनन्यात्मा—A and B

5 तदस्मृष्टमेव—B

6 अनुकारेऽनुकार्यं—B

7 The text reads तत्त्वत्वान्वया B The text reads तत्त्वत्वाः

ससवादानामिति¹ पाठ, सवादानामिति² तु पाठे वाक्याय
रूपाणां ससुदयानां³ ये सवादास्तेषामिति । वैयधिरस्येन
सप्ततिर्वस्तु शब्देन⁴ ।

एको द्वौ वा त्रयो वा चतुरादयो⁵ वा षडानामर्थः । तानि
त्विति अचुराणि षडानि च तान्येवेति तेन रूपेण युक्तानि,
मनागन्धस्पर्शताम्रगन्धानांलक्ष्यं । एवमचुरादित्वेनेति द्वा-त
भागं श्वाहत्याजं दर्शयितुं योजयति—तथैवेति । श्लोपादि
विषयानि(नी)ति⁶ श्लोपादिषमावाति(नी)लक्ष्यं । सप्ततेर्वालि
गुणद्विजातयो हि शम्भो⁷ पूर्वपूर्वेरपि कविसहस्रं रत्नेषु
पद्याया निबध्यन्ते । निबद्धाश्च चन्द्रादयश्चोपमानत्वेन⁸ । तथैव
पदार्थरूपाणीत्यत्र नापूर्वाणि यद्यपि तु शक्यन्त इत्यादि
विशेष्यन्तीत्यत्र आहूतं वाक्यमनुसंधनीयम् ।

Kāśka 15

लोकस्येति व्याचष्टे—सप्तदयानामिति । अमत्कृतिरिति
आलादप्रपातबुद्धिरित्यर्थः । अभ्युज्झिहीत इति व्याचष्टे—
उत्पद्यते उदयतीत्यर्थः । कुङ्करोवाकार⁹ दर्शयति—स्फुरणेषु
काव्येति ।

Kāśka 16

यदपि तदपि¹⁰ इत्यत्र लोकस्य निश्चितं

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स्फुरितमिदमितीयं बुद्धिरभ्युज्झिहीते ।

Kār 1A 16

1 सप्तदयानामिति—B, सवादानामिति—A

2 सप्तदयानामिति—A, सवादानामिति—B

3 Abhinava apparently accepts the reading of व in the text 4 सप्तदयानामिति—B 5 Repeated by A

6 The text reads श्लोपादिषमावाति A reads वाति after this 7 शम्भो—A

8 चन्द्रादयश्चोपमानत्वेन—A 9 कुङ्करोवाकार—B

10 Omitted by B

अनुगतमपि पूर्वच्छायया वस्तु तादृक्
मुकविरूपनिबन्धन्यता¹ नैव याति² ॥

इति कारिका अष्टोक्त्य पठिता ।

स्वविषय इति सय तादृक्तातिशयेन स्फुरित इत्यर्थः ।
परसादामेच्छेत्वादि द्वितीय रसोक्तार्थं पूर्वावस्थारेख सह पठति ।

परसादामेच्छाविरतमनसो वस्तु मुकुते

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Katika 17

इति तृतीय पादः । कुत सत्त्वपूर्वमानयामीत्याशयेन निरुपयोग्य
परोपनिषदवस्तुबोधको वा स्वादित्वादाहृषाह—स्वरस्यत्यैवेति ।
कारिकायां कुतवेति विज्ञातावेक्षणमनमित्यभिप्रायेण व्याचष्टे—
‘मुकवीनामिति’³ । एतदेव स्पष्टयति—प्राक्तनेत्यादिना तेषां
मित्र्यतेन । आपिर्भावगवीति सूत्रात्त्वर्थः । इतीति कारिका-
तत्त्वानिस्संगेनेत्यर्थः ।

Concluding
verses

अकिंश रसामयेण उक्तिः ये गुणालकाराख्यत⁴ शोभा या
ता विभति बाध्यम् । तद्वानमम्वकिंशो यो रसः सैकादिकवस्तुदा-
यनस्तत्कृतो यो गुणानां सौकुमार्यद्वयावस्तुसौम्यप्रवृत्तीनामलकार-
पर्याप्तताकारण्येन च या शोभा यो विभतिः । यस्मादिति⁵
काव्यादुपायात् । सर्वे समीक्षितमिति स्फुरतिर्गतिरिति ताप-
लक्षकमित्यर्थः । एतच्च सप्त धामेन निवृत्तलोकमिति श्लोकार्थं
भातः प्रामाण्यम् । सुहृतिमिरिति⁶ ये कष्टोपदेशेन दिनापि

1 विषय निबन्धन—A

2 The text reads योपयाति

3 The text reads मुकवित्वाहृषाह

4 निबन्धनद्वारेण—A

5 सतो—A. B is corrupt and reads सनेवा .

6 यस्मादिति—B 7 सुहृदिष B, which drops this
line from here to the end of the poem .

यथानिष¹पत्तयाज² तैरित्यर्थः । अखिलसौख्यधानीति चक्षितं
 इ³च्छतेतेनाम्बननुविद्धं यन्मोक्षं तस्य यात्रि⁴ एकमस्तन
 शक्यं । सर्वथा प्रिय सर्वथा च हितं दुर्लभं जनवतीति⁵ भावः ।
 विबुधोद्यमं न दनं⁶ कुञ्चीनां कृतज्ज्योतिषोऽप्यदोनामेव समीहि
 ताघादननिमित्तम् । विबुधाय कम्पतस्त्वविद⁷ । दर्शित इति
 स्थितः⁸ एव सन् प्रकाशित , अप्रकाशितस्य हि यथ मोक्षत्वम् ।
 कम्पतरया⁹ उपधानं यस्य तारद्वयदिमा यस्येति बहुवीहिण्यै
 बहुसीहि । सर्वसमीहितप्राप्तिर्हि काव्यादेकवक्ता¹⁰ । एतथोक्तं
 विस्तरतः ।

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सत्काम्यतत्पन्नयवामै विर¹¹प्रयुक्त-

कर्मं भक्तं तु परिपक्वमिषां यदासीत् ।

तद् व्याकरोत्तद्दयोदयताभ्येतेरु

इति सत्कामिप्रेषप्रयोजनोपसंहारः । इह बाहुव्येन लोको लोका-
 प्रसिद्ध¹²सुभासनाप्रसङ्गस्यैव ध्वस्तये । अथ यथावन्नात्रयवै नाम
 भ्रष्टवरात् प्रसिद्धान्करीकसमाधारक¹³हिते¹⁴विद्वत्तादिसम्ब-
 द्येन भवति । तथा हि—भर्तृहरिचोदं कृतम्, यस्याप्यौदार्यं
 नहिमा¹⁵ वसन्तपद्मान्न¹⁶ एवंनिपत्ताते हरवते उभयय श्रोत-

See Locana
p 12 || 19-20

1 •इयेनापि यथा रिपयथाज—A, B omits this line

2 यान्ति—B

3 जामासीहि—A 4 कम्पतम्—B 5 जिति—B

6 •कृत्वा—A 7 काव्यादेकवक्ता—A

8 •रौर—A The text reads सत्काम्यतत्पन्नयवामै विर¹¹प्रयुक्त-

9 प्रसिद्धा—A and B 10 •सुभासनाप्रसङ्ग—A

11 यस्याप्यौदार्यं नहिमा—A 12 यथावन्नात्रयवै—B

अनुगतमपि पूर्वेष्वपि वा ननु तादृक्
मुकविषयनिष्प्रसिद्धता¹ नैव याति² ॥

इति कारिका मण्डवीकृत्य पठिता ।

सविषय इति खन वाक्यान्तिच्छेदेन स्फुरित इत्यर्थः ।
परस्यादानेच्छेत्तादि द्वितीय श्लोकार्थं पूर्वमन्वयकारेण तद् पठति ।

परस्यादानेच्छाविरतमनयो ननु मुक्ये

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Kārikā 17

इति तृतीय पादः । पुनः सत्यपूर्वमानवाचीत्याशयेन निरूपणे
परोपनिषद्वत्सुप्रजोवद्ये वा स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह—सख्यस्यैवेति ।
कारिकायां मुक्येरेति आत्मावेक्ष्ययनमित्यभिप्रायश्च व्यासदे—
मुकयोनामिति³ । एतदेव स्पष्टयति—आत्मानेत्यादिना तेषां
मिथ्यत्वेन । आत्मिर्मात्रवत्ताति चतुस्तत्त्व⁴ । इतीति कारिका-
तदुक्तिनिष्पत्तेर्नैव⁵ ।

Conclud-
ing
verses

अष्टिष्टा रसाश्रयेण खरिता ये गुणालम्बरागत⁶ शोभा या
ता निर्मातव्याभ्याम् । तद्वानमन्यकृषो यो रस सैकादिकतत्त्वदा
भयतःकृतो यो गुणानां संकुमार्यवाभावस्तत्त्वसौमन्यप्रवृत्तीनामालङ्कार
पर्यवृत्ताकारण तेन च वा शोभा ता निर्मात । यस्मादिति⁷
आध्यानुमानात् । सत्यं समीहितमिति व्युत्पत्तिर्हीतिप्रताप
लक्षणमित्यर्थः । एतच्च क्व प्रामेयं विद्वद्वोक्तमिति श्लोकार्थं
भात व्याख्यातम् । मुक्येतिमिति⁸ चे कष्टावदेशेन विनापि

1 निष्प्रसिद्धता—A

2 The text reads नोपयाति

3 The text reads यमिति वा करोति

4 निष्प्रसङ्गकारिण—A

5 खरो—A, ॥ is corrupt and reads खनेना

6 यस्मादिति—B 7 मुक्येति B, which drops the
1 ne from here to the end of येरेत्यर्थः ।

प्रपन्थ, तस्मादादरणायमिति श्लोक प्रवर्तमानो दृश्यते ।
 लोकाधारस्य प्रवर्तनीयः । तत्र^१ साधोदित^२ प्रयोजनतत्पत्तये
 तदनुप्रासाधोऽत्राप्रवर्तनाकारवाद् प्रत्यकारा लक्ष्मणनिबन्धन
 कुर्यात् । तदुमिशयेणाह—आनन्दवर्धन इति । प्रथित शब्दे
 नैतदेव प्रथितं यतरेव नामप्रवृत्तयेनाभिहितं करोति । तस्या^३
 लक्ष्यविशुद्धिना नाल गणनीयम् । निधेयप्रयोजनादेशे हि
 धुताह शोऽपि रागाधो^४ यदि निर्वर्तिते किमेतावता प्रयोजन
 मप्यम्यहमेव स्यात् । तस्यादर्शना^५ प्रवृत्त^६ नाम प्रथितमिति^७
 लिखम् ।

सुदुटीकृतार्थवैचित्र्यवदि प्रवरदाविनीम् ।

तुषीं शक्तिमद् वादे प्रत्यक्षार्थनिदर्शनीम् ॥

आनन्दवर्धनदिवेकविकारिकाव्या

लोकार्थतत्पत्तनादनुमेयगारम् ।

अप्रोम्निपत्तकलगाद्विषयप्रकाश

व्यापार्यतामिनवगुणदिलोचन तद् ॥

भीतिद्विषेत्^८ वरणाभ्यपरागपूतो

मर्ते^९ दुरात्रप्रतिपत्तकलगाद्विषयप्रकाश

काव्यप्रमाणावदेदित्युक्तम्

वेपारसो व्यरचयद् धनियस्तुष्टिम् ॥

१ Om used by B

३ वक्तव्य—A

५ *वक्तव्य—B

७ वीरविकारि—B

२ साधोदित—B

४ लो विरोधाय—A

६ प्राथितविति—A

८ वित्तम्—A

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